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One of the greatest evil of scientific discoveries in the 
mid-twentieth century is the success of American scientists, 
engaged in the Manhattam project. Infact it was a German 
initiative. But the German talent was transferred to America due 
to Hitler's anti Jewish policies and succeeded America in 
manufacturing the first ever nuclear device. Other European 
countries and Russia and China also joined the armament race. 
USSR got the second position in the race as she had detonated 
its first nuclear device in 1949. After that, Britain had tested its 
nuclear device in 1952, France in 1960, and China in 1964 test 
fired their first nuclear devices and became party to the nuclear 
weapons states. 
Its immense devastating capability was realized by almost all the 
countries of the world. Therefore, efforts for controlling and 
eliminating these weapons were started immediately after the 
Second World War. Throughout the Cold War period, a number 
of treaties and agreements were signed among the independent 
nations to reduce, control, restrict and abolish these weapons. 
But the whole Cold War period witnessed a mad arms race 
between the two superpowers. 
The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons signed on 
July 1, 1968 remains the bedrock of the post-second World War 
global non-proliferation regime. With 187 states parties, this 
Treaty is the most widely adhered to and the most successful 
multilateral arms control agreement in history. The successful 
conclusion, in 1968, of negotiations on the NPT was a landmark 
in the history of non-proliferation. 
The NPTs main objectives are to stop the further spread of 
nuclear weapons, to provide security for non-nuclear weapons 
states which have given up the nuclear option, to encourage 
international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy, and to pursue negotiations in good faith towards nuclear 
disarmament leading to the eventual elimination of nuclear 
weapons. 
The NPT is fundamental, but the broader regime is a complex 
system of multilateral and bilateral agreements, arrangements 
and mechanisms intended to promote and achieve a world 
without nuclear weapons, sooner rather than later. This was 
valid during the Cold War and remains valid today. At the same 
time, the regime is intended to provide a framework to enable 
the world to make effective use of nuclear capability for peaceful 
purposes. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was set up by 
unanimous resolution of the United Nations in 1957 to help 
nation develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Allied to 
this role is the administration safeguards arrangements. This 
provide assurance to the international community that individual 
countries are honoring their treaty commitments to use nuclear 
materials and facilities exclusively for peaceful purposes. 
The IAEA therefore undertakes regular inspections of civil 
nuclear facilities to verify the accuracy of documentation 
supplied to it. The agency checks inventories and undertakes 
sampling and analysis of materials. Safeguards are designed to 
deter diversion of nuclear materials by increasing the risk of 
early detection. They are complemented by controls on the 
export of sensitive technology from countries such as UK and 
USA through voluntary bodies such as the Nuclear Suppliers' 
Group. 
Traditional safeguards are arrangements to account for and 
control the use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key 
element is the international system which ensures that uranium 
in particular in used only for peaceful purposes. 
The IAEA therefore undertakes regular inspections of civil 
nuclear facilities to verify the accuracy of documentation 
supplied to it 
The aim of traditional IAEA safeguards is to deter the diversion 
of nuclear matenal from peaceful use by maximizing the risk of 
early detection 
IAEA safeguards together with bilateral safeguards applied 
under the NPT can, and do, ensure that uranium supplied by 
countnes such as Australia and Canada does not contribute to 
nuclear weapons proliferation. In fact the worldwide application 
of those safeguards and the substantial world trade in uranium 
for nuclear electricity make the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
much less likely 
There are also several other treaties and arrangements 
designed to reduce the nsk of civil nuclear power's contnbuting 
to weapons proliferation 
Shortly after entry into force of the NPT, multilateral 
consultations on nuclear export controls led to the establishment 
of two separate mechanisms for dealing with nuclear exports 
the Zangger Committee in 1971 and the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group (NSG) in 1975 
Though the official policy goal of the United Nations is general 
and complete disarmament, it has never been senously pursued 
because such an idea runs into tremendous problems of 
definition From its inception commentators have tended to use 
"arms control" as a synonym for "disarmament" and then judged 
arms control by the degree of disarmament occurring at any 
particular time, there are crucial differences in the meaning and 
approach to the two terms 
Arms control came into being partly in response to the advent of 
the nuclear "balance of terror" and partly as a response to a 
perceived failure of the disarmament approach in the years 
immediately before and after World War II. In 1945, 
While disarmament was seen as an alternative to military 
strength, arms control was seen as a complement to it, since 
both enhance national and international security in different 
ways. While proponents of disarmament saw the existence of 
weapons as a cause of arms races and war, arms control was 
felt to represent a recognition of the continuing utility of military 
power in the modern world and the new arms controllers 
believed that there was no simple cause and effect relationship 
between the possession of weapons and the outbreak of war as 
armaments were ever present features in the landscape of 
international politics and they were as much a part of the peace-
time as well as the war-time environment. 
Throughout the cold war period, the armament race between 
the Soviet Union and the United States was controlled by a 
number of bilateral agreements. The US-Soviet/Russian 
agreements are: the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic 
missile systems or ABM Treaty (signed 1972); the treaty on the 
limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests or Threshold 
Test Ban Treaty/ TTBT (signed 1974); the treaty on underground 
nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes or the Peaceful 
Nuclear Explosions Treaty/PNET (signed 1976); the treaty on 
the elimination of intermediate range and shorter-range missiles 
or INF Treaty (signed 1987); the treaty on the reduction and 
limitation of strategic offensive arms or START I Treaty (signed 
1991); and the treaty on further reduction and limitation of 
strategic offensive arms or START II Treaty (signed 1993). 
John Kennedy tried to revive efforts to eliminate nuclear 
weapons. On September 25, 1961, he presented to the UN a 
"Program for General and Complete Disarmament", "The 
weapons of war must be abolished", he said, "before they 
abolish us". His ambitious plan included all the elements that 
negotiators still pursue today: a comprehensive nuclear test 
ban; a ban on the production of fissionable materials for use in 
weapons (plutonium and highly enriched uranium); the 
placement of all weapons materials under international 
safeguards; a ban on the transfer of nuclear weapons, their 
materials or their technology; and deep reductions in existing 
nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, with the goal of 
eventually eliminating them. 
During the 1980s and early 1990s the Regan administration 
developed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) which was an 
Anti Ballistic Missile System. The concept was to form a 
defensive shield against the nuclear attack from the Soviet 
Union. The popular press designated the program as "Star 
Wars" and was often critical of its extreme cost. The initial focus 
of the SDI was a nuclear explosion powered X-Ray laser 
designed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory by a 
young scientist named Peter Haglestein who worked with a team 
called O Group, doing much of the work in the late seventies 
and early eighties. O Group was headed by physicist Lowell 
Wood, a friend of Edward Teller, the "father of the Hydrogen 
bomb". In 1983 President Reagan was told of Hagelstean's 
breakthrough by Teller, which prompted Reagan's 'Star War' 
speech on March 8, 1983. 
Though the program initially focused on large scale systems 
designed to defeat a Soviet offensive strike. However, as the 
threat diminished, the program shifted towards smaller systems 
designed to defeat limited or accidental launches. By 1987 the 
SDIO developed a national missile defense concept called the 
Strategic Defense System Phase-1 Architecture. This concept 
consisted of ground and space based sensors and weapons , as 
well as central battle management system. The ground based 
systems operational today trace their roots back to this concept. 
In his 1991 State of the Union address George H. W Bush 
shifted the focus of SDI from defence of North America against 
large scale strikes to a system focusing on theatre missile 
defense called Global Protection Against Limited Strike. 
(GPALS). 
Reagan's vision of missile defense turned this address into one 
of the most controversial and influential presidential speeches of 
the 1980s. Some political analysts argue that by dramatically 
raising the stakes in the military competition between the US 
and the Soviet Union, Reagan's missile defense program paved 
the way for the success of later arms reduction talks. 
In subsequent decades, the notion of effective missile defence 
was gradually displaced by the principle of nuclear deterrence 
(appropriately known as MAD, for Mutually Assured 
Destruction). However, in the late 1970s, interest in strategic 
defence systems re-emerged in certain scientific, military and 
political circles which exerted a strong influence on Reagan, who 
was already opposed to the concept of offence-based nuclear 
deterrence and genuinely concerned about the vulnerability of 
the US in the event of a nuclear attack. 
Since the end of the Cold Was, a number of arms control 
advocates, politicians, and military officers have argued that the 
United States should substantially reduce its reliance upon 
nuclear weapons. Taking that argument to an extreme, a loosely 
knit group of retired military officers, scientists, and defense 
intellectuals maintains that the elimination of nuclear weapons 
should be an explicit goal of the United States.'The abolitionists 
contend that the only plausible use of nuclear weapons is to 
deter nuclear attack and that getting rid of nuclear weapons 
would eliminate this rationale. Although those holding more 
moderate views find this argument impractical, they too are 
ambivalent about nuclear deterrence, claiming that the risk of 
accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons 
outweighs any conceivable benefit. Some abolitionists and many 
military officers maintain that conventional precision-guided 
munitions (PGMs) offer an effective alternative to nuclear 
weapons. 
The overriding interest of the United States in South Asia lies in 
the establishment of positive and constructive relations with 
India, a rising power with one sixth of the world's population. 
India is growing economically at an average annual rate of 7% , 
and is developing significant military power projection 
capabilities that will make it an increasingly important factor in 
the Asia balance of power and in global councils. 
The most sensitive issue in American relations with the South 
Asian countries especially India and Pakistan is the issue of 
nuclear non proliferation and nuclear arms control. Since the 
end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
American self image as the "only super power" has reinforced 
the American assumption that the nuclear club should be 
restricted to its five present members and that the United States 
is entitled to have the biggest-and best-nuclear arsenal in order 
to preserve international stability. In pressing India and Pakistan 
to sign the NPT, the United States has presented its position in 
benign, altruistic terms, emphasizing its desire to help prevent a 
nuclear war in South Asia.'^ The implication is that South Asian 
are irrational fanatics who cannot be trusted with the bomb and 
that deterrence, which was the basis of the United States 
strategic doctrine during the cold war, will not work in the 
non-Western world. Since the United States is the only country 
that has ever used nuclear weapons, this American emphasis on 
the nuclear danger in South Asia is viewed in India and Pakistan 
as at best patronizing and at worst racist. 
Despite a number of pronouncement, the United States has 
failed to give India and Pakistan concrete incentives to cap their 
nuclear weapons potential at present levels. Yet the Perry 
declaration has opened up the possibility of a pragmatic bargain 
between India and the United States that could achieve the 
capping objective and, more broadly, reduce tensions over 
nonproliferation that could threaten the stability of the 
Indo-American relationship. 
The United States for its part, would have to make clear that it is 
reconciled to India's acquisition of the nuclear weapons option 
and avoid policies suggesting that it still harbors the "rollback" 
objective. In particular, the United States would have to end its 
ban on the sale of nuclear reactors to India and other restrictions 
on United States cooperation with India's civilian nuclear power 
program, starting with restrictions on United States cooperation 
on nuclear safety. This would require amendment of the 1978 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act to allow exports of Nuclear 
technology under specified conditions. 
India tested five tests on may 11, 13, 1998 and almost a year 
later, declared herself to be a state of nuclear weapon. Rather 
than a nuclear weapon state, by disclosing to the public its draft 
nuclear Doctrine. Even before the development of an operational 
Indian nuclear force, however, a doctrinal framework for it has 
been proposed. The document proposing a Nuclear Docthne for 
India is designed to stimulate informed discussion on the 
"credible minimum deterrent". India has decided to put in place 
to safeguard its strategic autonomy. The Nuclear Doctrine Group 
of the National Security Advisory Board prepared a draft after 
detailed discussions spread over several months. This 
consensus draft a consensus document of the entire National 
Security Advisory Board. It is now for the Strategic Policy Group, 
the National Security Council and then the Cabinet to approve, 
or reject the document. 
The Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) formulated by the National 
Security Advisory Board and released for public debate by the 
departing Vajpayee government in August 1999, is a remarkable 
documents (National Security Advisory Board 1999). Not only 
has it in simple, clear language brought together very divergent 
views on the controversial issue of nuclear policy, it has shifted 
the intellectual level of debate, so heated in the aftermath of 
Pokhran-ll, from the polemical to the thoughtful. 
The DND envisages a triad of air, land and sea-based delivery 
systems whose "survivability will be enhanced by a combination 
of multiple redundant systems, mobility, dispersion and 
deception". It distinguished between an unspecified "peacetime 
deployment" and a shift to "fully employable forces" in the event 
of a conflict arising. There is an emphasis on credibility - "any 
adversary must know that Indian can and will retaliate" - and on 
effectiveness based on "reliability, timeliness, accuracy and 
weight of attack". The DND goes on to outline the requirements 
for command and control, security and safety, and research and 
development, and concludes by focusing on disarmament and 
arms control. 
Assuming that states such as India make decision according to 
realist models and are driven primarily by national security 
imperatives, Western theorists and policymakers expect that 
India should build and deploy a nuclear arsenal of sufficient 
quantity and operational quality to ensure that it could withstand 
an adversary's first strike and retaliate with enough nuclear 
force to end a war on India's terms. Indeed, according to these 
theories India should have built, deployed, and operationally 
fine-tuned such a survivable second strike arsenal long ago. 
The May 11 and 13 tests do not give India the minimum nuclear 
deterrence it intends to acquire. In order to acquire such a 
deterrence it would be necessary for India to fabricate more 
nuclear weapons, and to test and produce the Agni missile, both 
of its proven range as well as of the improved range. In addition, 
it will also become necessary for India to deploy its nuclear 
weapons and put in place the command, control and intelligence 
system, and define its new security strategy. All these may take 
a minimum of two to five years or may be even longer. It is, 
therefore, premature to declare ourselves as a nuclear weapon 
state now. 
All this must be weighed against the situation India had 
confronted in May-June 1998. An angry and shaken United 
States imposed wide-ranging sanctions against India. Japan, 
India's largest donor, cut off all new assistance and put a freeze 
on high level contacts. The G-8 industrialized nations joined the 
United States in blocking multilateral lending to India. China 
reacted with venom against India's identification of Beijing as the 
principal factor in its decision to test. The diplomatically active 
Anglo-Saxon nations, Australia and Canada led the charge 
against "a deviant India" in various multilateral forums. 
Yet in the wake of its nuclear tests, India understood that it has 
to work hard to limit the political damage from Pokhran-ll and 
find a basis to revive relations with the major powers. After it 
completed the series of five tests, India announced that it was 
ready to consider signing the CTBT, join the negotiations on the 
Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty that limits the production of 
material for nuclear weapons, and reasserted its commitment to 
prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Given the 
fact that Indian had opposed with such vehemence these very 
same ideas in the recent past, the turn around in New Delhi's 
policy was nothing less than dramatic. The focus of India's 
diplomacy since then has been a willingness to negotiate 
adherence to internationally binding obligations such as the 
CTBT in return for other political and technological gains. From 
being a "perpetual dissident" against the global nuclear order, 
India, now having converted herself into a nuclear weapons 
power, was now eager to deal. Having shed its nuclear 
ideological virginity, India will never again be the same. 
Pakistan's nuclear policy has been develop in reaction of India's 
Pokhran 1 exclosion Bhutto reacted strongly to this test and said 
Pakistan must develop its own "nuclear capability". Regarding 
the program he said; "We will defend our country using any 
means necessary and build a nuclear capability second to none. 
We will eat grass for 1000 years, if we have to, but we will get 
there." 
In fact, Pakistan's emphasis on opacity and its rejection of a 
no-first use doctrine reflects its concerns about conventional 
inferiority vis-a-vis India. Nuclear opacity and nuclear weapons 
capability are regarded as means of deterring conventional war. 
Senior officials have implied that Pakistan could resort to nuclear 
use in the event of an Indian attack, conventional or nuclear, on 
its territory. However, Pakistan refuses to officially define its 
nuclear threshold even as it rejects nuclear first use. While a 
nuclear no first use policy was a luxury for Pakistan, a 
participant pointed out India would likely reverse its no-first use 
posture during a military conflict. In any case India has already 
revised that policy to cover other unconventional attacks by 
weapons of mass destruction on Indian troops within or outside 
Indian territory. 
Pakistan's nuclear program is based primarily on highly enriched 
uranium (HEU), which is produced at the A.Q. Khan Research 
Laboratory at Kahuta, a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment 
facility. The kahuta facility has been in use since the early 
1980s. By the early 1990s, Kahuta had an estimated 3,000 
centrifuges in operation, and Pakistan continued its pursuit 
expanded uranium enrichment capabilities. 
Bhutto had been concerned with India's pursuit of the "nuclear 
option" for several years, and this was the first opportunity he 
had to put his declaration of 1965 into effect. A key motivation 
for this program was concern over India's well known progress 
toward having its own nuclear option, and the public declarations 
by key leaders in India that they must acquire nuclear arms. 
Years later, after India's 1974 nuclear test, when Pakistan's 
nuclear program became public knowledge persistent attempts 
were made to paint the weapons program as a response to the 
test. It was a response to India's developing nuclear challenge, 
but not to the Pokhran test per se. To the extent that it was a 
response to a specific event, it was a response to India's 
conventional arms superiority as manifested in its victory during 
the Bangladesh War. 
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The Bangladesh War also helped create a relationship between 
Pakistan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) or "North Korea" which would later help Pakistan 
considerably in acquiring delivery systems for its nuclear arsenal 
in the 90s. 
During mid-1971 Bhutto approached North Korea in an effort to 
obtain critically needed weapons. 
There was a widespread recognition that nuclear were 
Pakistan's only viable deterrence against an Indian conventional 
onslaught. Some strategists even urged the recapture of 
Kashmir under a nuclear umbrella. Zia became committed to the 
nuclear option as a last resort instrument to save Pakistan "with 
whole world against him," an argument made by Agha Shahi, 
then the Foreign Minister. 
Moreover, Zia saw in the acquisition of nuclear weapons a key 
instrument to break Pakistan's isolation and transform it into the 
leader of the rejuvenating Muslim World. In July 1978 he 
outlined his perception: "China, India, the USSR, and Israel in 
the Middle East posses the atomic arm. No Muslim country has 
any. If Pakistan had such a weapons, it would reinforce the 
power of the Muslim World." 
Pakistan had nuclear weapons potential in 1987, and 
operational nuclear weapons since 1988. At first, Pakistan stuck 
with Zia's doctrine of relying on nuclear weapons as the last 
resort key to Pakistan's survival against India and the USSR. 
However, at the same time, Zia-ul-Haq's pan-Islamic world view 
was expressed in the willingness to facilitate and expedite other 
Islamic, primarily Iran's, nuclear weapons program, but not at 
the expense of, or as part of, Pakistan's own strategic weapons 
programs. It was through its close cooperation with Iran, that 
Pakistan also assisted other radical states including Libya and 
North Korea. 
Despite their best efforts the supporters of the concept of 
nuclear deterrence cannot prove that nuclear weapons 
preserved the peace in Europe or elsewhere in the world. What 
can be claimed though is that they played a supporting role in 
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preserving the peace. Nor can supporters of deterrence prove 
that the many crises during the Cold War were resolved or 
contained primarily by the threat of nuclear war. The history of 
the Cold War is replete with compelling evidence of the 
pernicious effects of the open-ended quest for nuclear 
deterrence, as shown by Professors Janice Stein and Richard 
Ned Lebow in a study entitled We All Lost the Cold War 
In today's post - Cold War World, defining national security 
merely, or primarily, in military terms conveys a false sense of 
reality. Nearly half a century of Cold War fashioned the issue of 
security into powerful conventional simplifications that are no 
longer valid. Unfortunately, many of these traditional and out 
moded concepts retain great currency amongst certain security 
analysts and defense planners, and the dominance of military 
and strategic considerations in the conduct of international 
relations endures as a legacy of the Cold War. While stability 
was and continues correctly to be of prime strategic importance 
in a transforming world its pursuit by some influential countries 
places exaggerated emphasis upon nuclear weapons and 
military concepts that are presumed still to lie at its core. 
In a post-Cold War world, the political value of nuclear weapons 
has declined markedly rendering them, more a liability than an 
asset. Despite the changed political climate and the window of 
opportunity to restructure international relations away from 
reliance on nuclear weapons, many influential thinkers and 
military planners in the United States, NATO, the Russian 
Federation and in some other countries still believe in the 
integrity of nuclear deterrence- i.e. that stability and security 
would necessarily be jeopardized in the absence of nuclear 
deterrence. Such deeply embedded beliefs are extraordinary 
resistant to new thinking or to change. They also reflect the 
reluctance of national security planners in the NWS to conceive 
of a security architecture that does not rely on nuclear arms. 
Nuclear weapons are held by a handful of states which insist 
that these weapons provide unique security benefits, and yet 
reserve uniquely to themselves the right to own them. This 
situation is highly discriminatory and thus unstable, it cannot be 
sustained. The possession of nuclear weapons by some states 
is a constant stimulus to other states to acquire them... a central 
reality is that nuclear weapons diminish the security of all states. 
The WMD proliferation problem will not be solved by short-term 
solutions. What is obvious is the need for a re-orientation of the 
technological determinants of our industhalized global culture. 
The civil-military ambivalence of many advanced research and 
development program needs to be addressed, and proposals for 
radically new research policies outlined which will safeguard 
against the commercial exploitation of weapons relevant 
technologies. 
It seems this would only be workable if the current security 
paradigm of the western hemisphere was changed and 
deterrence replaced by cooperation. Only then is a long-term 
solution imaginable. Bearing in mind the political arena, with its 
many different players, their various ambitions, and the ongoing 
struggle for western domination. 
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deface 
The greatest evi[ of scientific discoveries in the mid-twentieth century 
IS the success of ^American scientists, engaged in the Jvianhattam 
project. Infact it was a Qerman initiative. (But the C^erman taCent was 
transferred to JLmerica due to HitCer's anti Jewish poCicies and 
succeeded Jlmerica in manufacturing the first ever nucCear device. 
Other European countries and (Russia and China also joined the 
armament race. VSS^R^got the second position in the race as she had 
detonated its first nucfear device in 1949. Jlfter that, Britain had 
tested its nuclear device in 1952, Trance in 1960, and China in 1964 
test fired their first nucfear devices and Became party to the nucfear 
weapons states. 
T^he demonstration of this nucfear weapon of mass destruction was 
done By the Vnited States on the two cities of Japan in 1945. 
Its immense devastating capaBifity was reafized By afmost aff the 
countries of the worfd. Therefore, efforts for controffing and 
efiminating tfiese weapons were started immediatefy after the Second 
"Worfd M^ar. Throughout the Cofd War period, a numBer of treaties and 
agreements were signed among the independent nations to reduce, 
controf, restrict and aBofish these weapons. (But the whofe Cofd War 
period witnessed a mad arms race Between the two superpowers with 
Europe Being their center of activities. 
Ill 
The coCfapse of the Soviet Vnion in the earCy 1990s mar^dthe end of 
the Cofd War and the erstwhife Sipofar worCd transformed into a 
unipofar worfdwith VnitedStates Being the onfy superpower. 
T'he fast decade of the 20^^^ century witnessed the nucCear deveCopments 
inJ4.sia, especiaCCy the South JAsia. India and<Pal{istan detonated their 
nuc fear devices in 1998 which, to a large extent, has changed the world 
scenario. 
The second chapter deafs with the Vnited State's policy of nuclear 
weapons. The major part of V.S- ^oficy throughout the Cold War 
period was dominated 6y deterrence. 9{ence, a large amount was spent 
on defence expenditure. The decade of 80s and 90s was dominated 6y 
Vnited States Star Wars program, which is often criticized for its 
heavy cost, and the S.I)-1 
The Third Chapter is a description of India's nucfear policy especially 
after the second (pa^iran test of 1998, followed 6y India's (Draft 
Nuclear (Doctrine. The various reasons for adopting this nucCear policy 
were placed By India and her commitment to non-escaCation and non-
proliferation of these nuclear weapons put India into a category of 
responsiBfe nucfear power 
(pa^stan's nucfear poficy covers the forth chapter. It is more on fess a 
reaction of India's nucfear poficy. 
The Vnited State interest in other country's acquisition of arms are 
supposed to Be refated, in one way or the other, as a reaction of 
9/llespeciaffy the attac^on Iraq. 
CH APTEE -1 
9(uc[ear Weapons and 
South ylsia 
CHAPTER " 1 
NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND SOUTH ASIA 
On the first Saturday of May and October, the 
bi-annual open-house day of the Trinity Site National Historic 
Landmark, thousands of people travel to the New Mexico desert 
in order to visit the site of the world's first atomic explosion. 
When they get there, they discovered that there's not much to 
see. A Scrubby patch of sand and weeds encircled by a chain-
link fence, the Trinity Site is distinguished mainly by a stone 
obelisk and a few shards of the weaponised detonation tower, to 
some visitors, the obelisk stands in for a moment of national 
pride, and the end-point of a period of collaborative scientific 
genius. Others, however come to Trinity to mourn—or protest— 
the beginning of the atomic era and the arms race^ 
In the history of modern world the year 1932 was marked as one 
of the fateful ironies of the brutal 20*^  century. In Germany, the 
discoveries in Physics by James Chadwick, John Cockcroft and 
Ernest Walton, followed by the assumption of the Chancellorship 
of Germany by Hitler in 1933 and the Nazi persecution of the 
Jews disturbed the peace of German Universities where a large 
number of physicists happened to be of Jewish ancestry. In the 
meantime, French scientist were conducting research on nuclear 
fission technology, which was delicate to develop nuclear 
energy. Their research program ended abruptly with Hitler's 
invasion in 1940. This resulted in the exodus of the scientists. 
About hundred Physicists found refuge in the United States 
between 1933-1941^ and most of the French scientist fled to 
Canada. The US President F. Roosevelt was impressed to see 
the nuclear power and decided to develop this technology as 
quick as possible. The United State started its first atomic bomb 
program in 1942 under the code name "Manhattam Project". 
The remaining German scientists were busy in developing 
Atomic weapons program. This fear of German Atomic bomb 
became the driving force which eventually ushered the world 
into the Nuclear Age. 
It was Hitler's anti-Jewish policies that enrichedjthe American 
scientific community and triggered the massive AmericaTTeffbll 
which enlisted the best scientific talent gathered from all over 
Europe. The assembled scientist were engaged in a crusade 
against the odious regime of Hitler and they, therefore, pushed 
the very boundaries of scientific knowledge outward on a grand 
scale in the pursuit of a weapon of mass destruction.^ 
In fact it was the first Atomic bomb that marked the end of the 
second World War. The differential impact of the second World 
War on fortunes of the countries involved in the Nuclear 
enterphse influenced their ranking in the post war world order. 
The first Nuclear test conducted by United States under the 
Manhattan Project at Alamagordo, New Mexico on 16"^  July 
1945, unveiled the gigantic secret from the mysteries of nature 
to show that if it was used cautiously it could proved to be a 
blessing for mankind or else it could prove disastrous. 
The USA got the lead position with its first nuclear test and 
proved its superiority to the world, with its first nuclear attack on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6*'' and 9*^  August 1945 
respectively USA remained the only super power for four years 
until the USSR developed a nuclear bomb in 1949 The Soviet 
nuclear technology was a result of passing-on of crucial data to 
the Soviet Union, by Klaus Fuches, a German emigre Scientist, 
living in Britain, who participated in the Manhattam Project as a 
member of the British team He even passed on the design of 
the Plutonium bomb tested in the New Mexico desert on July 16, 
1945 Thus, the first Soviet nuclear test code-named "First 
Lightning"^ was conducted at Semiplatinsk in Kazakhstan on 
August 29 1949 The second test in 1951 was based on a Soviet 
design ^  
The decision of Britain to develop nuclear weapons supports the 
realistic explanation of nuclear proliferation Britain feared the 
possibility of US isolationism after the Second World War The 
British decision to develop nuclear weapons was rooted in the 
fear of US isolationism in the face of the Soviet threat, and was 
the legacy of 1940 when Britain alone faced a great threat 
There was a concern that Amenca might lapse into a new 
isolationism from which it might emerge too late to benefit 
England ^  
Britain took the decision to produce a bomb in January 1947 
Immediately after the World War II, the British Minister of 
Defense had ruled out any nsk of a war for the next five years 
Therefore, the British bomb was not viewed as a deterrent 
against the possible adversary, rather the decision emerged 
from an image of Britain as an impenal and self sufficient power 
which should have the latest and the most powerful weapons 
The first British Atomic device was tested in the Monte Bello 
Island of Australia on October 3, 1952/ 
The French technocrats pushed the nuclear weapons programs 
along with a minimum political leadership during the Fourth 
Republic, The Gaullist France adopted a hedging strategy. The 
uncertainty about the reliability of American nuclear extended 
deterrence was a factor that impelled France under de Gaulle to 
adopt a hedging strategy by developing an independent arsenal 
in the early 1960's. A similar consideration for other U.S. allies, 
such as Japan, is a definite possibility in the post-cold- war era. 
De Gaulle's suspicion of the United States for the defense of 
France in the case of a Soviet attack on Western Europe is clear 
when he said to President Eisenhower in September 1959. 
"I, de Gaulle, known that you, Eisenhower, would dare to risk the 
survival of your country in order to safeguard Europe: You have 
already proved your devotion. But what of your successors? Will 
they take the risk of devastating American cities so that Berlin, 
Brusels and Paris might remain free?"^ 
Thus France had developed the nuclear device and even on UN 
General Assembly's request to not to proceed with a 
forthcoming test, the French government stood firm in its 
decision to test the device. The French representative to the UN 
declared that in the absence of a general agreement on 
disarmament, France would resist any form of discrimination 
against her interests and would go ahead with her test program. 
The first French test was conducted on February 13**^  1960, 
nearly 1000 miles from Algiers.^ 
The decision to build the Chinese bomb was driven largely by 
security considerations Nie Ronngzhen pointed out that from a 
historical perspective, the possession of the atomic bomb helped 
China get nd of the heavy legacy of long being humiliated by 
foreign invasion and "imperialist bullying" USA did consider 
using nuclear weapons against China on several occasions 
during and after the Korean War, the USA even deployed under 
armed B-29 bombers in Guam in 1951 for possible use against 
targets in China The Korean War, events in Indochina, and the 
Taiwan Straits (Quemoy-Matsu) cnses all demonstrated China's 
insecurity in the face of US nuclear weapons and bullying °^ 
Therefore, China has started its weapon program after the 
second World War The Soviet Union assisted China in their 
nuclear weaponisation through their participation in uranium 
mining, training Chinese scientists and giving valuable nuclear 
equipment and machinery In October 15, 1957, Sino- Soviet 
New defence Technical Accord was signed by which Chinese 
request for a prototype of a bomb was made China exploded its 
first nuclear device in 1964 at Lop Nor " 
The issue of nuclear weapons had been the central feature of 
the East-West competition dunng the 1950s Nuclear 
deterrence. Arms control and disarmament were the major 
techniques adopted by the Unites States to contain 
Communism and restrain Soviet hegemonic designs through out 
the early Cold war period The issue of nuclear proliferation was 
a slowly developing force below the visible surface of the world 
politics ^^  
Initially disarmament and arms control were the existing 
measures for nuclear proliferations. The abolition of existing 
nuclear weapons is a measure of disarmament and a check on 
the production of new nuclear weapons is a measure of arms 
control. Non proliferation is akin to disarmament in one respect 
and to arms control in another.^^ It refers to : 
i) Putting a stop to the nuclear arms race and 
ii) Abolition of existing nuclear weapons. 
Thus, non-proliferation means stopping the transfer of nuclear 
weapons by nuclear powers to non-nuclear powers. The term 
non-dissemination refers to a check on the sharing of nuclear 
secrets by nuclear powers with non- nuclear powers. '^* In both 
cases emphasis is on the prevention of the expansion of the 
nuclear weapons. The expansion or spread of nuclear weapons 
is possible horizontally as well as vertically. 
The horizontal dimension refers to the proliferation of weapons 
across the world; while vertical proliferation describes the 
progressive development of weapons of mass destruction. The 
dangers of horizontal proliferations are obvious these days. 
There are at least two dozen countries that have access to one 
of the technologies for enriching uranium, but apart from nuclear 
weapon states all but three are under safeguards and two are 
violating them. (Iraq and North Korea). But technical limitation 
will not safeguard us against the proliferation of biological and 
chemical weapons. Any country with chemical or biotech 
industry can develop these. Here, the issue of which of the 
countries have pledged no-use and how this commitment is 
verified is of much greater concern.^^ 
Vertical proliferation was visible during the early 50's when the 
overkill capacity of the strategic weapon systems of the two 
super powers steadily increased. After the end of the US nuclear 
monopoly period, both USA and the Soviet Union were 
developing the second strike capability by a vigorous nuclear 
arms race never known in the history of the nations under the 
pretext of the Cold War rivalries. Then they moved on to the 
building up of a Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) capacity in 
order to maintain the so called "delicate balance of terror". 
Finally they succeeded in rationalizing the mad, run away 
nuclear arms race as an essential requirement of nuclear 
strategy to maintain the stability of the mutual deterrence. What 
was visible to ail including, of course, the nuclear weapon states, 
was the uncontrolled vertical proliferation.^^ 
Hence the dangers of vertical proliferation are equally stark. 
Nuclear disarmament has progressed slowly. The reduction to 
less than 6,000 nuclear warheads in the US and the states of 
the former Soviet Union respectively, as prescribed by the 
START treaties, has been verified bilaterally. Nonetheless, it still 
allows both the US and Russia an "overkill" capacity many times 
over. Meanwhile, the concept of nuclear deterrence is not yet 
dead. Research and development programs for nuclear 
technologies progress unsupervised in the US, France, UK, 
Israel, India, Pakistan as well as China: either acknowledged 
nuclear weapon states or those not party to the NPT. 
When it comes to the exporting countries for WMD usable 
technology, control mechanism, as for the importing countries 
are in effective. Export restrictions and effective monitoring of 
compliance, demanded again and again by NGOs, have been 
reported in the media, most noticeably after the first Gulf war in 
1991 when western governments had to face the fact that the 
main export culprits were based in their countries. Methods to 
contain vertical proliferation simply lag far behind what is 
needed.^^ Thus it is only through a two dimensional approach 
that a true non proliferation can be achieved. There is no end of 
horizontal proliferation without a stop to the vertical one. Some 
of the developing countries have repeatedly asked for an end to 
vertical proliferation in the nuclear weapon states in order to 
encourage horizontal non-proliferation. The argument from the 
nuclear powers, of course, is that vertical proliferation is needed 
to counter the effects of unwanted horizontal proliferation. Once 
this is effectively stopped, vertical proliferation would follow, they 
suggest.^^ 
A part from the vertical and horizontal proliferation, a number of 
new proliferation semantics have developed. 
The macro-proliferation, refers to the proliferations among the 
states; micro-proliferation deals with individual terronst groups 
terrorizing with nuclear weapons; latent and suppressed 
proliferation deals with nuclear options and nuclear capabilities 
which could be used when required; balanced proliferation is 
reconcile to a situation in which a limited number of countries 
going nuclear with out causing any imbalance; proliferation chain 
deals with a mechanistic automatic action reaction 
phenomenon.^ ® 
Efforts for arms control and disarmaments were made since the 
beginning of the Cold war. The partial test-ban treaty, concluded 
in 1963, was the first important step taken on the road to a 
comprehensive ban. Different approaches have been attempted 
since that time, among them, unilateral moratoriums, trilateral 
negotiations, multilateral deliberations, treaty amendments and 
nuclear-weapon-fee zones. ^ ° 
The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons signed on 
July 1, 1968 remains the bedrock of the post-second World War 
global non-proliferation regime. With 187 states parties, this 
Treaty is the most widely adhered to and the most successful 
multilateral arms control agreement in history. The successful 
conclusion, in 1968, of negotiations on the NPT was a landmark 
in the history of non-proliferation.- After coming into force in 
1970, its indefinite extension. The members states includes all 
five declared nuclear states i.e. China, France, the Russian 
Federation, The USA, and UK. To day, only four states remain 
non-parties; Cuba , India, Israel and Pakistan.^^ 
The NPTs main objectives are to stop the further spread of 
nuclear weapons, to provide security for non-nuclear weapons 
states which have given up the nuclear option, to encourage 
international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy, and to pursue negotiations in good faith towards nuclear 
disarmament leading to the eventual elimination of nuclear 
weapons. 
The NPT remains the only g\oba\ legally binding instrument 
committing the NWS to disarm, and its indefinite extension in 
1995 strengthened the global nuclear non-proliferation norm. 
Responding to the most significant challenge to the NPT to date 
i.e. the India nuclear detonations of May 1998, in contrast to the 
largely hypocritical statements emanating from the NWS, 
Canadian Foreign Minister Axworthy stressed that: nuclear non 
- proliferation regime is based on, and anchored in international 
law and norms, as well as incorporated into international 
mechanisms. The NPT is fundamental, but the broader regime is 
a complex system of multilateral and bilateral agreements, 
arrangements and mechanisms intended to promote and 
achieve a world without nuclear weapons, sooner rather than 
later. This was valid during the Cold War and remains valid 
today. At the same time, the regime is intended to provide a 
framework to enable the world to make effective use of nuclear 
capability for peaceful purposes.^^ 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) was set up by 
unanimous resolution of the United Nations in 1957 to help 
nation develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Allied to 
this role is the administration safeguards arrangements. This 
provide assurance to the international community that individual 
countries are honoring their treaty commitments to use nuclear 
materials and facilities exclusively for peaceful purposes. 
The IAEA therefore undertakes regular inspections of civil 
nuclear facilities to verify the accuracy of documentation 
supplied to it. The agency checks inventones and undertakes 
sampling and analysis of materials. Safeguards are designed to 
deter diversion of nuclear materials by increasing the risk of 
early detection. They are complemented by controls on the 
export of sensitive technology from countries such as UK and 
USA through voluntary bodies such as the Nuclear Suppliers' 
Group.^^ 
Traditional safeguards are arrangements to account for and 
control the use of nuclear materials. This verification is a key 
element is the international system which ensures that uranium 
in particular in used only for peaceful purposes. 
Parties to the NPT agree to accept technical safeguards 
measures applied by the IAEA. These require that operators of 
nuclear facilities maintain and declare detailed accounting 
records of all movements and transactions involving nuclear 
material. Over 550 facilities and several hundred other locations 
are subject to regular inspection, and their records and the 
nuclear material being audited. Inspections by the IAEA are 
complemented by other measures such as surveillance cameras 
and instrumentation. 
The aim of traditional IAEA safeguards is to deter the diversion 
of nuclear material from peaceful use by maximizing the risk of 
early detection. At a broader level they provide assurance to the 
international community that countnes are honoring their treaty 
commitments to use nuclear materials and facilities exclusively 
for peaceful purposes. In this way safeguards are a service both 
to the international community and to individual states, who 
recognize that it is in their own interest to demonstrate 
compliance with these commitments. 
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The inspections act as an alert system providing a warning of 
the possible diversion of nuclear matenal from peaceful 
activities The system relies on 
• Matenal Accountability - tracking all inward and outward 
transfers and the flow of matenals in any nuclear facility 
This includes sampling and analysis of nuclear matenal, 
on-site inspections, review and verification of operating 
records 
• Physical Security - restncting access to nuclear matenals 
at the site of use 
• Containment and Surveillance - use of seals, automatic 
cameras and other instruments to detect unreported 
movement or tampenng with nuclear matenals, as well as 
spot checks on-site 
All NPT non-weapons states must accept these full-scope 
safeguards In the five weapons states plus the non-NPT states 
(India, Pakistan and Israel), facility-specific safeguards apply, 
IAEA inspectors regularly visit these facilities to verify 
completeness and accuracy of records 
The terms of the NPT cannot be enforced by the IAEA itself, nor 
can nations be forced to sign the treaty In reality, as shown in 
Iraq and North Korea, safeguards can be backed up by 
diplomatic, political and economic measures "^^  
The greatest nsk of nuclear weapons proliferation lies with 
countnes which have not joined the NPT and which have 
significant unsafeguarded nuclear activities India, Pakistan and 
Israel are in this category. While safeguards apply to some of 
their activities, others remain beyond scrutiny. 
A further concern is that counthes may develop various sensitive 
nuclear fuel cycle facilities and research reactors under full 
safeguards and then subsequently opt out of the NPT. Bilateral 
agreements such is insisted upon by Australia and Canada for 
sale of uranium address this by including fallback provisions, but 
many countries are outside the scope by these agreements. If a 
nuclear-capable country does leave the NPT it is likely to be 
reported by IAEA to the UN Security Council, just as if it were in 
breach of its safeguards agreement. Trade sanctions are then 
likely^ 
IAEA safeguards together with bilateral safeguards applied 
under the NPT can, and do, ensure that uranium supplied by 
countries such as Australia and Canada does not contribute to 
nuclear weapons proliferation. In fact the worldwide application 
of those safeguards and the substantial world trade in uranium 
for nuclear electricity make the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
much less likely. 
The Additional Protocol, once it is widely in force will provide 
credible assurance that there are no undeclared nuclear 
materials or activities in the states concerned. This will be a 
major step forward in preventing nuclear proliferation. 
By mid 2004 a total of 57 countries plus Taiwan had ratified the 
Additional Protocol. However, of 71 countries with significant 
nuclear activities, 25 have yet to bring it into force.^^ 
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In May 1995, NPT parties reaffirmed their commitment to a 
Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty to prohibit the production of any 
further fissile materials for weapons. This aims to complement 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty agreed in 1996 and to 
codify commitments made by USA, UK, France and Russia to 
cease production of weapons materials, as well as putting a 
similar ban on China. This treaty will also put more pressure on 
Israel, India and Pakistan to agree to international verification. 
Another initiative relates to plutonium (Pu) and spent fuel. For 
uranium, safeguards take account of its nature: natural, 
depleted, low-enriched or high-enriched (above 20% U-235) and 
the corresponding degree of concern regarding proliferation. A 
similarly differentiated approach is being considered for Pu. Two 
or three categories are possible: degraded Pu (eg in high-
burnup fuel), low-grade Pu (eg separated from spent fuel of 
normal burnup) and high-grade Pu (eg from weapons or low-
burnup fuel). The first two correspond to what is generally known 
as a reactor- grade Pu, sometimes defined as having more than 
19% non-fissile isotopes. 
There are also several other treaties and arrangements 
designed to reduce the risk of civil nuclear power's contributing 
to weapons proliferation. 
Implementation of IAEA safeguards in the 13 non-nuclear 
weapons states of the EU is governed by a Verification 
Agreement between the country concerned, EURATOM and the 
IAEA. Safeguards activities are carried out jointly by the IAEA 
and EURATOM. A revision to earlier arrangements, the New 
Partnership Approach (NPA), was agreed in April 1992. The 
NPA enables the IAEA itself to deploy more of its resources in 
member states where independent regional safeguards systems 
are not in place. 
Shortly after entry into force of the NPT, multilateral 
consultations on nuclear export controls led to the establishment 
of two separate mechanisms for dealing with nuclear exports: 
the Zangger Committee in 1971 and the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group (NSG) in 1975. 
The Zangger Committee, also known as the Non Proliferation 
Treaty Exporters Committees, was set up to consider how 
procedures for exports of nuclear material and equipment 
related to NPT commitments. In August 1974 the committee 
produced a trigger list of items which would require the 
application of IAEA safeguards if exported to a non Nuclear 
Weapons State which was not party to the NPT. The trigger list 
is regularly updated. The Zangger Committee now has 31 
member states. 
The NSG, also known as the London Group or London Supplier 
Group, was set up in 1974 after India exploded its first nuclear 
device. The main reason for the group's formation was to bring 
in France, a major nuclear supplier nation which was not then 
party to the NPT. It included both members and non-members of 
the Zangger Committee. The group communicated its 
guidelines, essentially a set of export rules, to the IAEA in 1978. 
These were to ensure that transfer of nuclear material or 
equipment would not be diverted to unsafe guard nuclear fuel 
cycle or nuclear explosive activities, and formal government 
assurances to this effect were required from recipients. The 
guidelines also recognized the need for physical protection 
measures in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and 
weapons usable materials, and strengthen retransfer provision. 
The NSG began with seven members—the USA, the former 
USSR, the UK, France, Germany, Canada and Japan but now 
include 35 countnes. 
In 1968, the States parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), under article VI, undertook to pursue negotiations 
in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of 
the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament. Afterwards, and in many instances, including 
within the NPT review process, efforts were made to consider a 
comprehensive test ban as an essential element in the 
implementation of that article. The single multilateral negotiating 
body, the CD, has long been involved with the issue of a test 
ban. The Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events 
was established in 1976, and in 1982 and Ad Hoc Working 
Group on a Nuclear Test Ban was established with a limited 
mandate. In 1990 and in the following few years discussions 
touched upon the major issues of a nuclear-test ban in 
considerable detail. 
On 10 August 1993, the Conference took a landmark decision. 
On that day, the CD gave its Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear 
Test Ban a mandate to "negotiate intensively a universal and 
multilaterally and effectively verifiable comprehensive nuclear-
test-ban treaty, which would contribute effectively to the 
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prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its 
aspects, to the process of nuclear disarmament and therefore to 
the enhancement of international peace and security." 
The Ad Hoc Committee began those negotiations in January 
1994 and has conducted them with the highest degree of 
commitment to achieving an agreement as soon as possible. 
In the document on "Principles and Objectives of Nuclear Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament" adopted in New York in May 
1995, 175 States parties to the NPT decided that the completion 
by the CD of the negotiations on a universal and internationally 
effectively verifiable CTBT no later than 1996 was a goal whose 
achievement was important to the full realization and effective 
implementation of article VI of the NPT Treaty.^ 
Steady and significant progress has been achieved recently in 
the negotiations in the CD both on the political and technical 
levels. The updated "rolling text" forms part of the CD's report 
submitted to the fiftieth session of the General Assembly^. 
Many difficulties still lie ahead for the Conference on 
Disarmament to resolve. Without entering into the substance of 
the negotiations, suffice it to say that some 1,200 brackets will 
have to be eliminated from the rolling text before the 
negotiations come to a successful conclusion. To finish the work 
by a target date in 1996, the CD will have to negotiate with much 
determination and a great sense of urgency. There seems to be 
a growing recognition that the Ad hoc Committee might have to 
adjust its methods of work to match the task at hand. 
Events outside the Conference have also contributed to 
advances in the negotiations. On 20 October 1995, for instance, 
France, the United Kingdom and the United States announced 
their respective intentions to sign the relevant protocols to the 
South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty-the Treaty of 
Rarotonga- in the first half of 1996. Protocol 3 of that Treaty is 
an undertaking not to test any nuclear explosive device 
anywhere within the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone. As China 
and the Russian Federation have already ratified the Protocol 
the announcement by France, the United Kingdom and the 
United States of their signature to it would mean that all the 
nuclear weapon States will have undertaken a commitment not 
to test in that geographical area. That represents yet another 
indication of the strong determination of the international 
community, nuclear and non-nuclear-weapons States alike, to 
reach agreement on a CTBT in 1996.^ ^ 
Though the official policy goal of the United Nations is general 
and complete disarmament, it has never been seriously pursued 
because such an idea runs into tremendous problems of 
definition. From its inception commentators have tended to use 
"arms control" as a synonym for "disarmament" and then judged 
arms control by the degree of disarmament occurnng at any 
particular time, there are crucial differences in the meaning and 
approach to the two terms. 
Arms control came into being partly in response to the advent of 
the nuclear "balance of terror" and partly as a response to a 
perceived failure of the disarmament approach in the years 
immediately before and after World War II. In 1945, the whole 
context about the debate about disarmament had changed when 
the issue of nuclear weapons came into the picture. Atom 
bombs had been used and this mass destruction weapon could 
not be disinvented. Nuclear weapons represented an awesome 
potential for catastrophe which increased the general desire for 
disarmament but, at the same time, major new obstacles were 
placed in the path of effective disarmament. Nuclear-armed 
states that successfully cheated could now mean literal 
annihilation for the state or states that were its victims. The first 
US plan for the elimination of all nuclear weapons was submitted 
in November 1946, known as the "Baruch Plan" after Bernard 
Baruch, one of its authors. Under this plan, the USA, who was 
the only nuclear power in the world, offered to dismantle them 
and make its civil nuclear knowledge available to all other 
countries. A new International Atomic Developmental Authority 
would supervise the weapons disposal and peaceful nuclear 
energy programs. Though the UN General Assembly adopted 
the plan on December 31, 1946, it was rejected by the Soviet 
Union and its allies. As the plan called for the establishment of 
the monitoring and supervision agency before disarmament 
began, the Soviets were suspicious of the pro-Western majority 
of the organization which they felt would enable the Authority to 
prevent Soviet research into nuclear weapons while US 
scientists had already acquired the knowledge needed to 
construct them. When the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic 
bomb in 1949, the Americans fell prey to a similar lack of 
confidence in the idea of international control of nuclear 
weapons and they abandoned the idea completely when the 
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Soviets tested the H-bomb in 1954. However, the Baruch Plan is 
important because it represented the first and probably the last 
chance to achieve a complete ban on nuclear weapons. The two 
powers, during the 1950s, continued to call for such a ban as 
also for the total abolition of all weapons of any magnitude and 
these calls were generally recognized as representing little more 
than propaganda posturing that were designed for public 
consumption rather than as a basis for negotiation.^^ 
It became clear in the 1950s that complete nuclear disarmament 
would not be possible as the question of the verification of 
compliance with a total ban became "the" crucial issue. The 
French argued publicly that a total ban was impossible as the 
amount of fissile material in existence had reached the point 
where no reliable verification system could be produced which 
would guarantee that none had been hidden. Since total nuclear 
disarmament would demand total trust of the other side, which 
did not exist to the level needed in the Cold War, it was an 
impossible objective to pursue. It was several years before the 
superpowers could bring themselves to admit that this was 
indeed the case.'* 
Between 1957 and 1962, the strategic community brought out 
the differences between what they meant by the arms control 
approach and the ways it differed from disarmament as 
understood in the traditional way. According the Schelling and 
Halperin, "Arms control is essentially a means of supplementing 
unilateral military strategy thy some kind of collaboration with the 
countries that are potential enemies. The aims of arms control 
and the aims of a national military strategy should be 
substantially the same. "They also included in arms control any 
kind of military cooperation between potential enemies with the 
aim of "reducing the likelihood of war; its scope and violence if it 
occurs and the political and economic costs of being prepared 
for it."' 
While disarmament was seen as an alternative to military 
strength, arms control was seen as a complement to it, since 
both enhance national and international security in different 
ways. While proponents of disarmament saw the existence of 
weapons as a cause of arms races and war, arms control was 
felt to represent a recognition of the continuing utility of military 
power in the modern world and the new arms controllers 
believed that there was no simple cause and effect relationship 
between the possession of weapons and the outbreak of war as 
armaments were ever present features in the landscape of 
international politics and they were as much a part of the peace-
time as well as the war-time environment. 
Some scholars argued that arms control was a generic term, 
covering any arrangement designed to reduce the likelihood of 
international military conflict and ranging from unilateral national 
force improvements at one end of the spectrum to possibilities of 
universal disarmament at the other. 
The crucial distinguishing feature separating arms control from 
disarmament was that disarmament always involves arms 
reduction. These reductions could be total, involving the 
abolition of all arms or of one type of weapon; they could be 
partial, involving numerical reductions in some or all categories 
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of weapons; or they could be local, regional or global. In 
contrast, arms control may involve reductions but need not 
necessarily do so and in certain circumstances, the arms control 
approach produces a requirement for more, not fewer, weapons. 
While the disarmament approach assumes that weapons are a 
cause of was and to abolish weapons is to abolish wars, the 
arms control approach believes that wars begin in the minds of 
people. The objective then becomes the control of those factors 
which prompt states to go to war. 
A key feature in arms control is the acceptance of nuclear 
deterrence. The arms controllers saw nuclear weapons as an 
innovation that would make war between the great powers 
impossible and to abolish nuclear weapons would thus be a 
retrogade step. Nuclear deterrence was to be the "keystone" of 
national security, something to be enhanced and refined through 
measures to make it less accident-prone and to safeguard each 
side's retaliatory capability.^ 
Today, the term arms control is often used interchangeably with 
arms regulations, arms limitation and disarmament. A wide 
range of measures have come to be included under the rubric of 
arms control, and according to Jozef Goldblat, it is intended to: 
(a) freeze, limit, reduce or abolish certain categories of 
weapons, (b) prevent certain military activities; (c) regulate the 
deployment of armed forces; (d) proscribe transfers of some 
militahly important terms; (e) reduce the risk of accidental war; 
(f) constrain or prohibit the use of certain weapons or methods of 
war; and (g) build up confidence among states through greater 
openness in military matters.^ 
Besides the NPT a number of important multilateral arms control 
and disarmament agreements were signed in the nuclear 
sphere. They are: the Antarctic Treaty (signed 1959); the treaty 
banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space 
and under water or the Partial Test Ban Treaty (signed 1963), 
the treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the 
exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and 
other celestial bodies or the Outer Space Treaty (signed 1967); 
the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America 
and the Caribbean or the Treaty of TIateloIco (signed 1967); 
modified 1991 and amended 1992); the treaty on the non 
proliferation of nuclear weapons or NPT (signed 1968); the 
treaty on the prohibition of emplacement of nuclear weapons 
and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the 
ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof or the Seabed Treaty 
(signed 1971); the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty or 
Treaty of Rarotonga (signed 1985); and the Convention on the 
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (signed 1980). 
Throughout the cold war period, the armament race between 
the Soviet Union and the United States was controlled by a 
number of bilateral agreements. The US-Soviet/Russian 
agreements are: the treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic 
missile systems or ABM Treaty (signed 1972); the treaty on the 
limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests or Threshold 
Test Ban Treaty/ TTBT (signed 1974); the treaty on underground 
nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes or the Peaceful 
Nuclear Explosions Treaty/PNET (signed 1976); the treaty on 
the elimination of intermediate range and shorter-range missiles 
24 
or INF Treaty (signed 1987); the treaty on the reduction and 
limitation of strategic offensive arms or START I Treaty (signed 
1991); and the treaty on further reduction and limitation of 
strategic offensive arms or START II Treaty (signed 1993). 
Apart from arms control and disarmament, there is alternative 
defence (AD), the primary goals of which are to work towards 
disarmament, war prevention, defensive strength, damage 
limitation, detente, entente and democracy. According to Bjorn 
Moller, founder and director of the Global Non-Offensive 
Defence Network and a proponent of Non-Offensive Defence 
(NOD), AD is broadly conceived in a dual sense. He says, 
"Alternatives' has been defined permissively to include 
proposals both for drastic transformations and for incremental 
reforms. Furthermore, the category includes both good and bad, 
viable and infeasible, offensive and defensive alternatives, albeit 
with a cerl^ ain preference for the (presumably) good, feasible, 
and defensive alternatives. 'Defense' has been conceived of to 
encompass not only military defense and various forms of 
prophylactic security policies that might, it is hoped, largely 
eliminate the need for an actual defense. The focus, however, is 
placed on military alternatives."^ 
Although AD and security have been debated for ages and 
attained prominence in the aftermath of the World Wars as well 
as in periods of high international tension and fear of war, the 
interest has peaked in the 1990s when many NOD conceptions 
have now been incorporated into the establishment strategic 
discourse and many of the goals set by NOD proponents have 
at least been partly achieved.^^ 
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SOUTH ASIA: 
South Asia comprises all the seven countries who formed the 
South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 
namely, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri-Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan 
and Myanmar (formerly Burma). Among the South Asian 
countries, India and Pakistan have joined the nuclear club by 
conducting their nuclear tests in 1998. China, though a Central 
Asian country, and an official Nuclear Weapon State, plays an 
important role as far as the issue of nuclear proliferation in South 
Asia is concerned. North Korea, a newly emerged nuclear power 
can not be ignored altogether while discussing the South Asian 
nuclear proliferation. 
In South Asia the issue of nuclear proliferation ahs two 
connotations 
1. Strategic / military and 
2. Political 
Strategic / military connotation has been placed on number one 
due to the inherent fear of subjugation among the South Asian 
countries. After a long struggle and hard won freedom from the 
colonial rule, none of them can readily offer themselves to be 
sacrificed by the cold war players. After the liquidation of the 
Soviet Union and the so called, end of the cold war, the 
countries of the region felt insecure as they have lost the Soviet 
umbrella. This again resulted in a crisis of strong 'balancer' in 
the region. These factors made them conscious about their 
security and self defense which ultimately pushed them to 
develop in the direction of nuclear know how. 
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Political connotation is quite complicated , as the United States 
remained the only super power and trying her best to keep its 
hold in this region. For reasons of which US policy planners 
significantly emphasized its increasing interests in the area. 
After the 1998 India Pakistan nuclear tests, 9/11 terrorist attack 
of World Trade center, counted terrorism, foreign trade and 
investment, and avoiding a fifth India Pakistan war apparently 
have replaced nuclear non-proliferation at the top of the US 
foreign policy agenda for South Asia .^ ° 
The barriers to arms control in 1980s and 1990s was the 
resentment and defiance that damaged relations among India , 
Pakistan and the United States. The lack of trust and 
understanding between India and Pakistan is well known: 
neither side is willing to initiate a relationship of reciprocated 
good gestures. The animosity created by differences over the 
nuclear issue between Washington, India and Pakistan also 
was destructive. US non proliferation pressure precluded open 
discussions between India and Pakistan on regional security. 
Pakistan resented the imposition of the Pressler amendment , 
which it saw as discriminatory, and India objected as strongly 
to US pressure for it to join the NPT and curve its space and 
missile activities. As a result more Indian and Pakistani 
diplomatic energy went to diverting US pressure then to devising 
arms control to promote regional security. 
The Indian and Pakistani Prime Ministers realizing the delicacy 
of the strategic stability and arms control in South Asia, just 
after the 1998 nuclear tests, met in Lahore, Pakistan for greater 
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understanding and confidence building. But all hopes were 
dashed just weeks later when the two nvals fought the Kargil 
war. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attack against New York 
and Washington and the US campaign against the Al-Qaida 
terrorist net work and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan created 
even more resentment between India and Pakistan. India's fear 
of similar terrorist attack was apparently realized when Indian 
Parliament was attacked on 13 Dec. 2001 by terrorist who were 
suspected to belong to two Pakistan based military groups : 
Lashkar-e Taiba and Jaish-e- Mohammad .@ Although the 
Kargil war had heightened tensions, but the conflict remained 
limited because both sides wished to avoid escalation to a 
general war, that could lead to the use of nuclear weapons. 
Therefore, even as Kargil underscored the risks involved in 
conflict, it also demonstrated that India and Pakistan appreciate 
the importance of caution and restraint in their strategic 
competition, which is an essential condition for arms control and 
deterrence stability. Jeoffery Larsen has summed up the 
strategic predicament India and Pakistan is facing today, as 
follows: 
1. The rivals continue to have serious conflicts of interests, 
specially over Kashmir, and a deep mistrust of one 
another, 
2. Each side is prepare to use military force, including 
nuclear weapons to protect its security interest, but 
3. Neither wants war because of political considerations, 
because of the risk of escalation, and because neither side 
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have enough of an edge in conventional military forces to 
win any thing of political significance . Because South 
Asia is prone to all kinds of crises, the risk of conflict will 
be an indelible feature of India, Pakistan relations, even in 
a condition of mutual nuclear deterrence .^ ^ 
In countries like India and Pakistan scholars keep alluding to the 
U.S.tilts in different directions and keep feeling that the U.S. is or 
has been turning a blind eye towards other country's nuclear 
activities. They try to see a pattern in the U.S. policies towards 
them and others and then react and at times over-react. The 
confusion is created because of the style and strategic pursued 
by the U.S to achieve its objective at the particular time and in a 
specific environment with different kinds of tools available to it. 
In terms of principles the polices may be turn out to be 
contradictory. The objectives remains constant, however, until all 
hope is lost like in case of the Soviet Union when it carried out 
its first test in 1949 and became a NWS, or when the U.K, 
France and China donated their first devices and joined the 
nuclear club. Henceforth it was the flexible approach meant to 
meet the best of the bargain. It was his adaptability of approach, 
compliant and amiable at times, and paradoxical, ngid and 
caustic on others, that bewildered and caused endless confusion 
regarding US. nuclear policies. That was during the cold war 
years. In the post-cold war environment also, flexibility of 
approach has also be maintained while pursuing non-
proliferation goals in different regions. As to US. objectives after 
the end of the cold war, they are as constant as they were and 
have been clearly defined-broad means to achieve them also 
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having been stated off and on. But there is a difference. Along 
with the objective of non-proliferation, the objective of 
maintaining the status quo-monopoly has acquired an urgency 
hitherto unknown. While non-proliferation remains the prime 
objective, the hidden objective of maintaining US. supremacy is 
the engine that provides the driving force. In order to achieve its 
objectives, the US. had to operate within certain parameters 
related to ends it want to achieve and the means it uses to 
achieve those ends."^ ^ 
Though China does not comprise a South-Asian country, but its 
significance in the politics of South- Asia can not be ignored. Her 
policy on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) has been, and 
in many respects remains ambivalent. In1992,China signed The 
Nuclear Non proliferation Treaty (NPT).lt has also showed its 
willingness to join a comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT),As 
well as its support for developing a multilateral convention 
banning the future production of fissile material for use in 
nuclear weapons. On the other hand, China continues to 
conduct underground nuclear test, although it has stated that it 
will stop the testing once the CTBT enters into force. China did 
not join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and did not bother 
to meet the guidelines of NSG, while transferring its nuclear 
technology. China also agreed with the U.S. in 1992 to abide by 
the norms, guidelines and parameters of Missile Technology 
Control Regime(MTCR).But the U.S. concern about the Chinese 
proliferation activities in South-Asia and the Middle East is not 
meaning less as, export of Chinese missile systems and missile 
related technology, remained an important element of China's 
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foreign military sales. U.S. allegation of transfer of M-11misile 
system to Pakistan by China in 1993 resulted in the 
announcement of imposition of sanction against china for its 
export of missile related technology to Pakistan controlled under 
category II of the MTCR. Though the sanction were waived in 
Oct-1994 after Chinese commitment to abide by the 1987 
version of the MTCR Annex, as well as its commitment not to 
export ballistic-missile system inherently capable of reaching a 
range of 300 km.with space load of 500kg,which are the basic 
MTCR control parameters. China's inherent capability concept 
deals only with missile systems and not with missile-related 
technology, which according to U.S. is more important as it 
offers the poliferent state the possibility of developing an 
indigenous missile-production capability. China had also been 
reported to transfer C-808 ship based cruise missiles to Iran 
.Although these systems do not violate the basic MTCR 
parameters, they nevertheless potentially increase Iran's 
capability to threaten commercial shipping in the Persian Gulf.^ ^ 
President Clinton also accepted the importance of China as well 
as its relations with USA in his first important policy speech after 
the reelection, made on his trip to Australia, also reflected the 
US eagerness to mend fences with China and to improve their 
commercial ties. Even though both differ on many a vital issue, 
but both the nations want to continue with the dialogue. USA is 
concerned with China's Human Rights records, approach to its 
'renegade' province Taiwan, proliferation issue etc. China is 
equally sensitive to US relations and support to Taiwan, IPR and 
trade matters etc. Since the past few months China has 
replaced Japan as the number one surplus trade balance 
partner of USA. On the other hand the heavy dependent of US 
commerce and industry on China trade and the large future 
market potential may be able to bail out Clinton. The US trade 
circles estimate that 200,000 American jobs are depending on 
its China trade and there is a huge potential in the Chinese 
market, specially in sectors like civil aviation, nuclear energy etc. 
Apart from the above economic and business interests, US is 
being compelled to deal with China due to the present day 
world realities. She is a nuclear power with a credible deterrent 
and a second strike capability and further also enjoys veto 
power in the UN Security Council. These objective realities are 
further compounded with the Chinese state craft: the ancient 
Middle Kingdom is still, in spite of its Communist credentials, 
very nationalistic and at times arrogates itself with its self 
esteem. This gives rise to its basic philosophy of 'keeping the 
initiatives in one's own hands' and the ability to ' say no'. The 
second most sensitive area is the Korean Peninsula, with the 
increasing economic clout of South Korea and the worsening 
situation in North Korea, the USA is also worried about the 
nuclear questions and stability of North Korea itself. This issue is 
also entangled with the Sino-US relations, and nobody is sure 
about the leverage enjoyed by China vis-a-vis North Korea."^ "^  
The Post cold War period witnessed the rising drama 
associated with north Korea's nuclear weapon program. 
Under the Bush administration the US government showed its 
concerns of proliferation with Pakistan, because North Korea 
was believed to have traded its missile technology for access to 
Pakistan's nuclear secrets and the Ghauri III missile is doubted 
to be a North Korean design. Until recently, North Korea's main 
missile customers were the usual suspects in the Middle East, 
foes of the West such as Libya which took a fresh delivery in 
2001- and Iran, which on May 31, 2001, successfully tested a 
new small missile called Fateh. That may be a Chinese design 
but the bigger Shahab -3 which Tehran tested in 2000 whose 
1300 km range could reach Israel, is thought to be based on 
North Korea's medium - range Taepodong.^^ 
North Korea has played a central role in missile proliferation for 
example, it has sold modified Scud missiles abroad and seeks 
international sales of its new 1000-1300 km range NoDong 1 
missile, which is capable of carrying WMD war heads , and 
reportedly could be deployed by 1996. As the former director of 
the CIA, R. James Woolsey, has remarked North Korea " is 
willing to sell to any country with the cash to pay." North Korea 
may already have concluded agreements to provide the NoDong 
1 to Iran and to assist Iran in the construction of a missile 
production facility. Libya and Syria also have indicated and 
interest in the No- Dong 1, and Libya is reported already to have 
conducted an agreement to purchase either the missile, 
related technologies, or both. If North Korea, Iran and North 
African countries ultimately possess the No-Gong 1, cities in 
Japan, France, Italy, Greece and Turkey could be under the 
potential threat of missiles armed with WMD. 
North Korea is in development of two new multi-stage missiles 
of considerably greater range. According to public accounts by 
US intelligence officials, these missiles could threatened " all of 
the Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia much of the Pacific area and 
even most of Russia", if transferred to North Africa and the 
Middle East, " all the capitals of Europe could be threatened". 
North Korea's new missiles, popularly referred to as the Taepo 
Dong1 and Taepo Dong2, have been identified in unofficial 
sources as having ranges of 2000 km and 3500 km to 9600 km 
respectively, and as becoming operational as early as 1996 and 
2000 respectively. ®^ 
Japan is one of the most scientifically advanced among all the 
Asian countries. Till, today Japan has refrained herself from 
going to be nuclear. The obvious reason for which Japan is 
famous is its nuclear allergy, as she is the only country ever 
attacked with nuclear weapons. Japan is also famous for its 
"three no's policy: not to make , possess allow nuclear weapons 
on its soil. These attitudes remain a strong brake on Japan 
going nuclear. Japan's acquiring of nuclear weapons is 
supposed to be a departure from its post- war policy of nor 
possessing one. But a nuclear North Korea seems to put 
pressure on Japan going nuclear itself. In a confrontation with 
China , China needs five thermonuclear bombs, three on 
Tokyo and two in the Kausai region(Kobe, Osaka and Kyoto), 
to end Japan. But five nuclear bombs or even few more, 
devastating as they may be, would not spell the end for China, 
Japan, in short, cannot survive a first strike and retaliate. But 
China can.^' 
Even though Japan is a known ally and a strategic partner of 
USA, its increasing economic power, influence in the field of 
trade etc. compelled USA to take a positive but cautious view 
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towards Japan. In AphI 1996 USA signed a security pact with 
Japan mainly aimed at any future military hegemonistic designs 
of China 
The enhanced US diplomatic interest in Thailand may also be 
due to the impact of the overall post-cold war scenario. Keeping 
in view the July 1997 deadline the US has already shifted out all 
its mechanical intelligence gathering facilities out of Hongkong 
and relocated elsewhere, most of it in Australia and now may be 
seeking some more sophisticated facilities near China. 
Thailand suits most of these requirements . Geographically, 
Thailand is located at the corssroads of Indo- China and 
Myanmar. The Myanmar is also another sensitive target of 
USA which it does not want to be left isolated, as they fear such 
isolation may end her up as a camp follower of China. 
In short the enhanced involvement of USA in the Asia Pacific 
can be summarized as the ongoing process of the US quest to 
'contain' China through 'engagement' : but how successful will 
this strategic be, a question to be answered by the future but the 
emerging scenarios in the global power game do not favor 
either very much. On the other hand we have to look for such 
answers in their own domestic, economic and political 
scenario.^^ 
Among things long expected but not realized is the entry into 
force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT); 
the conclusion of nuclear material cut-off treaty; the ratification of 
the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the 
Russian Federation and the United States (START II) and the 
opening of negotiations on START III, the initiation of talks on a 
multilateral nuclear reduction treaty ,and internationally binding 
instrument on negative security assurances , and the 
replacement of the UNSCOM venfication regime in Iraq with a 
system backed by the United Nations Security Council 
Recent negative developments include the nuclear tests of India 
and Pakistan and their increasingly inflexible nuclear posture, 
Amencan plans to develop national missile defence and depart 
from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty to make this possible, 
plans for a 'Theatre High Altitude Area Defence' system which 
would eventually be deployed in East Asia, the Russian 
Federation's increased reliance on nuclear weapons, including 
tactical weapons, the sustained use of force, without Secunty 
Council authorization, against target in Iraq, the use by NATO, 
also without United Nations sanction, offeree to settle a regional 
conflict in the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, NATO's new 
nuclear doctrine and its nuclear sharing policy 
There have been some ephemerally positive events also, of 
which the consequences are not yet apparent The South Asian 
tests have increased world concern about nuclear proliferation 
but this has not yet led to concrete action and, as we have seen 
so often, worries tend to evaporate once the direct crisis is over 
Concerted moves of governments in Northern and Eastern Asia 
have raised awareness of the risks of nuclear proliferation and 
increased interest in regional solutions such as the 
establishment of nuclear - weapon-free zone—but the same 
governments threaten the regional balance by their plans to 
deploy regional anti-missile defence. There has been progress 
in the creation of a Central Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone 
treaty, and in the acceptance of the concept of a single-state 
weapon-free area, as embodied by Mongolia. ^ ^ 
The past few years have witnessed a general relaxation of the 
international situation which made it possible to achieve 
substantial progress in international arms control and 
disarmament. Such progress in turn has helped to bring about 
further relaxation of the international situation. At the moment, 
the coexistence of two main trends in this regard are visible. 
One is the main trend against nuclear and missile proliferation 
and demand for accelerated nuclear disarmament, which gives 
expression to the general wish of the international community. 
The other trend is that the nuclear superpowers, while insisting 
on a strategy of offensive nuclear deterrence, have sped up 
development of hi-tech conventional weapons. The competition 
to scale "heights" of military science is also developing swiftly. 
The latter trend is to a certain extent hindering the former, 
confronting international arms control and disarmament with 
contradictions and conflicting interests, and making the struggle 
ever more complex. 
Some changes have occurred in international arms control and 
disarmament since the end of the Cold War. 
Firstly, the West is now pursuing different objectives. The priority 
in international arms control and disarmament has shifted from 
the prevention of a major nuclear war to forestalling proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), especially the 
proliferation of nuclear, missile and other hi-tech conventional 
weapons to Third World countries. 
During the Cold War period, the US and the Soviet Union were 
rivals. The emphasis in arms control was pursuit of military 
stability, i.e. stability through crisis management and stability in 
arms race, so as to prevent a nuclear conflagration. Today, the 
possibility of such a major nuclear war is practically nil. Under 
these circumstances, the Western nations, with the US at their 
head, see threats to their security coming mainly form the 
employment of nuclear, bio-chemical weapons by "irresponsible" 
Third World countries and terrorists. Consequently, the West 
has shifted its attention to preventing proliferation of weapons, 
deeming the prevention of emergence of new nuclear weapon 
state as the number one issue in world security after the Cold 
War. The US gives priority to prevention of nuclear proliferation 
in its security and foreign policy. For that reason, the US has 
designed a strategy against proliferation and works jointly with 
its allies to prevent the nuclear arsenals of the former Soviet 
Union from proliferation or running out of control. The US has 
also strengthened international nuclear non-proliferation 
mechanisms, emphasizes transparency in military armament, 
enhances the functions of supervision and verification of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), controls the export 
of sensitive technology and steps up intelligence surveillance 
vis-a-vis Third World countries in an effort to contain nuclear and 
missile proliferation. The US attempts to prevent proliferation of 
WMD by the following measures. 
1. Conclusion of treaties, conventions and agreements. 
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2. Insistence on an effective strategic nuclear deterrence to 
maintain nuclear superiority. 
3. Research and deployment of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) 
defence systems (including America's home and theatre 
missile defence (TMD) systems. 
Secondly, changes in pattern. International arms control and 
disarmament have turned from East-West confrontation to 
South-North contradiction. East-West confrontation in the 
original sense of the word no longer existed when US-Soviet 
rivalry came to an end while there was an increase in South-
North contradiction. After "COCOM" is dissolved, a new 
institution has been formed with the purpose of controlling 
transfers of hi-tech conventional weapons and dual-purpose 
technology for military and civilian use. This is for all practical 
purposes and intentions a coordinating institution of Western 
countries in their joint efforts to prevent proliferation of high-
technology and advanced equipment to the Third World. 
Thirdly, the United Nations is playing more prominent role in 
advancing international arms control and disarmament. The 
intra-UN negotiations over the Convention on the Prohibition of 
Chemical Weapons (CWC) and the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) have been a success and the two instruments 
are open for signature. "^^ 
In 1997, international arms control and disarmament have 
reached a new crossroads. At the moment, the different parties 
have yet to reach a consensus as to what should be the next 
goal of arms control. Western nations led by the US continue to 
underline their policy on prevention proliferation of WMD, missile 
and hi-tech conventional weapons and accelerating 
development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defence 
systems. The developing countries are most concerned with 
further promotion of nuclear disarmament and they demand that 
the nuclear states formulae a program on "nuclear disarmament 
within a specified time." The General Assembly of the United 
Nations (UNGA) passed a resolution in 1996 urging that the 4'^  
special session of the UNGA on disarmament be convened in 
1997. Time is still needed to reach agreement on a new arms 
control agenda. Such military powers as the United States which 
seek military superiority by means of arms control have created 
difficulties and problems in international arms control and 
disarmament. In short, the outstanding problems are a follows: 
The coexistence of arms control and arms development poses 
new challenges in international arms control and disarmament. 
The US and Russia, among other countries have always 
deemed arms control and disarmament to be a crucial 
component of the national security strategy. For the sake further 
accommodation with the transformation from major war 
mechanisms to minor war mechanisms, they have indeed begun 
a drastic reduction of redundant nuclear and conventional 
weapons. These counthes however, did not reduce truly 
sophisticated weapons and armaments and progress in 
disarmament did not stop them from engaging in a hi-tech arms 
race on a still higher plane. The current new arms race is 
manifested in the following: 
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Continued implementation of the modification of strategic 
nuclear weapons. American technology of nuclear warheads is 
almost perfect. Following the comprehensive ban on nuclear 
testing, the US consequently continues to strengthen its 
strategic nuclear force focusing on improving launch vehicles 
and means of command, control, communication and 
information (C 31) that nuclear warfare calls for. Its "triad" launch 
vehicles for strategic nuclear force will be overhauled in a bid to 
raise the accuracy, viability and striking capabilities against hard 
urgets of nuclear weapons systems to unprecedented levels and 
achieve breakthroughs in C31. Russia continues to emphasize 
better striking power, targeting accuracy and mobility and the 
strengthening of its submarine-based nuclear force. Britain and 
France are likewise committed to upgrading and augmenting 
their strategic submanne-based nuclear force.^ 
A greater impetus to development of hi-tech conventional 
weapons and equipment, focusing on strengthening the naval 
and air forcesr Nuclear disarmament stimulates the development 
of conventional hi-tech and new-tech weapons and arms and 
such a new trend has gained greater prominence this year. More 
and more nations have come to realize that future warfare will 
take the form of information war in the shadow of nuclear 
deterrence. Conventional hi-tech weapons, involving less risk 
and of greater value in martial practice, might well be the key in 
determining the outcome of future warfare.-The US, Britain and 
France and other countries have all tilted towards hi-tech, high-
performance conventional weapons in their defence 
expenditure. The US has formulated a military build-up program 
for the 21^' century and set the objectives of organizing 
"digitalized" armed forces and battlefields The US believes that 
the core of information war lies in gaming the upper hand in the 
abilities to obtain, process and utilize information For that 
matter, the US has defined 27 key technology areas to ensure 
Its military preeminence ' Fjance, Germany, Britain and other 
West European countnes have decided to increase investment 
in defence-related science and technology and jointly develop 
selected projects which will play a key role in future warfare 
France and Germany, for instance, are pooling their resources 
to conduct research and development of a new generation of 
military satellites Japan has also decided to establish a compact 
hi-tech military force >Some developing nations also scramble to 
purchase AWACS aircraft, air tankers, reconnaissance satellites, 
anti-missile destroyers, anti-ballistic missile and other advanced 
arms and equipments "^^ 
A salient feature of hi-tech military building is emphasis on air 
and naval forces Be it nuclear or conventional disarmament, the 
emphasis has been on land forces, with little reduction of air or 
naval forces which, on the contrary, are growing evidently The 
US and Russia and both equipping there are and naval forces 
that are way ahead of other countnes with new type submarines, 
giant battleships and various more advanced aircraft The fourth-
generation strategic bomber will come into being shortly For a 
variety of reasons, the many littoral states have also given 
pnority to building up their naval and air forces Japan has 
started working on a new missile destroyer and is preparing for 
the construction of aircraft carriers and submannes India has 
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also laid down plans to import missile destroyers and Mirge-
2000 fighter jets. This symbiosis of quantitative reduction with 
qualitative improvement has posed new obstacles and 
challenges to international disarmament and arms control 
Efforts by the US to accelerate the development of anti-missile 
defence systems will have a direct impact on disarmament and 
spark off a fresh round of nuclear arms race. Contrary to the 
trend of disarmament and caution about proliferation, the US is 
quietly developing anti-missile defence systems and working on 
a new generation of anti-missile weapons capable of downing 
ballistic missiles. The US has emphasized time and again that 
the greatest threat it faces in the post-Cold War era is 
proliferation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and 
their delivery vehicles. After several years of debates, if formally 
decided in 1996 to develop and deploy multi-faceted anti-missile 
defence systems, mainly by these means: 1) Negotiation with 
Russia so as to modify the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), 
signed between the US and the USSR in 1972, because that 
treaty is an obstacle to the development of anti-missile defence 
systems. 2) Phased deployment. The US Department of 
Defence has decided to deploy defence systems against short-
range and medium-range missiles in the first place and suspend 
temporarily the deployment of higher level and nation-wide anti 
missile defence systems. The US is most worried about the 
prospect of so-called "rogue states" attacking its overseas 
targets with short-range and medium-range missiles. The 
Pentagon has decided to complete the deployment of anti-short-
range-missile defence systems by the end of the century. 3) 
increased appropriations. The US Congress endorsed an 
increased appropriation of US$450 million in 1996 for the 
development of short-range-missile defence systems and 
manufacture of new types of PARTIOT PAC-3 missiles. The 
Pentagon estimates that a minimum of US$14 billion would be 
required to establish a nation-wide anti-missile defence system. 
4) Working hand in hand with allies to enhance its theatre anti-
missile defence capabilities by drawing on their capital and 
technology. Besides, 10 countries and regions including Israel, 
Turkey, Saudi-Arabia, the Netherlands and Taiwan are installing 
or purchasing American anti-missile defence systems. The US 
argues for stronger international anti-proliferation mechanisms 
on the one hand. On the other, it heavily proliferates vahous 
advanced weapons including anti-missile weapons. ^'^ 
Issues relating to treaty implementation. Since the early 1990s, 
about a dozen disarmament and arms control treaties has been 
reached, taken effect or about to be signed soon between the 
US and Russia and also internationally on a multilateral basis. 
Treaty implementation will become a major issue confronting the 
international arms control and disarmament process. Judging 
from the developments of 1996, the following major issues, at 
least, will be encountered in treaty implementation. 
Since Amehcan ratification of the START II treaty in January 
1996, divergences on the issues within the Russian Duma have 
become more acute. Albeit President Boris Yelt sin specifically 
ordered that the treaty be ratified in the first half of 1996, no 
definite date of ratification is within sight as of the moment. Many 
opponents of the treaty within the Russian military and political 
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circles criticize the treaty as being unequal, by which 
Washington attempts to fundamentally weaken Russia. They 
demand that the ratification of the treaty be linked to NATO's 
eastern expansion and America's development of anti-missile 
defence systems and have proposed amendments to certain 
articles of the treaty. 
While effecting disarmament, the developed nations have sold 
huge quantities of arms and equipment and have added to 
instability of the regional military situation. Over the years, the 
US has been the No.1 arms dealer in the world. In 1995, the US 
exported US$22 billion worth of arms, accounting for 57 percent 
of the world's total arms sale. Britain and France, inter alia, 
feverishly tried to catch up and competed fiercely for a share of 
the arms market. The dumping of weapons world wide by 
developed counties is a hazard to the international community."*^ 
Up to the late 1980s it was generally assumed that any 
undeclared nuclear activities would have to be based on the 
diversion of nuclear material from safeguards. States 
acknowledged the possibility of nuclear activities entirely 
separate form those covered by safeguards, but it was assumed 
they would be detected by national intelligence activities. There 
was no particular effort requiring the IAEA to attempt to detect 
them. 
However, inspections in Iraq following the UN Gulf War cease-
fire resolution showed the extent of Iraq's clandestine nuclear 
weapons program, ii became clear that the IAEA would have to 
broaden the scope of its activities. Iraq was an NPT Party, and 
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had thus agreed to place all its nuclear material under IAEA 
safeguards. But the inspections revealed that it had been 
pursuing an extensive clandestine uranium enrichment program, 
as well as a nuclear weapons design program. 
The main thrust of Iraq's uranium enrichment program was the 
development of technology for electromagnetic isotope 
separation (EMIS) of indigenous uranium. The process used by 
regarding threading as used in the Manhattan Project to make 
the highly enriched uranium used in the Hiroshima bomb, but 
was abandoned soon afterwards. '*'* 
The DPRK acceded to the NPT in 1985 as a condition for the 
supply of a nuclear power station by the then USSR. However, it 
delayed concluding its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the 
IAEA, a process which should take only 18 months until April 
1992. 
During that period, in late 1985, it brought into operation a small 
gas-cooled, graphic-moderated, natural uranium (metal) fueled 
"Experimental Power Reactor" of about 25 MWt Yongbyon. It 
exhibited all the features of a plutonium production reactor for 
weapons purposes and produced only about 5 MWe. North 
Korea also made substantial progress in the construction of two 
larger reactors designed on the same principles, a prototype of 
about 200 MWt (50 MWe) at Yongbyon, and a full-scale version 
of about 800 MWt (200 MWe) at Taechon. 
In addition it completed and commissioned a reprocessing plant 
for the extraction of plutonium from spent reactor fuel. That 
Plutonium, if the fuel was only irradiated to very low burn-up. 
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would have been in a form very suitable for weapons. Although 
all these facilities at Yongbyon were to be under safeguards, 
there was always the risk that at some stage, the DPRK would 
withdraw from the NPT on some pretext and use the plutonium 
for weapons. 
One of the first steps in applying NPT safeguards is for the IAEA 
to verify that initial stocks of uranium and plutonium to ensure 
that all the nuclear material in the country have been declared 
for safeguards purpose. While under taking this work in 1992, 
IAEA inspectors found discrepancies which indicated that the 
reprocessing plant had been used more often then the DPRK 
had declared. This suggested that the DPRK could have 
weapons-grade plutonium which it had not declared to the IAEA. 
Information passed to the IAEA by a Member State (as required 
under the IAEA's Status) supported that suggestion by indicating 
that the DPRK had two undeclared waste or other storage sites. 
In February, 1993 the IAEA called on the DPRK to allow special 
inspections of the two sites so that the initial stocks of nuclear 
material could be verified. The DPRK refused, and on 12 March 
announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT (three months 
notice is required). In April 1993 the IAEA Board concluded that 
the DPRK was in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations 
and reported the matter to the UN Security Council. In June 
1993 the DPRK announced that it had "suspended" its 
withdrawal from the NPT, but subsequently claimed a "special 
status" with respect to its safeguards obligations. This was 
rejected by IAEA. 
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Once the DPRK's non-compliance had been reported to the UN 
Security Council, the essential part of the IAEA's mission had 
been completed. Inspections in the DPRK continued, although 
inspectors were increasingly hampered in what they were 
permitted to do by the DPRK's claim of a "special status". 
However, some 8,000 corroding fuel rods associated with the 
experimental reactor remained under close surveillance.'*^ 
Following bilateral negotiations between DPRK and the USA 
and the conclusion of the agreed framework in October 1994, 
the IAEA has been given additional responsibilities. The 
agreement requires a freeze on the operation and construction 
of the DPRK's plutonium production reactors and their related 
facilities, and the IAEA is responsible for monitoring the freeze 
until the facilities are eventually dismantled. The DPRK 
remained uncooperative with the IAEA verification work and did 
not comply with its safeguards agreement. 
Ultimately, the DPRK was persuaded to stop what appeared to 
be its nuclear weapons program in exchange, under the agreed 
framework, for about $US5 billion in energy-related assistance. 
This included two 1000 MWe light water nuclear power reactors. 
There was also the prospect of diplomatic and economic 
relations with the USA. 
In August 2002, with the project running several years behind 
schedule due to North Korea's continued lack of cooperation 
with the IAEA in verifying the history of its nuclear program, first 
concrete for the two-unit nuclear power plant was poured at 
Kumho, on the northeast coast. This formal start of construction 
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was a milestone for KEDO, which planned to deliver the main 
components in 2005. The work would then stop unless North 
Korea was fully compliant with IAEA requirements regarding 
verification of past activities (specifically, that all nuclear matenal 
held by North Korea has been declared and placed under 
safeguards)."*^ 
However, in October 2002 it emerged that DPRK had been 
working clandestinely to enrich uranium for weapons use, using 
centrifuge equipment. These appeared to be some linkage to 
Pakistan's centrifuge program and in 2005 Pakistan confirmed 
that it had supplied centrifuges to DPRK. 
In December 2002 DPRK removed the IAEA seals on its 
facilities at Yongbyon and ordered the IAEA inspectors out of the 
country. It has since restarted its small reactor and claims to 
have reprocessed the 8000 irradiated fuel rods to recover 
weapon-grade plutonium. In April 2003 it withdrew from the 
NPT- the first country to do so. 
Since 2003 negotiations have been intermittently under way to 
secure some agreement on curtailing North Korea's nuclear 
weapons program. These have involved China, South Korea 
and the USA, which has insisted upon "Complete, verifiable, and 
irreversible dismantling of North Korea's weapons programs" 
through "diplomatic dialogue in a multilateral framework 
involving those states with the most direct stakes in the 
outcome." 
Iran attracted world attention in 2002 when previously 
undeclared nuclear facilities became the subject of IAEA inquiry. 
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On investigation, the IAEA found inconsistencies in Iran's 
declarations to the Agency and raised questions as to whether 
Iran was in violation of its safeguards agreement, as a signatory 
oftheNPT. 
Iran joint the NPT in 1974 and in 1975-76 construction started 
on two 1293 MWe nuclear reactors comprising the Bushehr 
power station on the Persian Gulf. Siemens KWU was the 
contractor. After the Islamic revolution, payment was withheld 
and work was abandoned early in 1979 with unit I substantially 
complete. 
In 1994 Russia was brought in to complete unit 1 as a VVER-
1000 reactor. This necessitated major changes, including 
fabrication of all the rector components in Russia under a 
construction contractor with Atomstroy export. The reactor is due 
to start up in 2007. 
All fuel for the life of the reactor will be supplied from Russia, 
and it is intended that used fuel will be returned there, obviating 
the need for any fuel cycle facilities in Iran. All work has been 
under IAEA safeguards and operation will also be under 
safeguards. The Atomic Energy Organization of Iran has 
announced that construction of unit 2 is to proceed and that 
feasibility studies for a further 5000 MWe have been ordered ^'^ 
The momentum in disarmament and arms control will continue 
to be maintained in spite of problems and challenges. But at the 
same time we note that the existing international anti-
proliferation mechanisms cannot had nuclear proliferation 
altogether. A number of treaties and accords have been 
50 
concluded in recent years to curb nuclear proliferation. Such 
treaties and accords have their positive side but not entirely 
satisfactory with regard to certain articles because of its failure 
to give full expression to the just demands and reasonable 
positions of many developing countries including China. Some 
articles are clearly discriminatory. Moreover, these treaties and 
accords have failed to mention the conclusion of legal 
documentation on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons and so 
use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 
states and nuclear-free zones. No mention is made either of the 
need to concluded a convention on the comprehensive 
prohibition of nuclear weapons. Hence, it will be a protracted 
and arduous task to attain the lofty goal of comprehensive 
prohibition and through destruction of nuclear weapons. 
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CHAPTER-II ,-' : 
A Critical Analysis of U.S. Policy Towards 
Nuclearization 
"7/76 Mom bomb is too dangerous to be loose in a lawless 
world We must constitute ourselves trustee of this 
force It is an awful responsibility which has come to us 
instead of our enemies and we pray that He may guide us to 
use it in His way for His purpose. ^  
Harry Truman 
These words of President Truman show, how willingly the US is 
accepting the responsibility to save the world from nuclear 
annihilation. And, of course, it must be. Because US is 
responsible for manufacturing and using these weapons for the 
first time in the history of the world. On watching the first ever 
nuclear test conducted by the United States at New Mexico, 
Robert Oppenheimer along with other Manhattam scientists 
shouted , " We all are sons of the bitches now".^ 
Since then, this American scientist lobbied to play a central role 
in mitigating what he saw as impending crisis. Bird and Sherwin 
in their American Prometheus made Oppenheimer responsible 
for drafting a report for the UN commission—The Acheson-
Lilienthal report—that promoted 
Scientific transparency and cooperative disarmament. According 
to Bird and Sherwin the report was "a singular model for 
rationality in the nuclear age", also reflected a keen awareness 
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that the budding conflict with the Soviet Union could best be 
defused by pledging to rid the US of atomic weapons as a 
means of stopping the Soviet weapons program ^  
In January 1946, existence of even a few Atomic bombs so 
alarmed the United Nations General Assembly that it ordered 
the Atomic Energy Commission(AEC), which it had just 
established, to "make specific proposals", for the elimination 
from national armaments of Atomic weapons and of all other 
major weapons adaptable to mass destruction "^  
In June 1946 the United States representative to the ABC, 
Bernard Baruch, presented an Amencan plan on nuclear 
weapons to the commission "We are here to make a choice 
between the quick and the dead Science has torn from 
nature a secret so vast in its potentialities that our minds cover 
from the terror it creates Yet terror is not enough to inhibit the 
use of the Atomic bomb We must provide the mechanism to 
assure that atomic energy is used for peaceful purposes and 
preclude its use in war " ^ 
The Baruch plan proposed the creation of an International 
Atomic and Development Authority that would be entrusted with 
all phases of the development and use of Atomic energy Baruch 
urged that this authority alone possess the knowledge and 
control of all atomic energy activities "Potentially dangerous to 
world security," And the power to control, inspect, and license 
all other atomic activities Once this regime was in place he said 
the United states "then the sole producer" would stop the 
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manufacture of atomic bomb, and all existing bombs in the 
American arsenal would be eliminated. 
Cold War suspicions and ambitions stalled any action on the 
proposal, but its concerns and proposed solution reappeared in 
modified form in later plans. By the time President Eisenhower 
stepped up to the UN podium on December 8, 1953, the United 
States had conducted 42 tests explosion and had developed 
Hydrogen bombs with an explosive power in the range of 
millions to tons of TNT ( Compared to the 12000 to 20000 tons 
of TNT the bomb dropped on Hiroshima equaled). 
The dangers of this vertical proliferation or growth in one state's 
nuclear arsenal, were matched by the dangers of horizontal 
proliferation. Once the Soviet Union and Great Britain acquired 
their own nuclear weapons. This meant, two things Eisenhower 
feared. "First, the knowledge now possessed by several nations 
will eventually be shared by others-possibly all others. Second, 
even a vast superiority in numbers of weapons...is no 
prevention, of itself, against the fearful material damage and toll 
of human lives that would be inflicted by surprise aggression". 
Nations naturally had begun building warning and defensive 
systems against nuclear air attacks. But, he warned, "Let no one 
think that the expenditure of vast sums for weapons and 
systems of defense can guarantee absolute safety for the cities 
and citizens of any nation. The awful arithmetic of the atomic 
bomb does not permit of any such easy solution".^ 
As part of his solution , Eisenhower proposed the creation of 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which would 
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promote the peaceful uses of atomic energy while the world's 
nuclear powers "began to diminish the potential destructive 
power of the world's atomic stockpiles". 
By the time the IAEA became open for membership in 1956, the 
disarmament components of the original vision were gone. The 
agency retained dual-some would say contradictory objectives. 
The IAEA was directed to "accelerate and enlarge the 
contnbution of atomic energy to peace", and to ensure that its 
assistance "is not used in such a way to further any military 
purpose." 
John Kennedy tned to revive efforts to eliminate nuclear 
weapons. On September 25, 1961, he presented to the UN a 
"Program for General and Complete Disarmament", "The 
weapons of war must be abolished", he said, "before they 
abolish us". His ambitious plan included all the elements that 
negotiators still pursue today: a comprehensive nuclear test 
ban; a ban on the production of fissionable materials for use in 
weapons (plutonium and highly enriched uranium); the 
placement of all weapons materials under international 
safeguards; a ban on the transfer of nuclear weapons, their 
materials or their technology; and deep reductions in existing 
nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles, with the goal of 
eventually eliminating them.^ 
Kennedy undoubtedly recognized the practical national and 
international political obstacles to such a plan. Nevertheless, the 
President presented a vision-part propaganda-of the world he 
and his country sought. "The mere existence of modern 
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weapons-10 million times more powerful than anything the world 
has ever seen and only minutes away from any target on earth-
is a source of horror and discord and distrust", he said "Men 
may no longer pretend that the quest for disarmament is a sign 
of weakness, for in a spiraling arms race a nation's security 
may well be shrinking even as its arms increase". 
In 1961, Kennedy established the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency (ACDA) to coordinate the government's 
pursuit of these goals. One of the agency's first tasks was to 
begin negotiations between the United States and the Soviet 
Union on a treaty to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. 
According to George Bunn, the first ACDA general counsel and 
a principal member of the NPT negotiating team, " The basic 
purpose of the NPT was to provide another choice-to establish a 
common nonproliferation norm that would assure cooperating 
nuclear weapon 'have-not' countries that if, they did nor acquire 
nuclear weapons, their neighbors and rivals would not do so 
either."^ 
There was much confusion in the early years of the cold wars, 
about what constituted "Mutual Deterrence". Some confused it 
with the possession of nuclear capability by both sides Others 
believed it arose when both sides had roughly the same number 
of nuclear weapons. However, strategists were quick to point out 
that there is a big difference between a balance of terror in 
which each side has the capacity to obliterate the other, and one 
in which both sides have that capacity, no matter who strikes 
first. In other words, it is not the 'balance' of an arms race that 
constitutes mutual deterrence; it is the stability of the balance. A 
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stable balance only exists when neither side is stnking first can 
destroy the other's ability to stnke back merely equaling or 
matching the weapon system of the enemy misconstrues the 
nature of the problem To deter an attack means being able to 
strike back in spite of it It means being able to strike second 
with 'assured destruction' capability 
But even this is not quite true Deterrence does not mean that 
both sides must have efficient retaliatory system, it only means 
that each side must think the other had This is so because 
deterrence is pnmaniy a psychological phenomenon If both 
sides have invulnerable deterrence forces, but neither side 
believes that the other has, then the situation, is one of extreme 
instability, because each side will believe it could launch a 
successful attack And if neither side has deterrence capacity, 
but both Sides believe that the other side has it, then the 
situation IS one of mutual deterrence even if all the objective 
requirements are missing In other words, whether or not a 
situation of mutual deterrence exists depends on the state of 
mind or the mental image which one side has of the other, and it 
IS not automatically connected with real-world objective military 
capabilities ^ 
Whatever might be the definition or purpose of nuclear 
deterrence in the eyes of the analysts, the practical 
expenence of the US Secretary of State Hennery Kissenger 
provides more authentic and reliable conclusion 
In a nuclear age the basic problem of strategy is in establishing 
a relationship between a policy of deterrence and a strategy 
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for fighting a war in case deterrence fails From the point of view 
of its impact on the aggressor's actions maximum deterrence 
can be equated with the threat of maximum destructiveness 
From the point of view of a power's readiness to resist 
aggression, the optimum strategy is one which is able to achieve 
its gaols at maximum cost °^ 
The horror and the power of modern weapons tend to paralyze 
action horror will make few issues seem worth contending for, 
the power causes may dispute to seem irrelevant to the over-all 
strategic equation The psychological equations, therefore, will 
almost inevitably operate against the side which can extricate 
itself from the situation only by the threat of all-out war As the 
power of modern weapons grows, the threat of all out wars loses 
its credibility and therefore its political effectiveness Our 
(U S A's) capacity for massive retaliation did not avert the 
Korean war, the loss of northern Indochina, the Soviet-Egyptian 
arms deal, or the Suez cnsis 
The power of modern weapons force our statesmanship to cope 
with the fact that absolute security is no longer possible 
Whatever the validity of identifying deterrence with maximum 
retaliatory power, we will have to sacrifice a measure of 
destructiveness to gam the possibility of fighting wars that will 
not amount to national catastrophe Policy, it has been said, is 
the science of the relative The same is true of strategy, and to 
understand this fact, so foreign of our national expenence, is the 
task history has set our generation ^^  
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Dunng the 1980s and early 1990s the Regan administration 
developed the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) which was an 
Anti Ballistic Missile System. The concept was to form a 
defensive shield against the nuclear attack from the Soviet 
Union. The popular press designated the program as "Star 
Wars" and was often critical of its extreme cost . The initial focus 
of the SDI was a nuclear explosion powered X-Ray laser 
designed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory by a 
young scientist named Peter Haglestein who worked with a team 
called O Group, doing much of the work in the late seventies 
and early eighties. O Group was headed by physicist Lowell 
Wood, a friend of Edward Teller, the "father of the Hydrogen 
bomb". In 1983 President Reagan was told of Hagelstean's 
breakthrough by Teller, which prompted Reagan's 'Star War' 
speech on March 8, 1983. 
Though the program initially focused on large scale systems 
designed to defeat a Soviet offensive strike. However, as the 
threat diminished, the program shifted towards smaller systems 
designed to defeat limited or accidental launches. By 1987 the 
SDIO developed a national missile defense concept called the 
Strategic Defense System Phase-1 Architecture. This concept 
consisted of ground and space based sensors and weapons , as 
well as central battle management system. The ground based 
systems operational today trace their roots back to this concept. 
In his 1991 State of the Union address George H. W Bush 
shifted the focus of SDI from defence of North America against 
large scale strikes to a system focusing on theatre missile 
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defense called Global Protection Against Limited Strike 
(GPALS) 
In a televised speech of March 23'^  1983, President Reagan 
asked the Amencan Public for its support of the defence budget 
he had submitted to Congress To gam this, he explained the 
key principle of military strategy in the nuclear age ('deterrence 
of aggression through the promise of retaliation') and highlighted 
the dramatically increased military power of the Soviet Union 
This power, he claimed, undermined the ability of the US to 
guarantee retaliation and thus to maintain deterrence 
The Soviet have enough accurate and powerful nuclear 
weapons to destroy virtually all of our missiles on the ground ^ ^ 
In response to this threat, Reagan called for a continuation of 
the 'major modernization program' of conventional and nuclear 
forces which he had initiated after taking office in January 1981 
The President framed the mam body of his speech with a 
futuristic vision At the beginning he promised to reveal, 'a 
decision which offers a new hope for our children in the twenty-
first century', and at the end be outlined 'a mission to counter the 
awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are 
defensive' He asked 
What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their 
security did not rest on the threat of instant US retaliation to 
deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy 
strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or 
that of our allies'? 
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Reagan acknowledged that 'this is a formidable technical task', 
but he was confident that 'the scientific community who gave us 
nuclear weapons' could now 'turn their great talents to the cause 
of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering 
these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete' As an important 
first step, the President initiated 
A long-term research and development program to begin to 
achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by 
strategic nuclear missiles 
Reagan's vision of missile defense turned this address into one 
of the most controversial and influential presidential speeches of 
the 1980s Some political analysts argue that by dramatically 
raising the stakes in the military competition between the US 
and the Soviet Union, Reagan's missile defense program paved 
the way for the success of later arms reduction talks However, 
when Senator Edward Kennedy first attached the 'Star Wars' 
label to Reagan's vision in comments made on the floor of the 
Senate the day after the speech, it was to accuse the President 
of 'misleading Red Scare tactics and reckless Star Wars 
schemes', Kennedy's comments were meant to point out the 
fantastic nature of Reagan's missile defense program and the 
real dangers of his escalation of the arms race into space Yet, 
despite these critical intentions, the 'Star Wars' label was so 
evocative and ambivalent that it was immediately embraced by 
some of Reagan's supporters, and henceforth the programm, 
which did not acquire its official-and rather uninspiring-title 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) until the spnng of 1984, was 
universally known as 'Star Wars' 
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In subsequent decades, the notion of effective missile defence 
was gradually displaced by the pnnciple of nuclear deterrence 
(appropriately known as MAD, for Mutually Assured 
Destruction) However, in the late 1970s, interest in strategic 
defence systems re-emerged in certain scientific, military and 
political circles which exerted a strong influence on Reagan, who 
was already opposed to the concept of offence-based nuclear 
deterrence and genuinely concerned about the vulnerability of 
the US in the event of a nuclear attack ^^  
Since the end of the Cold Was, a number of arms control 
advocates, politicians, and military officers have argued that the 
United States should substantially reduce its reliance upon 
nuclear weapons Taking that argument to an extreme, a loosely 
knit group of retired military officers, scientists, and defense 
intellectuals maintains that the elimination of nuclear weapons 
should be an explicit goal of the United States The abolitionists 
contend that the only plausible use of nuclear weapons is to 
deter nuclear attack and that getting rid of nuclear weapons 
would eliminate this rationale Although those holding more 
moderate views find this argument impractical, they too are 
ambivalent about nuclear deterrence, claiming that the risk of 
accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons 
outweighs any conceivable benefit Some abolitionists and many 
military officers maintain that conventional precision-guided 
munitions (PGMs) offer an effective alternative to nuclear 
weapons 
While the abolitionists and their less extreme brethren perform a 
valuable service by subjecting nuclear weapons to critical 
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scrutiny, they overstate both the level of public support for their 
case and the viability of conventional alternatives. A careful 
assessment of public attitudes toward nuclear weapons reveals 
considerable skepticism toward nuclear disarmament. Nor can 
PGMs take the place of weapons. The U S. armed forces must 
overcome daunting technological and organizational barriers 
before PGMs are truly capable of deterring and defending 
against weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Without a candid 
discussion of what conventional weapons can and cannot do, 
the United States risks a dangerous erosion of its nuclear 
deterrent before laying the groundwork for an alternative 
defense posture. ^ ^ 
While nuclear weapons played an important role in U.S. strategy 
dunng the Cold War, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the 
collapse of the Soviet Union have triggered a reassessment of 
nuclear weapons policy within the defense community. The first 
call to reconsider the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national 
security policy came from an unlikely source. In an article written 
in January 1994, Paul H. Nitze argued that it was time for the 
United States to reexamine its reliance upon nuclear deterrence 
He reasoned that the threat of nuclear retaliation would be 
unlikely to deter aggression by regional powers, and that the 
U S government would be unwilling to use nuclear weapons to 
punish such a move. As a result, he recommended converting 
the principal U.S. strategic deterrence from nuclear weapons to 
PGMs. Nitze believed that such a force would give the United 
States of more credible and flexible deterrence. He argued that 
"It may well be that conventional strategic weapons will one day 
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perform their pnmary mission of deterrence immeasurable better 
than nuclear weapons if only because we can, and will, use 
them •' ^^  
Whereas Nitze sought to enhance deterrence, those who have 
dominated the ensuing debate have sought to abolish it In late 
1995 the Australian government formed the Canberra 
Commission for the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, a group 
comprising such experienced policymakers as former secretary 
of defense Robert McNamara and former French pnme minister 
Michel Rocard The commission's report, issued in August 1996, 
called on the United States, Russia, China, Britain, and France 
to commit themselves to the elimination of all nuclear weapons 
The commission's members rejected the argument that the 
possession of nuclear weapons deters war To them, the notion 
that nuclear states would be able to retain their arsenals 
indefinitely without the possibility of nuclear weapons' being 
used lacked credibility They argued that the only way to 
eliminate the threat of nuclear war would be to abolish nuclear 
weapons To achieve this goal, the commission recommended 
that the nuclear states should reduce the readiness of their 
strategic nuclear forces, eliminate their tactical nuclear arsenals, 
end nuclear testing, and initiate negotiations to reduce further, 
the size of the American and Russian nuclear stockpiles They 
also called upon the nuclear powers to agree unanimously not to 
be the first to use nuclear weapons nor to use them against non-
nuclear states 
For him, nuclear deterrence represented not a force for stability, 
but rather a catalyst for conflict As he put it, deterrence rests 
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upon an "embedded assumption of hostility and associated 
preference for forces in high states of alert," a posture that could 
lead to war through accident or miscalculation He was dubious 
of the ability of nuclear weapons to deter the use of chemical or 
biological weapons by rogue states He claimed, in short, that a 
world free from the threat of nuclear was had to be devoid of 
nuclear weapons ^^  
Given Butler's intimate contact with nuclear doctrine and 
weapons throughout his military career, his conversion to 
abolitionism was certainly stnking It was not, however, unique 
In the wake of Butler's speech, sixty-one retired generals and 
admirals from seventeen countnes, including Charles Horner, 
William Odom, John Galvin, and Andrew Goodpaster of the 
United States, Lord Carver and Sir Huge Beach of Great Britain, 
and Boris Gromov and Alexander Lebed of Russia, joined the 
chorus calling for nuclear abolition In February 1998, 120 
former civilian leaders from forty-six countries, including jimmy 
Carter, Lord Callaghan, Mikhail Gorbachey, Helmur Schmidt, 
and Pierre Trudeau, released a statement supporting the 
eventual elimination of nuclear weapons Goodpaster went on to 
lead a study group under the sponsorship of the Henry L 
Stimson Center The group's March 1997 report, An Amencan 
Legacy Building a Nuclear Weapon Free World, argued that the 
president should commit the United States unequivocally to the 
elimination of WMD and advance the cause by seeking 
ratification of the Chemical Weapons Convention and 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and by negotiation a third 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty It also called for a blank-sheet 
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review of U S nuclear weapons policy, a cutoff in the production 
of fissile material, and an invitation to others to participate in 
nuclear threat reduction activities ^^  
Although the abolitionists are a loosely knit group, they share a 
number of core beliefs The first is that the only rational purpose 
for nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack, a possibility that 
would disappear if nuclear weapons were eliminated. In addition, 
the abolitionists argue that nuclear weapons cannot deter 
attempts by regional powers to coerce or invade their neighbors, 
protect U S troops from attack, or deter or respond to the use of 
chemical or biological weapons. Hence, the costs and nsks 
associated with nuclear weapons outweigh the benefits of 
possessing them. General Butler has portrayed deterrence as "a 
formula for unmitigated catastrophe...premised on a litany of 
unwarranted assumptions, improvable assertions and logical 
contradiction " In his eyes, "the threat to use nuclear weapons is 
indefensible " 
A second assumption, which flows from the first, is that the 
elimination of nuclear weapons will produce a safer world As 
the members of the Canberra Commission put it, "a central 
reality" Left out of the abolitionist abolitionist argument is the 
relationship between nuclear deterrence and the outbreak of 
conventional war In fact, many people have argued that nuclear 
deterrence helped to prevent war between the United States and 
Soviet Union. While the abolition of nuclear weapons would, by 
definition, eliminate the possibility of nuclear war, it could 
increase the potential of conventional war 
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A final, often implicit, assumption is that non-nuclear munitions 
offer a viable alternative to nuclear weapons Nitze has made 
the case most explicitly, but the assumption clearly figures in 
other arguments as well The National Academy of Sciences 
Committee on International Security and Arms Control, for 
example, argues that the United States' conventional superiority 
over potential adversanes will allow it to restnct its nuclear 
arsenal to the deterrence of nuclear attack or coercion Andrew 
Krepinevich and Steven Kosiak, while not abolitionists, 
nonetheless agree that ROMs will permit the United States to 
make deep reductions in its nuclear arsenal The central 
question is whether non-nuclear PGMs will be able to deter 
aggression and-failing that-whether they can carry out the same 
missions as nuclear weapons ^^  
The overnding interest of the United States in South Asia lies in 
the establishment of positive and constructive relations with 
India, a rising power with one sixth of the world's population 
India is growing economically at an average annual rate of 7% , 
and IS developing significant military power projection 
capabilities that will make it an increasingly important factor in 
the Asia balance of power and in global councils 
The key to a constructive American relationship with India and 
with neighbonng Pakistan is to avoid embroilment in their 
struggle over the terms of their power relationship Yet dunng 
the cold war the United States became enmeshed in this 
struggle Amencan policy assigned a clear pnority to relations 
With Pakistan by providing a total of $3 8 billion in military aid to 
Pakistani military rulers that was nominally directed against the 
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communist powers but was in practice used to strengthen 
Pakistan relative to India 
The psychological and political legacy of this cold war American 
tilt continues to trouble United States relations with India despite 
the steady growth in economic and cultural ties Shortly after 
Prime Minister of India I K Gujral assumed office in May 1997 
The New York Times, in a profile of the new Indian leader, 
recalled the strained atmosphere that had marked a recent 
meeting between Gujral and a prominent American senator 
Gujral "maintained an air of studied distance," and aide to the 
senator told the Times "There was a kind of bristling feeling, as 
though there were bad memones that had not been fully laid to 
rest" 
In Pakistan the cold war years have also left painful memories 
that impede constructive relations with the United States ^ ^ 
The most sensitive issue in American relations with the South 
Asian countries especially India and Pakistan is the issue of 
nuclear non proliferation and nuclear arms control Since the 
end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
American self image as the "only super power" has reinforced 
the American assumption that the nuclear club should be 
restricted to its five present members and that the United States 
IS entitled to have the biggest-and best-nuclear arsenal in order 
to preserve international stability In pressing India and Pakistan 
to sign the NPT, the United States has presented its position in 
benign, altruistic terms, emphasizing its desire to help prevent a 
nuclear war in South Asia The implication is that South Asian 
are irrational fanatics who cannot be trusted with the bomb and 
that deterrence, which was the basis of the United States 
strategic doctrine during the cold war, will not work in the non-
Western world Since the United States is the only country that 
has ever used nuclear weapons, this American emphasis on the 
nuclear danger in South Asia is viewed in India and Pakistan as 
at best patronizing and at worst racist 
Many Indians have what might be called a "post-dated" self-
image, they are confident that India is on the way to great power 
status and want others to treat them as if it has already arnved 
By the same token, to many Americans India's ambitions are 
pretentious nonsense, given its widespread poverty, and New 
Delhi should be prepared to deal with the United States on the 
basis of the actual power relationship between the two countries 
This IS the normal attitude for a powerful state to adopt in 
relations with a less powerful state, but its practical effect, in the 
case of India, is to reinforce nationalist feeling, including support 
for nuclear weapons 
India's space program also acquires growing sophistication It is 
developing technical capabilities that could be used to make 
intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United 
States possibly within 10 years Meanwhile, by marking clear 
that It IS capable of rapidly assembling and delivenng short-
range and intermediate range nuclear weapons through its 
Prithvi and Agni missile programs, India is attempting to assert 
major power status without incurnng the economic and 
diplomatic costs that overt weaponization would involve 
U S Secretary of Defense William J Perry announced a basic 
reversal of Amencan nuclear policy in South Asia and said on 
Jan 31, 1995, in a talk before the New York based Foreign 
Policy Association "I recognize that the nuclear capabilities of 
India and Pakistan flow from a dynamic that we are unlikely to 
be able to influence in the near term. Rather then seeking to roll 
back - which we have concluded is unattainable in these two 
countries we have decided, instead to seek to cap their nuclear 
capabilities" 
Despite this pronouncement, the United States has failed to give 
India and Pakistan concrete incentives to cap their nuclear 
weapons potential at present levels. Yet the Perry declaration 
has opened up the possibility of a pragmatic bargain between 
India and the United States that could achieve the capping 
objective and, more broadly, reduce tensions over 
nonproliferation that could threaten the stability of the Indo-
American relationship 
In such a bargain, India would retain its nuclear weapons option 
but would agree to a series of concessions that would make its 
commitment to capping unambiguous and also provide political 
cover for the Clinton administration to make parallel American 
concessions An accommodation between India and the United 
States on nonproliferation and nuclear arms control issues is a 
prerequisite for a parallel accommodation with Pakistan. 
First, India would seek a compromise with the United States in 
their current dispute over India's refusal to sign the test ban 
treaty One approach would be to sign the treaty while reserving 
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the nght to conduct further tests (as China has done) until the 
treaty goes into force. Another approach would be to stop testing 
without signing the treaty, either immediately or after further 
tests The Indian government could make a declaration, 
endorsed by parliament, citing the key clauses of the treaty and 
explicitly pledging that India will unilaterally comply with these 
provisions 
Second, India would agree to extend the application of 
International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards, now limited to 
its Tarapur nuclear reactor, to all of its existing and future civilian 
nuclear reactors, and would sign the fissile material cutoff 
convention now being negotiated, which would require similar 
safeguards to confirm that fissile material is not being diverted 
from power reactors for military use. (This would not constitute 
the "full-scope" safeguards hitherto demanded by the United 
States because inspections of research reactors and 
reprocessing facilities would still be barred. 
Third, India would make a binding commitment not to export 
nuclear technology, formalizing its present de facto policy. This 
would place New Delhi in accord with a key provision of the 
NPT 
The United States for its part, would have to make clear that it is 
reconciled to India's acquisition of the nuclear weapons option 
and avoid policies suggesting that it still harbors the "rollback" 
objective. In particular, the United States would have to end its 
ban on the sale of nuclear reactors to India and other restrictions 
on United States cooperation with India's civilian nuclear power 
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program, starting with restrictions on Unitet States cooperation 
on nuclear safety. This would require amendment of the 1978 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act to allow exports of Nuclear 
technology under specified conditions.^° 
The United S.tates is now without doubt the dominant military 
power in the world. With twelve-battle-carrier groups and 
hundreds of military bases spread around the world, the US 
spent $455 billion on its armed forces in 2005, with another $82 
billion marked for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
This is more than the total sum spent by the next thirty-two 
countnes down the list, and is close to 50% of total world military 
spending. The quadrennial defense review released by the 
Pentagon on 3 February 2006 and the federal budget for fiscal 
year 2007 released on 6 February schedule further increases 
both of military spending and of the range of operational 
program. 
'Open Democracy's' global security correspondent Paul Rogers 
points out: "As these budgets increase, almost every other area 
of federal spending is reduced-clear evidence of the 
overarching priority of fighting the war...This is clearly a global 
war, and the world as a whole is involved, whether or not it 
wants to be" 
Moreover, the united states shows every sign of determination to 
use as well as expand this military power. US military doctrines 
have shifted away from deterrence to preemption, unilateral 
military intervention, and simultaneously fighting several local 
wars overseas. The US military has put in place a 2004"lntrim 
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global strike alert order" from Donald Rumsfeld that requires it 
to be ready to attack hostile counthes that are developing 
weapons of mass destruction, specifically Iran and North-Korea. 
The military claims to be able to carry out such attacks within 
"half a day or less" and to use nuclear weapons in such an 
attack.^^ 
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CHAPTER - UI 
India's 9{udcar Policy 
CHAPTER-II I 
INDIA'S NUCLEAR POLICY 
India maintained its position in favor of abjuring nuclear 
weapons until Jawaharlal Nehru was at the helm of affairs, 
though one can quote remarks and observations by him which 
indicated that he had not entirely ruled out the option of India 
acquiring nuclear weapon. After the death of Jawaharlal Nehru, 
India decided to depart from the idealistic path and prepared 
itself for acquiring nuclear weapons in case it became 
necessary. Instructions to this effect seem to have been given 
during the Prime Ministership of Lai Bahadur Shastri. In 1968, 
India decided not to accede to the Nuclear Non-proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), and thus, kept open its option of acquiring nuclear 
weapons. In 1974, Pokhran-I test was carried out which 
demonstrated that India had not only kept its option open but 
also was capable of fabricating nuclear weapons. Information 
made available recently indicate that several times in the recent 
past in 1982 during Mrs. Indira Gandhi's regime, in 1995 when 
Mr. Narasimha Rao was in power, and in 1997 when Mr. I. K. 
Gujral was the Pnme Minister, the Government of India had 
made all the preparations for carrying out nuclear weapons 
tests, but ultimately resiled from it under a variety of pressures. 
In 1996, India did not sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) because it wanted to keep open not only its option to 
acquire nuclear weapon - a purpose which could have been 
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served by our non-accession to the NPT - but also the manner 
in which the option would be exercised.^ 
In the history of Indian Nuclear Policy Oct. 16,1964, was one of 
the defining and critical moments. Up to that date India only 
thought of developing a capability which could be converted into 
a nuclear weapon option, if it become necessary. When China 
became a nuclear weapon power, detonated its first nuclear 
device on Oct 1969, India felt threatened by this turn of event. 
China which was involved in an armed conflict with India in1962, 
became a nuclear weapon power. Thus it became imperative for 
Indian Policy-makers to give serious consideration for the 
country acquiring nuclear weapons. A few days after Dr. Bhabha 
talked of India being in a position to go nuclear in about 18 
months following a decision and that it would cost only Rs.18 
Lakhs per weapon. He was immediately rebuked by V. K. 
Knshna Menon who was a fervent anti-nuclear campaigner. ^ 
In 1955, Homi Bhabha, presided over the first U.N. conference 
on the peaceful uses of atomic energy in Geneva, argued that 
India needed to develop nuclear power to augment its energy 
base. The reasons were the growing demand for the electricity 
of a large population, coal resources were localized to only 
some parts of India and transport over long distances added 
significantly to the real cost at the consuming end, and finally 
India depended excessively on burning wood and agricultural 
waste (including cow dung) which was wasteful of resources 
having important alternative uses.^ 
Continuing his argument in the second U.N. conference on the 
peaceful uses of atomic energy held in Geneva, in 1958. Homi 
Bhabha held forth that developing countries like India needed 
nuclear power ever more than the industrialized ones which had 
already invested heavily in fossil fuel power generation. 
In 1959, India took a decision to set up its first nuclear power 
station in western India, in the vicjnity of Bombay. The site (of 
Tarapur) was chosen in 1961 and global bids were invited for 
building the power station. The contract for construction of 
India's first nuclear power station (with two boiling water 
reactors) was given to the General Electrics, a U.S. company, in 
mid 1964. Both the units became fully operational in the autumn 
of 1969. During 1960 to 1970 India concentrated on completing 
the Indo-USLP/i^ject at Tarapur and Indo-Canadian Project in 
Rajasthan (near Kota). Techniques of quality control and non-
destructive testing were areas requiring special training. It was 
an exhilarating period as the young engineers and scientists of 
the Indian Atomic Energy Program were simultaneously 
engaged in learning and training others in the many facets of 
nuclear technology. Indian industry was being inducted to the 
extent possible through development contracts and extensive 
shop floor training. In the latter half of the Sixties, a decision was 
taken that the third atomic project would be taken up as a total 
Indian effort with full responsibility for design, engineering, 
manufacture, erection and commissioning resting with Indians. 
At that time there were no embargoes or technology denials-
they would come, but much later. It was an act of faith that as 
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early as possible India should acquire comprehensive 
capabilities to build and operate nuclear power plants.'* 
During the period 1970-1980,the Indian atomic energy program 
took on the task of producing the nuclear matenals, namely 
uranium and heavy water, in quantities required by the reactor 
construction program. Process technologies were developed at 
the Bhabha Atomic Research Center, Trombay and engineering 
and fabrication activities were embarked upon to put up 
industrial scale plants. Production of nuclear fuel and heavy 
water certainly posed many challenges and there were 
disappointments and delays along the way. Eventually they were 
solved and Indian industry began to supply equipments and 
components required for these construction facilities. Other 
technological enterprises that were set up during this period 
included an electronics industry for producing reactor control 
and instrumentation. High vacuumed techniques, metal 
deposition and coating process and similar specialized activities 
were taken up. One of the biggest challenges encountered in ail 
these activities related to quality up gradation of various section 
of Indian Industry. This has been one of the biggest spin-off 
benefits of the atomic energy program.^ 
When the first unit of Madras Atomic Power Station was started 
in 1983, it was indeed a proud moment for the country and the 
atomic energy establishment. The countries which had the 
capability to design and build nuclear power units on their own 
technology at that time were the U.S, the U.S.S.R, France, 
Germany, Japan, Canada, the U.K and Sweden. India had 
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managed to join this select club in spite of limited industrial and 
technological base. The second unit of Madras Atomic Power 
Station was commissioned in 1985. Earlier on, work had 
commenced on an atomic power station with two units at 
Narora, on the banks of river Ganga, some distance away from 
Delhi. This site is located in a seismic zone and so extensive 
analyses of the design and validation with testing preceded the 
finalization of designs. For this reason, the gestation period was 
longer than initially foreseen. The first unit of this station was 
commissioned in 1989.^ 
From the early eighties, serious consideration was given to a 15 
year plan for a development of nuclear power. In the earlier 
phase, projects were taken up with rather large time gaps and 
the project execution times were rather long, mainly due to 
learning curve problems. It was recognized that designs and 
major equipment had to be standardized for a number of units. 
Long time cycle equipments was best ordered well ahead of civil 
construction at site. Also this equipment was to be ordered in 
batch mode rather than one or two at a time if manufacturing 
cycle times were to be minimized. It was also recognized that 
much greater mechanization of construction was a must. The 15 
year plan was not only looked at the nuclear power units but 
also at matching capacities for production of fuel and heavy 
water. In 1985, a program of constructing ten reactors of 235 
MW(the size that were standardized for the units at Madras and 
Narora) and ten of 500 MW-a larger version -was approved by 
the government of India. In addition to the units in operation and 
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those under construction, the target was 10,000MW of nuclear 
power by the year 2000 A D 
Although the nuclear power program described above meant a 
large scale expansion of activities, there was a need to target for 
an even higher nuclear power capacity because of the rise in 
demand for electricity The Soviet Union had been assisting 
India in the field of thermal and hydro-electnc power for several 
decades For 1978 onwards, the Soviet Union had been hinting 
that they could cooperate with India in the field of nuclear power 
also They offered to build in India light water reactors of soviet 
design (referred to as VVER) with a capacity of 440 MW But 
after the breakup of the Soviet Union, virtually no progress was 
made on the Indian soviet project The development in the 
nuclear field was halted dunng 1990's Initially in1990-91, India 
had a two short lived Governments which were mainly 
concerned with the existential problems The Congress 
Government under P, V Narsimha Rao was in minority initially 
and dunng this period India was facing a severe financial crisis 
Thus the new economic policy of P V Narsimha Rao and his 
Finance Minister Manmohan Singh was to let the private sector 
into power generation and reduce direct investments from the 
government of India in this activity and no new starts were made 
on any nuclear power units during 1990-1996 Of the program of 
15 years, only four reactors of 235MW had been started The 
second unit at Narora and two units at Kakarapara (in Gujarat), 
started in 1980's were completed and put into service ^  
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When China exploded its first nuclear weapon in October 1964, 
the then Government of India sent an emissary to the United 
States to explore the possibility of latter providing a nuclear 
umbrella to India. The United States expressed its inability to 
oblige. Then India tried its best to seek security from nuclear 
weapons within the framework of global measures for nuclear 
disarmament. It took a series of initiatives for this purpose. Apart 
from taking the lead in 1954 for seeking a ban on nuclear 
weapons tests, India was one of the leading countries which 
moved the resolution in the General Assembly in the early 1960s 
for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. What India 
had in mind while taking this initiative was to prevent both 
vertical and horizontal proliferation. Unfortunately, the outcome 
was far removed from the original purpose conceived by India. 
The NPT provided for the prevention of only horizontal 
proliferation. In 1982, India took the initiative for setting in motion 
negotiations for the adoption of a convention on the non-use of 
nuclear weapons; and for a freeze on the production of 
weapons-grade fissile material. Finally in 1988 India submitted 
to the 3^ ^ Special Session of the UN General Assembly devoted 
to disarmament (SSODIII) s comprehensive plan for the 
elimination of nuclear weapons. This plan, which came to be 
known as the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan, suggested the 
eliminated of nuclear weapons in three stages by the year 2012. 
It also suggested a freeze of collateral measures to facilitate the 
process of moving towards elimination as well as long-term 
measures for luring in and sustaining a nuclear weapons free 
world. Three initiatives did not elicit any positive response from 
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the nuclear weapon powers Through all the initiatives that India 
succeed, the primary purpose was to rid the world of nuclear 
weapons For, India believed that this was the only framework in 
which It could avert threat to its secunty emanating from 
countries armed with nuclear weapons However, the nuclear 
weapons states remained adamant on their opposition to the 
elimination of nuclear weapons and on their insistence on the 
right to possess and was nuclear weapons The last occasion 
when their categones and unambiguous position on this issue 
was reiterated was the heanng before the International Court of 
Justice on the issue of the legality of the possession and use of 
nuclear weapons ^  
In the meanwhile, on May 18,1974 India had exploded its first 
nuclear device at Pokhran (Rajasthan) to which it named as 
peaceful nuclear explosion (PNE) India is the only country 
whose first nuclear device was conducted underground All the 
five nuclear weapons states had conducted their first nuclear 
test in the atmosphere 
Militarily, India's nuclear option is pnmanly a response to the 
Chinese nuclear weapons posture, and politically it reflects a 
determination to achieve greater recognition in global forums 
Besides, it is India's goal to escape from second-class status in 
world affairs and receive recognition commensurate with its 
position as one of the world's oldest and largest civilizations 
Since nuclear weapons still constitute the pnncipal com of 
power, this quest for equitable status has prompted India to 
perfect its ability to assemble and deliver nuclear weapons-
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unless and until the existing nuclear weapons states make 
credible progress toward a nuclear free world.^ 
India exploded its first nuclear rest in 1974,to which it named as 
P.N.E.(peaceful Nuclear Explosion).After almost a gap of 24 
years, on May 11,1998 Indian P.M.Atal Bihari Vajpayee 
announced that New Delhi had conducted three nuclear tests, 
one which involved the detonation of thermo nuclear device. 
Two days later India announced that it had conducted two more 
detonators that purportedly "completed the planned series of 
underground tests". The nuclear test that India conducted was 
code named as "BUDDHA IS SMILING" which espoused the 
case of non-violence in its long history of over five thousand 
years chose to shun its oft-stated goals of global disarmament in 
favor of the going nuclear in the summer of 1998.^° 
When China exploded its first nuclear weapon in October 1964, 
the then Government of India sent an emissary to the United 
States to explore the possibility of latter providing a nuclear 
umbrella to India. The United States expressed its inability to 
oblige. Then India tried its best to seek security from nuclear 
Weapons within the framework of global measures for nuclear 
disarmament. It took a series of initiatives for this purpose. 
Apart from taking the lead in 1954 for seeking a ban on nuclear 
weapon tests, India was one of the leading countries which 
moved the resolution in the General Assembly in the early 1960s 
for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. What India 
had in mind while taking this initiative was to prevent both 
vertical and horizontal proliferation. Unfortunately, the outcome 
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was far removed from the original purpose conceived by 
India. The NPT provided for the prevention of only horizontal 
proliferation. In 1982, India took the initiative for setting in 
motion negotiations for the adoption of a convention on the non-
use of nuclear weapons; and for a freeze on the production of 
weapon-grade fissile material. Finally in 1988 India submitted 
devoted to disarmament (SSODIII) a comprehensive plan for 
the elimination of nuclear weapons. This plan, which came to 
be known as the Rajiv Gandhi Action Plan, suggested the 
elimination of nuclear weapons. This in three stages by the year 
2012. It also suggested a freeze of collateral measures to 
facilitate the process of moving towards elimination as well as 
long-term measures for ushering in and sustaining a nuclear 
weapons free world. These initiatives did not elicit any positive 
response form the nuclear weapon powers. Through all the 
initiatives that India passed, the primary purpose was to rid the 
world of nuclear weapons. For India believed that this was the 
only framework in which it could avert threat to its security 
emanating from counthes armed with nuclear weapons. 
However, the nuclear weapon states remained adamant on their 
opposition to the elimination of nuclear weapons and on their 
insistence on the right to possess and use nuclear weapons.^^ 
Under these circumstances India tested five tests on may 11, 
13, 1998 and almost a year later, declared herself to be a state 
of nuclear weapon. Rather than a nuclear weapon state, by 
disclosing to the public its draft nuclear Doctrine. Even before 
the development of an operational Indian nuclear force, 
however, a doctrinal framework for it has been proposed. The 
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document proposing a Nuclear Doctrine for India is designed to 
stimulate informed discussion on the "credible minimum 
deterrent". India has decided to put in place to safeguard its 
strategic autonomy. The Nuclear Doctrine Group of the National 
Secunty Advisory Board prepared a draft after detailed 
discussions spread over several months. This consensus draft 
a consensus document of the entire National Security Advisory 
Board. It is now for the Strategic Policy Group, the National 
Security Council and then the Cabinet to approve, or reject the 
document. 
The Draft Nuclear Doctrine (DND) formulated by the National 
Secunty Advisory Board and released for public debate by the 
departing Vajpayee government in August 1999, is a remarkable 
documents (National Security Advisory Board 1999). Not only 
has it in simple, clear language brought together very divergent 
views on the controversial issue of nuclear policy, it has shifted 
the intellectual level of debate, so heated in the aftermath of 
Pokhran-ll, from the polemical to the thoughtful.^^ 
The preamble to the DND asserts the primacy of economic and 
social development, for which the prerequisites are a stable, 
peaceful world and autonomy of national decision-making. 
These, however, are threatened by the continuing existence of 
nuclear weapons, which are legitimized by the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Enumerating its objectives, the DND 
calls for "credible minimum deterrence" based on a capacity for 
"punitive retaliation with nuclear weapons to inflict damage 
unacceptable to the (nuclear) aggressor". For this, the 
90 
requirements are "sufficient, survivable and operationally 
prepared nuclear forces", organization, and the will to employ 
nuclear weapons should deterrence fail. The document 
proclaims no-first-use of nuclear weapons as a central tenet, as 
well as non-use against countries which are not nuclear and are 
not allied with nuclear powers. Robust conventional forces are 
considered necessary in order to raise the nuclear threshold. 
The DND envisages a triad of air, land and sea-based delivery 
systems whose "survivability will be enhanced by a combination 
of multiple redundant systems, mobility, dispersion and 
deception". It distinguished between an unspecified "peacetime 
deployment" and a shift to "fully employable forces" in the event 
of a conflict arising. There is an emphasis on credibility - "any 
adversary must know that Indian can and will retaliate" - and on 
effectiveness based on "reliability, timeliness, accuracy and 
weight of attack". The DND goes on to outline the requirements 
for command and control, security and safety, and research and 
development, and concludes by focusing on disarmament and 
arms control.^^ 
The answer to question that why India adopted this nuclear 
policy at the time it was adopted are many. Among the multiple 
factors that causes every states decisions to acquire or forge 
nuclear weapons, the three most important considerations 
involve national security, international status and domestic 
politics. 
In terms of national security, India's development of nuclear 
weapons has been driven primarily by concerns about China. 
India and China have been natural competitors in Asia since 
they emerged as modern; Post-colonial states in the late 1940's 
Both are ancient civilizations with extraordinarily rich cultures. 
Both were re-born in the first half of the 20*^  century via 
nationalist moments that inspired millions of people around the 
world. After regaining their independence, India and China 
pursuit starkly different Political-economic development paths, 
which in turn provided competing models for scores of newly 
independent Third world states. When assessing their countries 
status in the hierarchy of nations, post-independence Indian 
decision-makers have reflexibly cast their gaze at China for 
purposes of comparison. What they see often displeases them. 
Despite early expressions of neighborly solidarity Sine Indian 
relations soured in the late 1950's. In 1962, China trounced India 
in a border war, whose underlying territorial disputes remain 
unresolved today. It is nearly impossible to over estimate the 
impact of the China war on a people who drive enormous pride 
from their Gandhian legacy of non-violence. The national 
security roots of India's nuclear weapon program lie in 1962 
defeat and in China's 1964 nuclear explosive test. The 
program's fundamental raison d'etre is to deter another attack by 
China, which while considered highly unlikely, cannot be entirely 
ruled out by any Indian leader. 
As for as the issue of India's (New Dehli's) international status is 
concerned, the China factors still dominates the scene. Between 
the first Chinese nuclear test of 1964 and the first Indian test of 
1974, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) entered into 
force in 1970. The NPT affectively created a club of legitimate' 
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NWS whose membership was frozen at five, with China being 
the last one, on the basis of the country's conducting nuclear 
test before the enforcement of the NPT when the door to the 
nuclear club slammed shut in 1970, India found itself on the 
outside, consigned to being either a nuclear 'have not' or an 
'illegitimate' NWS. soon there after, several events enhanced 
China's international stature. In July 1971 U S. President 
Richard Nixon announced to travel to Biejing to began the 
process of normalizing U.S. relations with China. In Oct. 1971, 
China's seat at the U.N. and its permanent seat on the Security 
Council were given to Beijing. Indian leaders noted both the 
symbolic bestowal of great power status on China and the fact 
that the membership lists of the Security Council and the nuclear 
club were now identical. India's 1974 nuclear blast followed soon 
after. 
The India Government's policy papers that was submitted 
Parliament two weeks after the 1998 nuclear tests, reads, "India 
is a NWS. This is a reality that can not be denied. It is not a 
conferment that we seek; nor is it a status for others to grant. It 
is an endowment to the nation by our scientists and engineers. 
It is India's due, the right of one-sixth of human-kind". This 
shows that India wants to be treated as an important country, at 
least as important as China. For that purpose, Indian leaders 
and strategists believe that nuclear weapons remain a key 
indicator of state power.^ Therefore, the only choice left with 
India was to update and validate the papability that had 
demonstrated 24 years ago in the nuclear test of 1974 
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The third important consideration that relates to the factor of 
domestic politics is the time frame i.e. 1998. After 24 years of 
restraint, it was the BJP leader who during the 1998 election 
campaign said, The BJP rejects the notion of nuclear 
apartheid' and will actively opposed attempts to impose a huge 
monistic nuclear regime. We will not be dedicated to by 
anybody in matters of security and in the exercise of the nuclear 
option. Therefore, in order to fulfill its election promises, and to 
the extent of the BJP government took this decision, also, to 
convey the Indian voters that this government is much more 
than the earlier governments.^^ 
Prime Minister Mr. P. V. Narsimha Rao's candour is particularly 
significant in the aftermath of the indefinite extension of the 
N.P.T. with his interview, India has asserted that it is a nuclear 
weapon capable power, unencumbered by the NPT. 
India's resumption of nuclear testing and its admiration of 
French Government's, announcement of the latters. Intention to 
conduct nuclear test because France regards nuclear weapons 
as being necessary for its security even though it has no 
adversary, nuclear or non- nuclear. 
By contrast India is in the unenviable position of having two 
nuclear-armied neighbors with both of whom it had fought wars 
in the past. We find that Prime .Minister Rao's statement has an 
element of extraordinary restraint. He has spoken of India's 
disinclination to make a bomb even though it could do so readily. 
This is in sharp contrast to the policies adopted by other seven 
nuclear weapon and nuclear weapon -capable nations. Having 
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came this far, India should unilaterally declare a no-first use of 
its nuclear capability. India had proposed a mutual renunciation 
of first use in the past only to have Pakistan rejected it. A 
unilateral declaration on no-first-use will not only be a diplomatic 
coup for India but will also help it to gain in moral stature.^^ 
One of the immediate causes for the release of a Draft Nuclear 
Doctrine in August, 1999 in the after math of the nuclear blasts 
May1998) is to derive maximum electoral advantage. The 
Vajpayee Government was in a caretaker capacity having lost its 
majority in the lower house of Indian parliament and a new 
election had already been called for Oct. 1999. Another view 
might suggest that the nuclear doctrine was formulated only 
to formalize BJP's nuclear policy declared after the nuclear 
tests were conducted in may 1998. Yet another view might be 
to legitimize India's nuclear weapons through the formulation of 
DND arising out of "the reciprocal fear of surprise attack".^^ 
A Critical assessment of India's D.N.D by Pakistan Foreign 
Minister is that it is the latest manifestation of India's ambition of 
regional hegemony and global major power: the same pursuit. 
The Indian nuclear doctrine outlines New Delhi's goal of 
acquiring massive nuclear war fighting capabilities. Such a 
massive program for developing nuclear arsenal coupled with 
plans for acquiring a massive conventional capability will surely 
have near and long term strategic implications for the region and 
beyond as well as for regional and global non-proliferation 
concerns. The scale of the nuclear weapons capability 
envisaged by the doctrine is clearly not designed to maintain 
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"credible deterrence" against Pakistan which has made 
proposals for nuclear and missile restraint in the region. Nor can 
this capability be meant for nuclear deterrence against China. 
According to authoritative sources India is planning up to 400 
operationally deployed warheads. For a minimum credible 
deterrence India does not need to deploy such a large nuclear 
arsenal. These can be justified only by larger ambitions for 
military hegemony and control sea lanes from the oil rich Gulf in 
the West to the Straits of Malacca in the East. Accordingly, the 
world needs to comprehend the near and long term implications 
of India's nuclear capability. India's plans for the development of 
a vast conventional force coupled with a large nuclear arsenal 
are aimed at building an offensive rather than a defensive 
military capability. The objective is assertion and consolidation of 
influence, based on the premise that nuclear weapons are, in 
the words of Jasawant Singh, the currency of power and force. 
There are near term implications for initiatives aimed at nuclear 
restraints and avoidance of a nuclear arms race in South Asia. 
Pakistan had believed that nuclear deterrence could be 
exercised by Pakistan and India at the lowest possible level.^^ 
Nonetheless, in the 1990s,Indian strategists and a few 
politicians began seriously to question the adequacy of the 
"option" strategy and non weaponized deterrence. The nuclear 
non-proliferation Treaty was extended indefinitely in 1995, 
perpetuating the possession of nuclear weapons by the United 
States, Russia Britain France and China for the indefinite future, 
while denying the rest of the world these weapons. This 
outraged Indian specialists and the attentive public, prompting 
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rethinking of India's own nuclear policy. Some Indian military 
and non governmental strategists had long ago decided that the 
country should deploy nuclear weapons. For them, the 
developments in the mid 1990s offered another political 
opportunity to make their case. True believers in nuclear 
disarmament had been driven from effective power by 1998 or 
had been disillusioned by the failure of the major powers to 
pursue nuclear disarmament even after the cold war's end. 
Cynics who had used complaints about inadequate progress in 
nuclear disarmament to cover India's ongoing nuclear weapons 
and ballistic missiles program wanted to lift the veil. The 
strategic enclave had run out of patience. After twenty-four years 
of self restraint, the May 1998 nuclear test reflected all of these 
changes.^^ 
Assuming that states such as India make decision according to 
realist models and are driven primarily by national security 
imperatives. Western theorists and policymakers expect that 
India should build and deploy a nuclear arsenal of sufficient 
quantity and operational quality to ensure that it could withstand 
an adversary's first strike and retaliate with enough nuclear 
force to end a war on India's terms. Indeed, according to these 
theories India should have built, deployed, and operationally 
fine-tuned such a survivable second strike arsenal long ago. 
Domestic factors, including moral and political norms, have been 
more significant in determining India's nuclear policy. Often, 
tensions between domestic interests have made this policy 
appear ambivalent and ambiguous. India has been torn between 
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a moral antagonism towards the production of weapons of mass 
destruction, on one hand, and on the other an ambition to be 
regarded as major power in the world where the recognized 
great powers rely on nuclear weapons for security and prestige. 
India's domestic imperative to foster socio-economic 
development has clashed with an interest in building up military 
strength. India's policy making processes and institutions also 
have affected its nuclear history: Indian political leaders and the 
leading scientists have consciously excluded the military from 
nuclear decision making, again for internal reasons.^ ® 
Indian officials stated that security compulsions from China 
compelled the nuclear tests of May 1998. However, Indian 
diplomacy in 1999 and 2000 suggested that brandishing nuclear 
strength was meant to serve more protean purposes. Nuclear 
prowess gave the Vajpayee Government confidence and 
domestic political credit to invest in diplomacy to establish the 
Pakistan front as was attempted at Lahore. Nuclear 
assertiveness created new found respect for India in 
Washington, as Indians, saw it. India's growing importance also 
drew the heads of state from France, Germany, Japan and the 
United Kingdom to meet with Vajpayee. China was a more 
delicate challenge; India approached it with less-self assurance 
than it displayed toward its other interlocutors.^° 
The May 11 and 13 tests do not give India the minimum nuclear 
deterrence it intends to acquire. In order to acquire such a 
deterrence it would be necessary for India to fabricate more 
nuclear weapons, and to test and produce the Agni missile, both 
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of its proven range as well as of the improved range. In addition, 
it will also become necessary for India to deploy its nuclear 
weapons and put in place the command, control and intelligence 
system, and define its new security strategy. All these may take 
a minimum of two to five years or may be even longer. It is, 
therefore, premature to declare ourselves as a nuclear weapon 
state now.^ ^ 
Credible minimum deterrence is a dynamic concept which will 
have to be related to the evolving capabilities of possible 
adversaries. Some commentators have assumed that this could 
entail an open-ended arms race. But it is not necessary for the 
operation of nuclear deterrence that warheads should be 
matched with warheads and missiles with missiles. A credible 
retaliatory nuclear force can be maintained without entering into 
a competitive spiral of arms. In order, however, to raise the 
threshold of outbreak of conventional military conflict as well as 
threat or use of nuclear weapons by an adversary, highly 
effective conventional military capabilities will have to be 
maintained.'"^ 
The credibility and effectiveness of the Indian nuclear deterrent 
will be based on the manifest capability to inflict unacceptable 
punishment on an adversary if it uses nuclear weapons against 
India and its forces. Some commentators have assumed that 
unacceptable punishment is similar to "assured destruction" 
quantified by former U.S. Defence Secretary Robert McNamara. 
According to his definition, it meant ability to destroy 
approximately half of the former Soviet Union's industrial 
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capacity and one-fifth to one-fourth of its population. All this 
appeared scientific and precise; but basically assured 
destruction was a budgetary device for rejecting the excessive 
demands of the American armed forces.^^ 
Minister for External Affairs Jaswant Singh has written "that the 
country's national security, in a world of nuclear proliferation, lies 
either in global disarmament or in exercise of the principle of 
equal and legitimate security." The question arises: how does 
signing the CTBT - which, incidentally, is opaque about what 
exactly it is supposed to be banning - help either the cause of 
disarmament or that of equal and legitimate security? And, 
considering the realities of power, why does anybody in 
government think that it would? The fact is it would be foolish for 
India not to utilize the hiatus between now and when CTBT is 
finally sealed and ratified by all parties, to resume nuclear 
testing and to proceed apace with designing a variety of nuclear 
weapons. '^^  
All this must be weighed against the situation India had 
confronted in May-June 1998. An angry and shaken United 
States imposed wide-ranging sanctions against India. Japan, 
India's largest donor, cut off all new assistance and put a freeze 
on high level contacts. The G-8 industrialized nations joined the 
United States in blocking multilateral lending to India. China 
reacted with venom against India's identification of Beijing as the 
principal factor in its decision to test. The diplomatically active 
Anglo-Saxon nations, Australia and Canada led the charge 
against "a deviant India" in various multilateral forums.^^ 
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Following the Pakistani tests at the end of May 1998, the five 
Permanent Members of the United nations Security Council (the 
P-5) issued a statement in early June condemning the nuclear 
tests and linking them to the Kashmir dispute. They followed 
through with the United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1172, that called on India and Pakistan to desist from nuclear 
and missile programs, called on the two countries to join the 
NPT and referred to the Kashmir dispute as the under-lying 
cause of insecurity in the Subcontinent. This was followed by a 
Sino-U.S. joint statement on non-proliferation in South Asia, 
during President Clinton's visit to China in June 1998. In short, 
India was confronted with a terrible scenario of international 
economic sanctions, a basis for UN activism to coerce India into 
joining the NPT, the internationalization of the Kashmir dispute, 
and a Sino-U.S. collusion against India. New Delhi has 
successfully fended off these dangers that appeared so 
imminent in mid-1998. India's gains since then are a 
consequence of fundamental changes in both the substance of 
India's nuclear policy as well as the style of India's diplomacy. 
The following is an examination of the key principles that have 
helped India cope with the post-Pokhran diplomatic challenges. 
The greatest transformation in Indian diplomacy has been the 
shift from a radical posturing on the nuclear issue to a readiness 
to bargain. Never before has India the kind of deal-making it has 
over the last year and a half with the United States on the 
nuclear issue. For the Americans, bargaining comes naturally; 
they have no problem in splitting the difference between two 
divergent positions. Making deals and accommodation of 
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divergent principles is part of American political life. Liberals and 
conservatives, internationalists and isolationists, the religious 
right and social radicals have no problem coexisting in the same 
political party. Externally the focus of Amencan diplomacy is on 
"problem solving" on a pragmatic basis. 
In diplomacy, a great power often strives hard to prevent a 
particular event from happening. Once the event takes place, 
and there is no way of undoing it, the wisest course is to limit the 
damage, adapt to the new reality, and move on. For many years, 
the United States has worked overtime to stop India from 
becoming an overt nuclear weapon power. But within a month of 
India declaring itself a nuclear state, the United States began a 
process of engaging India, with the implied sense that the 
outcome would be less than "pure" from the American non-
proliferation point of view. 
Yet in the wake of its nuclear tests, India understood that it has 
to work hard to limit the political damage from Pokhran-ll and 
find a basis to revive relations with the major powers. After it 
completed the series of five tests, India announced that it was 
ready to consider signing the CTBT, join the negotiations on the 
Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty that limits the production of 
material for nuclear weapons, and reasserted its commitment to 
prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Given the 
fact that Indian had opposed with such vehemence these very 
same ideas in the recent past, the turn around in New Delhi's 
policy was nothing less than dramatic. The focus of India's 
diplomacy since then has been a willingness to negotiate 
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adherence to internationally binding obligations such as the 
CTBT in return for other political and technological gains. From 
being a "perpetual dissident" against the global nuclear order, 
India, now having converted herself into a nuclear weapons 
power, was now eager to deal. Having shed its nuclear 
ideological virginity, India will never again be the same.^^ 
Even as the United States makes its adjustments, India too has 
begun to concede that it had tended to demonise the NPT 
system in the past. There is a recognition in New Delhi, that 
India too has a stake in the preservation of the rules to prevent 
the spread of weapons of mass destruction. India is now 
replacing its old rhetoric against the NPT, with a more 
sophisticated position that calls for accommodation of India's 
own nuclear security interests in return for supporting the global 
non-proliferation rules. Unlike in the past India is now willing to 
see that the NPT, CTBT and other non-proliferation regimes 
have strong international support and declare that it has no 
desire to overturn them. 
Thus it has been anticipated by the Indian policy makers that in 
the future India should brace for a very difficult period. During 
this period, the pursuit of many of Indian foreign policy goals, 
including that of trying to become a permanent member of the 
Security Council, will have to be suspended. India can expect to 
remain outside the mainstream of the disarmament dialogue and 
international affairs in general. Its relations with countries whose 
nuclear hegemony India have challenged, will continue to 
remain strained. This is particularly true of China because, like 
all other nuclear weapon powers, it not only sees a challenge to 
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the status quo which suits it ideally, but also it sees a direct 
challenge to its dominance in Asia. Much of the deterioration 
that has taken place in India's relations with China should have 
been anticipated when we decided to move towards acquihng a 
nuclear deterrence. These are the inevitable consequences of 
India upsetting the world nuclear order of which China is a part. 
This would have happened even if there would have been no 
reference to the Chinese threat in the letter the Prime Minister of 
India addressed to President Clinton and some other Heads of 
Governments. This, however, does not exonerate India from the 
fundamental diplomatic responsibility of weighing her words 
carefully and not having said things which unnecessarily 
annoyed China.^ '^  
It is not necessary that India's attempt to acquire a minimum 
nuclear deterrence will lead to a nuclear arms race between 
India and Pakistan or between India and China. There has, in 
fact, been no nuclear arm race in the post-Word War period 
except that between the United States and the then Soviet 
Union. Other countries like UK, France, China and Israel also 
built their nuclear deterrence in the meantime. The size of their 
deterrence was not determined by any arms race which they 
had with their rivals but by their respective notions of what was 
adequate for their security in the circumstances in which they 
were placed and what would give them a really effective voice in 
the world affairs. Herald Macmillan, the former British Prime 
Minister had said that Britain acquired nuclear weapons to "eat 
at the high table". President de Gaulle's ambition was to have an 
adequate forc-ed-frappe (in short a deterrence) for the glory and 
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prestige to France. China has only about 600 warheads as 
opposed to thousands in the arsenals of Russia and USA. This 
country has less than 20 long-range missiles (ICBM) which can 
strike at targets in the United States. Given these facts, there is 
no reason why India cannot have a nuclear deterrence of the 
size determined by the threat to its security and by other 
circumstances, including the economic burden that has to be 
borne. 
It is also not necessary for a country to have a second strike 
capability against its superior rival. China has in its arsenal a few 
missiles that can hit targets in the United States but they do not 
constitute a second strike capability against the United States, 
nor against the Soviet Union. Similarly, it is not necessary for 
India to have a second strike capability against China. 
Therefore, it is not necessary for India to enter into a nuclear 
arms race against China. And Pakistan has the same 
compulsion as India for not getting involved in a nuclear arms 
race.^^ 
India decided not to be a party to the CTBT in 1996 because it 
thought that it might have to carry out a few nuclear weapon 
tests in the interest of its security. This principal purpose seems 
to have been served with the recent tests and the determination 
by Indian scientists that this is all that is needed to develop a 
minimum nuclear deterrence. India's second objection was that 
the CTBTs "Entry into Force" clause was an infringement of her 
sovereignty in that it obliged India to sign a treaty which she had 
publicly declared to be repugnant to our security interests. But 
once India decide to sign the treaty, this objection will no longer 
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remain valid. India's third objection was the CTBT was 
discriminatory because it permitted certain tests - laboratory and 
sub critical-which only a few nuclear weapons states were 
capable of carrying out. But now that India's ability to conduct 
laboratory tests has been convincingly demonstrated and Indian 
scientists have claimed that they can carry out sub critical tests if 
needed, the treaty is no longer discriminatory against us.^ ^ 
One of the reasons the US and other nuclear powers are wary of 
India on the nuclear front, however, is that it was not party to 
any aspect of the international non-proliferation regime until 
1997, when it signed the Chemical Weapons Convention. 
Among the significant treaties it has not signed are the nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty. Thus India has a very limited safeguards agreement with 
the IAEA, which does not cover any of its nuclear research 
facilities. That is why after its test in 1998 the US was hard put to 
find any multilateral mechanism through which to sanction 
lndia.^° 
India's biggest regret, in the present controversy, however, is the 
awkward timing of the accusation, which virtually seeks to put 
Indian scientists at par with Pakistan's rogue scientists. India is 
going all out to ensure that the NSSP initiative is invested with 
some real substance and at least the US department of 
Commerce has claimed that things are going very well in 
bilateral relations. When an Indian journalist wrote in editorial, 
claiming that the NSSP was devoid of any real substance. 
Matthew S. Borman, deputy assistant secretary for export 
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administration, US Department of Commerce, wrote a lengthy 
rejoinder to counter the claim. 
On its part, India is determined to persuade the US that its 
project of spreading democracy requires that it develop special 
ties with democratic countries and shuns dictatorships such as 
Pakistan, even if it needs to use them for a while in some 
project. The US, in according "major non-NATO ally" status to 
Pakistan recently, has drawn criticism in India. 
The recent and the first meeting between Indian Prime Minister 
Manmohan Singh and Bush had also appeared to have gone 
well. The new United Progressive Alliance government is in any 
case keen to demonstrate that it has been able to maintain the 
forward momentum created by the previous government in 
developing close strategic ties with the US despite the sanctions 
imposed after the 1998 Pokhran II nuclear tests. 
New Delhi is hoping that the present controversy will soon blow 
away and the countries will be able to get down to business as 
usual in the shortest possible time. But there is also 
apprehension that the inexplicable and totally unfounded 
accusation may be a precursor to reimposition or further 
tightening of the sanctions regime promulgated after the nuclear 
tests of 1998. These sanctions had been removed primarily 
because they had to be removed in the case of Pakistan, which 
became a close US ally after September 11, and the US could 
not be seen to be treating the two newly proclaimed nuclear 
weapons states differently. In any case, the US has persisted 
with treating India and Pakistan at per with each other, a hyphen 
that Indian has long resented.^^ 
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CHAPTEE - IV 
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CHAPTER = IV 
PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR POLICY 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was the founder of Pakistan's Nuclear 
Program, initially as Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural 
Resources, and later as President and Prime Minister; which 
earned him to give the title by his own people as Quaid-e -
Awam (Leder of the People). Pakistan's nuclear program was 
launched in earnest shortly after the loss of East Pakistan in the 
1971 war with India, when Bhutto initiated a program to develop 
nuclear weapons with a meeting of physicists and engineers at 
Multan in January 1972.In 1974 India successfully tested a 
nuclear "device". Momentum for the program was provided by 
this Indian nuclear test operation, called the 'Smiling Buddha'. 
Bhutto reacted strongly to this test and said Pakistan must 
develop its own "nuclear capability". Regarding the program he 
said; 
"We will defend our country using any means necessary and 
build a nuclear capability second to none. We will eat grass 
for 1000 years, if we iiave to, but we will get there. "^ 
In fact, Pakistan's emphasis on opacity and its rejection of a no-
first use doctrine reflects its concerns about conventional 
inferiority vis-a-vis India. Nuclear opacity and nuclear weapons 
capability are regarded as means of deterring conventional war. 
Senior officials have implied that Pakistan could resort to nuclear 
use in the event of an Indian attack, conventional or nuclear, on 
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its territory. However, Pakistan refuses to officially define its 
nuclear threshold even as it rejects nuclear first use. While a 
nuclear no first use policy was a luxury for Pakistan, a 
participant pointed out India would likely reverse its no-first use 
posture during a military conflict. In any case India has already 
revised that policy to cover other unconventional attacks by 
weapons of mass destruction on Indian troops within or outside 
Indian territory.^ 
Pakistan's nuclear program is based primarily on highly enriched 
uranium (HEU), which is produced at the A.Q. Khan Research 
Laboratory at Kahuta, a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment 
facility. The kahuta facility has been in use since the early 
1980s. By the early 1990s, Kahuta had an estimated 3,000 
centrifuges in operation, and Pakistan continued its pursuit 
expanded uranium enrichment capabilities.^ 
In the 1990s Pakistan began to pursue plutonium production 
capabilities. With Chinese assistance, Pakistan built the 40 MWt 
(megawatt thermal) Khusab research reactor at Joharabad, and 
in April 1998, Pakistan announced that the reactor was 
operational. According to public statement made by US officials, 
this un safeguarded heavy water reactor can produce up to 8 to 
10 kilograms of plutonium per year. According the Wikipedia's 
Plutonium article this is sufficient for one nuclear weapon. The 
reactor could also produce tritium if it were loaded with lithium-6, 
although this is unnecessary for weapons purposes because 
modern nuclear weapon designs ude Li6 directly. According to J. 
Cirincione of Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 
Khusab's pllutonium prokuction capacity could allow Pakistan to 
develop lighter nuclear warheads that warheads that would be 
easier to deliver with ballistic missile. 
Plutonium separation reportedly takes place at the New Labs 
reprocessing plant next to Pakistan's Institute of Nuclear 
Science and Technology (Pinstech) in Rawalpindi and at the 
larger Chasma nuclear power plant, neither of which are subject 
to IAEA inspection."^ 
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) estimates that 
Pakistan has built 24-48 HEU- based nuclear warheads with 
HEU reserves for 30-52assitional warheads. The US Navy 
Center for Contemporary Conflict that Pakistan possesses 
between a low of 35 and a high off 95 nuclear warheads, with a 
median of 60. 
Pakistan's nuclear warheads are based on an implosion design 
that uses a solid core of highly enriched uranium and requires 
an estimated 15-20kg of material per warhead. The NRDC also 
thinks that Pakistan has also produced a small but unknown 
quantity of weapons trade plutonium, which is sufficient for an 
estimated 3-5 nuclear weapons per annum based on the 
estimation of 5kg of plunonium per warhead. Pakistan also 
claims that the fissile cores are stored separately fro the other 
non-nuclear explosive packages, which Islamabad says, can be 
put together rather quickly.^ 
In the past, the People's Republic of China played a major role 
in the development of Pakistan's nuclear infrastructure, 
especially when increasingly stringent export controls in western 
countries made it difficult for Pakistan to acquire matenals and 
technology elsewhere. According to a 2001. Department of 
Defense repot, China has supplied Pakistan with nuclear 
materials and expertise and has provided critical assistance in 
the construction of Pakistan's nuclear facilities.® 
As a result of the meeting, the program was initiated by Bhutto 
himself. He enacted a long-standing personal agenda executed 
at the earliest opportunity he had. A proper study of this program 
thus must trace the history of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto himself, and his 
developing interest in the nuclear option for Pakistan. 
By that time Pakistan had already initiated a national nuclear 
program a relatively early date, though later than India. The 
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) was set up in 
1956 so that it could participate in the Atoms for Peace program 
announced by the Eisenhower administration, but development 
was slow in its early years. '^ 
Things began to pick up in 1960. The nuclear program acquired 
a new patron- the Minister of Mineral and Natural Resources, 
named Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In 1960 Dr. Ishrat H. Usmani was 
appointed Chairman of the PAEC. Usmani would be responsible 
for setting in motion many of the critical programs and 
institutions that would later give Pakistan nuclear weapons. 
Usmani started Pinstech (full name variously given as the 
Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Sciences and Technology, and the 
Pakistan Institute of Science and Technology) and the Karachi 
Nuclear Power Point. One of Usmani's most momentous 
achievement is said to be the training program under which 
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brilliant young Pakistanis wee selected and sent for training 
abroad. Between 1960 and 1967 some six hundred were 
selected of whom 106 eventually returned with doctorate 
degrees.^ 
Also in 1960 in US gave Pakistan a $350,000 grant to help 
prepare Pakistan for its first research reactor which the United 
Stated agreed to supply two years later. This reactor, a 5 MW 
high-water research reactor known as the Pakistan Atomic 
Research Reactor (PARR-I), began operating in 1965 at 
Pinstech in Nilore. 
In 1963 Bhutto became Foreign Minister, carrying his interest in 
nuclear capabilities into office with him. He watched with 
growing concern as China moved closer to nuclear capability, 
and in response India's domestic rhetonc on the subject grew 
more bellicose. 
Bhutto elaborated his views on anti-colonialism and the future of 
Pakistan in his book The Myth of Independence, finished in 1967 
and published in 1969. One of the these of the book was the 
necessity for Pakistan to acquire nuclear weapons to be able to 
stand against the industrialized states, and against a nuclear 
armed India. 
But Bhutto did not have the means to put his views into practice 
then. That would have to wait until he became Prime Minister, 
which he became on 20 December 1971, 3 days after the end of 
the Bangladesh War. 
The 1971 war had been a crushing defeat for Pakistan, which 
had lost more than half its population. Despite the close 
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relationship with China that had developed over the previous 
decade, Chinese support for Pakistan during the most extreme 
crisis of F^akistan's existence came to nought. China failed to 
provide any significant assistance for Pakistan, such as applying 
pressure on India's border. 
Bhutto had been concerned with India's pursuit of the "nuclear 
option" for several years, and this was the first opportunity he 
had to put his declaration of 1965 into effect. A key motivation 
for this program was concern over India's well known progress 
toward having its own nuclear option, and the public declarations 
by key leaders in India that they must acquire nuclear arms. 
Years later, after India's 1974 nuclear test, when Pakistan's 
nuclear program became public knowledge persistent attempts 
were made to paint the weapons program as a response to the 
test. It was a response to India's developing nuclear challenge, 
but not to the Pokhran test per se. To the extent that it was a 
response to a specific event, it was a response to India's 
conventional arms superiority as manifested in its victory during 
the Bangladesh War. 
The Bangladesh War also helped create a relationship between 
Pakistan and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(DPRK) or "North Korea" which would later help Pakistan 
considerably in acquiring delivery systems for its nuclear arsenal 
in the 90s.^ 
During mid-1971 Bhutto approached North Korea in an effort to 
obtain critically needed weapons. An agreement was quickly 
reached and on 18 September 1971 the first arms shipment 
from the DPRK arrived in Karachi. On 9 November 1972, only 
one day after withdrawing from SEATO, Pakistan announced 
that it was establishing formal diplomatic relations with the 
DPRK. Military assistance to Pakistan continued through the 
later 1970s, with the DPRK providing artillery, multiple rocket 
launchers, ammunition, and a variety of spare parts. 
India's first nuclear test, known variously as "Smiling Budha", the 
PNE (for "Peaceful Nuclear Explosive"), and most recently 
Pokhran-I, occurred on 18 May 1974. It provided an additional 
stimulus to the Pakistani weapons program, which had made 
little headway up to that point. Bhutto increased the funding for 
the program after the Indian test, but since arrangements to 
secure lavish funding had been underway for more than a year 
this would have occurred anyway. One consequence of test was 
ironically to hamper Pakistan's program as the test sharply 
escalated international attention to proliferation and led to 
increased restrictions on nuclear exports to all nations, not just 
India. Over the next three years, these restrictions would change 
the entire course of the Pakistani nuclear program. °^ 
Pakistani work on weapons design began ever before the start 
of work on uranium enrichment, under the auspices of the 
PAEC. In March 1974, Munir Ahmad Khan called a meeting to 
initiate work on an atomic bomb. Among those attending the 
meeting were of Hafeez Qureshi, head of the Radiation and 
Isotope Applications Division (RIAD) at Pinstech, Dr. Abdus 
Salam, then Adviser for Science and Technology to the 
Government of Pakistan and Dr. Riaz-ud-Din, Member 
(Technical), PAEC. The PAEC Chairman informed Qureshi that 
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he was to work on a project of national importance with another 
expert, Dr. Zaman Sheikh, then working with the Defence 
Science and Technology Organization (DESTO). The word 
"bomb" was ^never used in the meeting but qureshi exactly 
understood the objective. Their task would be to develop the 
design of a weapons implosion system.^^ 
Pakistan has laid down scenarios under which it may use 
nuclear weapons as a last resort - if its survival is threatened by 
India not only military but by strangling its economy or stopping 
access to shared water resources, says a new report by Italian 
nuclear physicists who visited the country recently.^^ 
Pakistan has the capability to make both plutonium and highly 
enriched uranium (HEU), or "fissile materials," for nuclear 
weapons. Its main uranium enrichment facilities are at the A.Q. 
Khan Research Laboratories at Kahuta. Pakistan also has 
another newer enrichment facility near Wah that the US 
government calls the Godwal uranium enrichment plant. It may 
have other production scale facilities. Pakistan also operators 
smaller enrichment facilities, including the Sihala and Goira 
ultracen. 
Pakistan possesses a capability to make weapons. Pakistan 
operators the Khushab reactor, which is estimated to generate 
about 50 megawatts of power, large enough to produce 
plutonium for few nuclear weapons per year. Separation of the 
Plutonium is reported to occur at New Labs at Rawalpindi, 
located near Islamabad. This plant, next to the Pakistan Institute 
of Nuclear Science and Technology (Pinestech), is large enough 
to handle all the irradiated fuel from the Khushab reactor.^^ 
General Zia-ul-Haq rose to power in the 1977 military coup. It 
was during has 11 year tenure that Pakistan became a nuclear 
power and defined a coherent nuclear strategy. 
There was a widespread recognition that nuclear were 
Pakistan's only viable deterrence against an Indian conventional 
onslaught. Some strategists even urged the recapture of 
Kashmir under a nuclear umbrella. Zia became committed to the 
nuclear option as a last resort instrument to save Pakistan "with 
whole world against him," an argument made by Agha Shahi, 
then the Foreign Minister. 
Moreover, Zia saw in the acquisition of nuclear weapons a key 
instrument to break Pakistan's isolation and transform it into the 
leader of the rejuvenating Muslim World. In July 1978 he 
outlined his perception: "China, India, the USSR, and Israel in 
the Middle East posses the atomic arm. No Muslim country has 
any. If Pakistan had such a weapons, it would reinforce the 
power of the Muslim World."'"'^  
Pakistan had nuclear weapons potential in 1987, and 
operational nuclear weapons since 1988. At first, Pakistan stuck 
with Zia's doctrine of relying on nuclear weapons as the last 
resort key to Pakistan's survival against India and the USSR. 
However, at the same time, Zia-ul-Haq's pan-Islamic world view 
was expressed in the willingness to facilitate and expedite other 
Islamic, primarily Iran's, nuclear weapons program, but not at 
the expense of, or as part of, Pakistan's own strategic weapons 
programs. It was through its close cooperation with Iran, that 
Pakistan also assisted other radical states including Libya and 
North Korea. 
Soon afterwards, Pakistan began a game of brinkmanship 
through the escalation of border clashes in the Siachen Glacier 
area and in Kashmir. Pakistani active support for the Islamist 
insurgency in Kashmir increased markedly. The near-war 
appearance of a major Indian military exercise not far from the 
Pakistani border startled and Pakistani High Command, 
reminding them of the possibility of massive Indian reaction to 
the Pakistani provocations. At the same time, the border clashes 
and the insertion of terrorists into Indian Kashmir continued to 
escalate. 
Islamabad then decided to prevent an Indian retaliation by 
invoking the nuclear card. As tension grew and war seemed 
inevitable, Pakistan hastily assembled at least one nuclear 
weapons during the nose-to-nose confrontation with India in 
1990. This led to a hasty intervention by the US and other 
Western powers, pressuring both New Delhi and Islamabad not 
to escalate their confrontation. The new Pakistani nuclear 
strategy proved successful. Thus, the crisis of 1990 was a 
watershed event in Pakistan's national strategy. Nuclear 
weapons were no longer considered merely a trip-wire of last 
resort in case of a major invasion of the country, nuclear 
weapons now became a key to Islamabad's assertive strategy of 
escalation of the struggle in Kashmir under a nuclear umbrella 
restraining Indian retaliation.^^ 
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In 1991, Islamabad considered the New World Order advocated 
by the US, and especially in the call for non-proliferation, a 
strategic threat to its independence. "The New World Order does 
not allow any country in the Third World except the American 
surrogates to posses nuclear weapons. "Fully aware that no 
single country can confront the US on its own, Islamabad 
stressed the growing significance of nuclear and military 
cooperation with other radicals as a profound issues of 
confrontation with the US. Islamabad acknowledged that "the 
People's Republic of China and North Korea have been... 
supplying Iran, Pakistan and other Muslim countries with 
medium-range missiles and nuclear technology for peaceful 
purpose." This cooperation now served as the source of strength 
for Islamabad defiance against US pressures, for any alternative 
would be detrimental to the future of Islam. "If Pakistan 
surrenders before the Americans now with respect to the nuclear 
programme, there will be no limit for such a surrender; because 
the Americans endeavor to demolish Pakistan's military power 
and make her a banana republic so that the Muslim World 
should be enslaved by the US-imposed world order." 
It was in the context of strategic perception that the Pakistani 
military nuclear capabilities were finally admitted officially. On 21 
October 1991, Pakistan, for long a known yet not acknowledged 
nuclear power, crossed the line and created a precedent. In a 
Karachi meeting. Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of the 
Pakistani bomb, officially acknowledged that Pakistan was a 
nuclear power. "It is a fact that Pakistan has become a nuclear 
power and is at present concentrating on manufacturing 
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sophisticated arms to fulfill its requirements, "Dr. Khan stated 
Subsequently, the nuclear factor has become a clear and critical 
factor in the Pakistani national strategy, especially vis-a-vis India 
and the US ^^ 
Despite several halfhearted and not convincing denials by senior 
Pakistani officials that Pakistan has nuclear weapons, in early 
1995 the extent of the Pakistani military nuclear effort and 
capabilities were being clarified. By now, 1994-95, Pakistan had 
between 15 and 25 nuclear weapons, each about 20kt strong. 
Some of these weapons are fully operational and the rest stored 
in parts. Some of these disassembled nuclear weapons would 
require only several hours of assembly to become fully 
operational. 
These weapons are small enough for delivery by Pakistan's 
known platforms - F- 16 fighter-bombers and M-11 ballistic 
missile. The main storage and maintenance site of the Pakistani 
nuclear weapons, particularly the weapons at a 'screwdriver 
level.' Is located at the ordnance complex in Wah—a top secret 
and exceptionally guarded facility, Pakistan's final assembly and 
arming, forward operational storage, and weapons loading 
installations and located in the Chagai air Base. The Pakistanis 
also maintain a forward weapons' storage site at Sargodha Air 
Base or air deliverable weapons. However, it is not clear 
whether operational weapons are being kept there permanently. 
Further more, the Pakistani weapons production infrastructure 
reached maturity. In early 1995, the annual production capacity 
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was estimated at between six and twelve nuclear weapons, 
each about 20 kt strong.^^ 
Further more, Pakistan is running an elaborate program of 
acquisition of nuclear materials and technologies via the 
Russian, especially Chechen, Mafiya. Presently, these 
widespread acquisition efforts from western and eastern Europe, 
as well as the former Soviet Union, already, contribute to 
shortcuts, acceleration, and expediting of the emergence of a 
second generation of Pakistani nuclear weapons. Their main 
contribution, however, is in the development of a solid 
production capacity for the Pakistani advanced nuclear weapons 
in the next decade. 
Meanwhile, the nuclear strategy of Mrs. Bhutto's Pakistan was 
being refined and better defined. Islamabad was now convinced 
that only nuclear deterrence can prevent an Indian offensive 
from defeating the Pakistani Army. In June 1995, sources close 
to Mrs. Bhutto stressed the centrality of the nuclear component 
to Pakistan's overall war-fighting capabilities: "Only in the 
presence of a nuclear deterrent can the Pakistani Army feel 
strong and stable. Confronting India with conventional weapons, 
especially when these weapons have been provided by a 
superpower like the United States, would not only be difficult, but 
would be tantamount to inviting danger as well." 
Presently, Pakistan's highest priority is the acquisition of the 
latest aircraft the PRC can offer. The first program is the swift 
acquisition of FC-1 fighters as replacement not only or the 
ageing F-6s and F-7s, but also for the F-16s in fighter missions. 
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A joint Chinese-Pakistani program, the FC-1 is primarily a high 
performance fighter. Islamabad believes that having large 
numbers of FC-1s in service will free the remaining F-16s deep 
strike missions, including with nuclear weapons should the need 
arise. The FC-1 is expected to become operational before 
2000.^^ 
Nuclear optimists supports opacity on the grounds that declared 
thresholds and redlines undermine operational flexibility and 
increase nuclear risks during crises. Proponents of opacity also 
argued that transparency only works in the absence of conflict 
and with at least a semblance of communications between 
nuclear adversaries. Absent these preconditions, as in the case 
of India and Pakistan, transparency can be counterproductive. In 
any case, nuclear doctrines are often misleading and at variance 
with operational plans. By keeping deterrence vague and by 
avoiding explication of red lines, Pakistan can also avoid a 
nuclear arms race with India and keep its weapons un-deployed. 
This nuclear restraint, reflected in Pakistan's policy of minimum 
nuclear deterrence, has helped to buttress nuclear crisis stability 
in South Asia. ^ ^ 
In fact, Pakistan's emphasis on opacity and its rejection of a no-
first use doctrine reflects its concerns about conventional 
inferiority vis-a-vis India. Nuclear opacity and nuclear weapons 
capability are regarded as means of deterring conventional war. 
Senior official have implied that Pakistan could resort to nuclear 
use in the event on an Indian attack, conventional or nuclear, on 
its territory. However, Pakistan refuses to officially define its 
nuclear threshold even as it rejects nuclear first use. While a 
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nuclear no first use policy was a luxury for Pakistan, a 
participant pointed out India would likely reverse its no-first use 
posture during a military conflict. In any case India has already 
revised that policy to cover other unconventional attacks by 
weapons of mass destruction on Indian troops within or outside 
Indian territory.^° 
Pakistan does not abide by a no-first use doctrine, as evidenced 
by President Pervez Musharraf's statement in May, 2002. 
Musharraf that and Pakistan did not want a conflict with India but 
that if it came to war between the nuclear armed rivals, he would 
"respond with full might." These statements were interpreted to 
mean that if pressed by an overwhelming conventional attack 
from India, Pakistan might use its nuclear weapons. Aside from 
these public declarations, Pakistan has not issued an official 
nuclear doctrine. There has also been criticism of Pakistan's 
nuclear doctrine which gives rise to ambiguity and that they were 
too eager to use the nuclear option in the Kargil War when the 
Pakistan Army was facing a stern challenge due to loss of posts 
and personnel.^^ 
The organization authorized to make decisions about Pakistan's 
nuclear posturing in the National Command Authority (NCA) 
established in February 2000. The NCA is composed of two 
committees that advise President Musharraf on the development 
and employment of nuclear weapons; it is also responsible for 
wartime command and control. In 2001, Pakistan further 
consolidated its nuclear infrastructure by placing the Khan 
Research Laboratories and the Pakistan Atomic Research 
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Corporation under the control on of one Nuclear Defense 
Complex.^^ 
Concerns were also voiced that the post-11 September 
international environment has adversely affected nuclear 
deterrence in South Asia, both in terms of the evolution of 
terrorism and the ways in which India reacts and mobilizes its 
forces. Regardless of divergent assessments of nuclear 
deterrence stability, there was consensus that India-Pakistan 
chses could keep on recurring because of the linkage between 
political disputes and military strategies. Divergent Indian and 
Pakistani policies towards Kashmir and attempts to challenge 
the status quo increase the risk of war. Nuclear capability is here 
to stay in South Asia, said a participant, but its is embedded in 
and must be detached from India and Pakistan's political 
relationship. If Pakistan continues with its efforts to compel India 
to negotiate on Kashmir through sub-conventional warfare, 
increasing costs might compel India to respond militarily. Indian 
and Pakistani attitudes towards nuclear weapons are maturing, 
noted another, but they don't have the luxury of a long 
maturation process to ensure that nuclear weapons are never 
used. A more optimistic participant believed that nuclear 
weapons capabilities might have made conflict resolution more 
difficult, but nuclear deterrence has facilitated conflict 
prevention.^^ 
Indian and Pakistani officials have repeatedly assured the 
international community that their nuclear assets are not 
threatened because of secure command and control systems 
and foolproof safeguards of fissile matenals and warheads. 
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While many participants expressed concerns about accidental or 
inadvertent use, they also believed that existing nuclear 
safeguards and Material Protection Control and Accounting 
(MPC and A) could adequately protect India and Pakistan's 
nuclear assets. Hence, they resisted suggestions that Pakistan 
and India adopt a broader, cooperative approach to threat 
reduction. Apart from cooperation in best practices, these 
suggestions included a bilateral India-Pakistan dialogue on 
nuclear risk reduction; utilizing IAEA practices in civilian facilities 
under full-scope safeguards and transferring that knowledge to 
military installations; learning from precedents, particularly in the 
Russian-US context; and benefiting from non-intrusive measures 
such as transfers of security technologies through turn-key kits, 
as in the case of the US-Russian relationship. US supplied kits 
are installed by Russia, eliminating the need for physical 
intrusion by the US government, companies and experts. Some 
exchanges of best safeguard practices are already underway 
with the US. These include track two activities such as visits to 
US facilities like the Cooperative Monitoring Center at Sandia 
National Laboratories.^"* 
Some participants defended the robustness of Pakistani 
command and control. Since a National Command and Control 
authority was well in place, they argued, the dangers of 
accidental, unauthorized, or inadvertent use were minimal. 
However, even nuclear optimists admitted that false warning and 
panic launchings could pose a threat, particularty at time of 
crises. Deterrence stability will be ensured, said participant, if 
both sides are reasonably sure that their nuclear assets are 
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survivable; if they do not use them as instruments of coercion; 
and if they do not panic in case of a false alarm. The importance 
of non-deployment, knowledge of mutual capabilities and 
effective signaling of intentions, particularly during crises, were 
added to this list of nuclear 'dos'. Others, however, warned that 
poor intelligence and weak, insecure command and control 
structures and centralized command increased pressures for 
dispersal and delegation to commanders in the field, and hence 
heightened risks of unauthorized or inadvertent use. While there 
was unanimity about the importance of good intelligence to 
prevent war by miscalculation, a participant advocated a 
technical dialogue between India and Pakistan warning about 
the poor quality of intelligence.^^ 
India and Pakistan were warned that their nuclear weapons do 
not ensure security since they have little grounds for confidence 
in their first strike capability; they were reminded of the nuclear 
risks that the United States and the Soviet Union confronted 
during the height of the Cold War, and that the US and Russia 
still face such risks despite technologically superior nuclear risk 
reduction mechanisms and procedures. The importance of 
pursuing the goal of nuclear disarmament through Article VI of 
the NPT was also emphasized in response to a comment that a 
South Asian nuclear rollback was not in the cards. An alternative 
proposal to the NPT regime was presented. Under the aegis of 
the UN Security Council, all nuclear weapons states would 
commit themselves to a time-bound process of nuclear 
disarmament; non-nuclear states would not be permitted to 
acquire nuclear weapons; failure to comply would result in 
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inspections; and a failure to comply would be countered by UN 
Security Council authorized use offeree. 
129 
References 
1. Pakistan and weapons of mass destruction 
http://en/wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakistan and weapons 
of mass destruction 
2. Ibid 
3. Ibid 
4. Ibid 
5. Ibid 
6. Ibid 
7. Gary Sublette; Pakistan's Nuclear weapons Program. The 
Beginning 
http://72.14.207.104/search?q+cache:v8EtuBOzlKcJ 
: nuclearweaponarchieve.org/pakistan/Pak 
Origin.html+shl=en&gl=in &ct.. 
8. Ibid 
9. Ibid 
10. Ibid 
11. Ibid 
12. Nadeem Iqbai; Economic threat May Push Pak to Nukes-
FReport, common Dreams Nes Centre, Published on 
F-eb4,2002 by the Inter Press service.http://www 
13. David Albright; "Securing Pakistan's Nuclear weapons 
Complex, ISIS Oct.25-27,2001 http://www.isis-
online.orq/pubcations/terrorism/stanlev paper.html 
130 
14. Bobansky, Yossef; Pakistan's Nuclear Brink manship. 
http://www.freeman.Org/m online/bodanslky/ 
pakistan.htm 
15. ibid 
16. Ibid 
17. Ibid 
18. Ibid 
19. Pugwash Meeting no.280,pugwash workshop Report by 
Samina Ahamd Pugwash online. Avoiding an India 
Pakistan Nuclear Confrontation, Lahore, 
Pakistan, 11-12 march 2003 
http://www.puqwash.orq/reports/re/sa/march2003/pa 
kistan2003-workshop-report. htm 
20. Ibid 
21. Pakistan and weapons of mass destruction. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pakisatn and weapons 
of mass destruction 
22. Ibid 
23. Pugwash meeting no 280, op.cit. 
24. Ibid 
25. Ibid 
26. Ibid 
ConcCusion 
CONCLUSION 
'We live in an age of nuclear giants and ethical infants. We 
lie in a world that has achieved bhiliance without wisdom, 
power without conscience. We've unlocked the mysteries of 
the atom and forgotten the lessons of the Sermon on the 
Mount. We know more about war than we know about 
peace, more about killing than we know about living." 
Omar Bradley 
Nuclear deterrence overwhelmingly dominated the Cold War 
calculus of international security. Nuclear weapons dictated a 
requirement for instant readiness for war fighting that continues 
to this day. EEven though Presidents Ronald Reagan and Mikhail 
Gorbachev agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must 
never be fought, thousands of nuclear weapons remain on hair-
trigger alert. 
Despite their best efforts the supporters of the concept of 
nuclear deterrence cannot prove that nuclear weapons 
preserved the peace in Europe or elsewhere in the world. What 
can be claimed though is that they played a supporting role in 
preserving the peace. Nor can supporters of deterrence prove 
that the many crises during the Cold War were resolved or 
contained primarily by the threat of nuclear war. The history of 
the Cold War is replete with compelling evidence of the 
pernicious effects of the open-ended quest for nuclear 
deterrence, as shown by Professors Janice Stein and Richard 
Ned Lebow in a study entitled We All Lost the Cold War 
In today's post - Cold War World, defining national security 
merely, or primarily, in military terms conveys a false sense of 
reality. Nearly half a century of Cold War fashioned the issue of 
secunty into powerful conventional simplifications that are no 
longer valid. Unfortunately, many of these traditional and out 
moded concepts retain great currency amongst certain security 
analysts and defense planners, and the dominance of military 
and strategic considerations in the conduct of international 
relations endures as a legacy of the Cold War. While stability 
was and continues correctly to be of prime strategic importance 
in a transforming world its pursuit by some influential countries 
places exaggerated emphasis upon nuclear weapons and 
military concepts that are presumed still to lie at its core. 
In a post-Cold War world, the political value of nuclear weapons 
has declined markedly rendering them, more a liability than an 
asset. Despite the changed political climate and the window of 
opportunity to restructure international relations away from 
reliance on nuclear weapons, many influential thinkers and 
military planners in the United States, NATO, the Russian 
Federation and in some other countries still believe in the 
integrity of nuclear deterrence- i.e. that stability and security 
would necessarily be jeopardized in the absence of nuclear 
deterrence. Such deeply embedded beliefs are extraordinary 
resistant to new thinking or to change. They also reflect the 
reluctance of national security planners in the NWS to conceive 
of a security architecture that does not rely on nuclear arms.^ 
Nuclear weapons are held by a handful of states which insist 
that these weapons provide unique security benefits, and yet 
reserve uniquely to themselves the right to own them. This 
situation is highly discriminatory and thus unstable, it cannot be 
sustained. The possession of nuclear weapons by some states 
is a constant stimulus to other states to acquire them... a centra! 
reality is that nuclear weapons diminish the security of all states. 
Following decades of a costly East - West arms race, the late 
1980s witnessed the beginning of a hopeful new era in nuclear 
arms reductions with the negotiation of the 1987 Intermediate -
and shorter - Range Nuclear Force (ING)Treaty. START I in 
July 1991 and parallel unilateral cuts in American and Soviet 
sub- strategic nuclear weapons a few months alter; moratona on 
nuclear weapon testing initiated in October 1990 by the then -
Soviet Union and followed by the United states in 1992; 
renunciation of "inherited" (Soviet stationed) nuclear weapons by 
Belarus Kazakhstan and Ukraine START II in January 1993; 
indefinite extension of the nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
in 1995 establishment of nuclear- weapon-free zones (NWFZs) 
in South -East Asia in December 1995 and in Africa in April 
1996, and conclusion of a Comprehensive nuclear - Test -Ban 
Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996. The ending of the Cold War 
and its associated winding down of the nuclear and conventional 
confrontation between East and West raised hopes of finally 
moving towards prohibition of biological, chemical and nuclear 
weapons. 
But in the aftermath of the Cold War several factors intervened 
to dampen hopes and bring into question the resolve to achieve 
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nuclear reductions and to implement fully a number of 
negotiated arms control agreements. The bilateral START I 
process has been at a standstill, entry into force of the CTBT 
remains at best a remote possibility, testing and deployment of 
missile defence systems threaten the integnty of the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty.^ 
Attempts have been made to make peaceful uses of atomic and 
nuclear energy. For this purpose Nuclear materials declared 
surplus to military requirements by the USA and Russia are now 
being converted into fuel for commercial nuclear reactors. The 
main material is highly enriched uranium (HEU), containing at 
least 20% uranium- 235 (U-235) and usually about 90% U-235. 
HEU can be blended down with uranium containing low levels of 
U-235 to produce low enriched uranium (LEU), typically less 
than 5% U-235, fuel for power reactors. It is blended with 
depleted uranium (mostly U-238), natural uranium (0.7% U-235), 
or partially-enriched uranium. 
Highly-enriched uranium in US and Russian weapons and other 
military stockpiles amounts to about 2000 tonnes, equivalent to 
about twelve times annual world mine production. 
World stockpiles of weapons-grade plutonium are reported to be 
some 260 tonnes, which if used in mixed oxide fuel in 
conventional reactors would be equivalent to a little over one 
year's world uranium production. Military plutonium can blended 
with uranium oxide to form mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. 
After LEU or MOX is burned in power reactors, the spent fuel is 
not suitable for weapons manufacture. 
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Commitments by the US and Russia to convert nuclear weapons 
into fuel for electricity production is known as the Megatons to 
Megawatts program. 
Surplus weapons-grade HEU resulting from the various 
disarmament agreements led in 1993 to an agreement between 
the US and Russia governments. Under this Russia is to convert 
500 tonnes of HEU from warheads and military stockpiles 
(equivalent to around 20,000 bombs) to LEU to be brought by 
the USA for use in civil nuclear reactors. 
In the short term most US military HEU is likely to be blended 
down to 20% U-235, then stored. In this form it is not usable for 
weapons.^ 
Disarmament will also give rise to some 150-200 tonnes of 
weapons-grade plutonium (Pu). Weapons-grade plutonium has 
over 93% of the fissile isotope, Pu-239, and can be used, like 
reactor-grade Pu, in fuel for electricity production. Options for its 
disposal include: 
• Immobilization with high-level waste-treating plutonium as 
waste, 
• Fabrication with uranium oxide as MOX fuel for burning in 
existing rectors, 
• Fuelling fast-neutron reactors. 
At the NPTREC, Vice-President Al Gore, and later at the 
September 1996 signing of the CTBT, President Bill Clinton 
committed the United States to promote non-proliferation and 
disarmament ensures leading to the eventual prohibition of all 
nuclear weapons. The leaders of the other NWS made similar 
promises. On living up to these commitments, however, the 
record is mixed and there is a crying need for political 
leadership. 
Rational humans recognize that nuclear weapons are not 
sensible as they have no utility although they have the 
capacity to destroy civilization. Recognizing this, the Pugwash 
Conferences on Science and World Affairs, founded in 1957 by 
scientists who sought to build bridges between East and West 
and eventually to outlaw nuclear weapons, believe that if 
humankind acts rationally , sooner or later it will abolish nuclear 
weapons.^ Professor Jozef Rotblant, 1995, noble prize winner 
and President of Pugwash, is one of the distinguished scientist 
who believed that because of proliferation risks, mankind should 
give up nuclear power altogether. 
The evils of nuclear proliferation were visible in Europe, besides 
the two super powers. That's why Europe was the center of 
world politics through out the cold war period. The post cold war 
period witnessed the shift of world politics from Europe to Asia, 
specially South Asia. Because the Asia-Pacific is a region where 
increase in defense spending in real terms and the number and 
quality of the weapons being acquired have made it the fastest 
growing arms market in the world. It is also a region where 
security analysts have fundamental disagreements over the 
implications of the arms build up, where the level of 
transparency in military expenditures is so low that it is often 
impossible to relate the procurement process to a perceived 
set of military needs, and where all of this is taking place 
against a backdrop of uncertainty, vastly increased geo-strategic 
complexity and simmering disputes over sovereignty, territory 
and control of off shore resources. At the same time, it is also 
period of relative calm and of increasing national and regional 
confidence. In short, it is hard to imagine how the circumstances 
could be more propitious for the introduction of a little 
substantive "bite" into official efforts to strengthen peace and 
stability in the region. 
In the wake of the short-lived burst of multilateral mania that 
marked the end of the cold war, completely unrealistic demands 
were made of the United Nations by an international community 
unprepared to provide the material and political support 
necessary to sustain far more modest objectives. Now that the 
rose coloured glasses are gone, and with them the illusion that 
the United Nations can do everything there is a tendency to 
conclude that the United Nations can do nothing. A more 
measured analyses suggests a trend towards a new kind of 
burden sharing in which regional organization increasingly seek 
to equip themselves to find practical, workable solutions to 
regional problems which might become crisis requiring broader 
involvement if left unaddressed. ^ 
The may 1998 South Asian explosions marked the shift of world 
attention to this region, which comprises mostly, the states who 
had newly gained independence from the colonial power. 
The nuclear weapons states believe that they have a very great 
stake in the world nuclear order that they have built after more 
than half a century of determined efforts. They have 
accomplished this task on the one hand by developing new 
nuclear weapon systems, by building up massive arsenals of 
such weapons and by devising doctrines to justify their retention 
and use, and, on the other hand, by trying to convince the rest of 
the world that these weapons are safe in their hand but highly 
dangerous in the hand of other countries. They have coined and 
given wide currency to such phrases as "rogue" countries and 
"delinquent" nations to characterize those countries which aspire 
or attempt to acquire weapons of mass destruction/ 
For the first time since the end of the cold war, the war against 
Iraq, fought at least officially over the possession of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD); the standoff between India and 
Pakistan over Kashmir; the unresolved showdown on the 
Korean peninsula; and the efforts of transnational terrorist 
networks to manufacture or acquire such weapons - together, 
these dangerous crises mark the new nuclear age that has 
succeeded the US-Soviet Union confrontation of the post 1945 
era. 
The response of the United States to the new strategic 
environment has been formulated in two recent White House 
papers. The first paper, concerning the National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America (September 2002), 
marked the adoption of the pre-emptive strike doctrine: 'While 
the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the 
international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if 
necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by acting pre-
emptively against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing 
harm against our people and our country. 
The second paper, the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (December 2002), referred to the eventual 
recourse to a nuclear strategy: The United States will continue 
to make clear that it reserves the right to respond with 
overwhelming force- including through resort to all our options -
to the use of WMD against the United States, our forces abroad, 
and friends and allies'. The same report makes clear that pre-
emption does not replace deterrence. The question is, whether 
recourse to nuclear strategy would be lawful under these 
circumstances? 
In 1996, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) responded to 
two requests for advisory opinions, the first by the World Health 
Organization (WHO) and the second by the UN General 
Assembly, concerning the legality of the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons. The Court decided that it had no jurisdiction to answer 
the first request and gave an ambiguous answer to the second. 
The Court's opinion to the UN General Assembly stressed that 
there existed no universal rule of international law specifically 
authorizing or prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. It further 
stated that use, or threat of use, of nuclear weapons that 
contravenes the prohibition of the use of force and fails to meet 
all requirements of the right of self-defence is unlawful. The 
opinion also underlined that use of nuclear weapons should be 
compatible with international humanitarian law. So far, so 
predictable The further conclusions were wholly unexpected. 
In the last and fairly obscure part of the operative part of opinion, 
the Court stated that the threat or use of nuclear weapons 
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'would generally be contrary' to international humanitarian law; 
but 'in view of the current state of international law, and of the 
elements of fact at its disposal, the Court cannot conclude 
definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would 
be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-
defence, in which the very survival of a state would be at stake. 
'After 104 paragraphs of detailed technical legal analysis, the 
cardinal standpoint of the ICJ is that international law cannot 
guide the states' conduct during a nuclear crisis.8 
President Bush himself has admitted publicly that he doubts 
nuclear deterrence would work against what he rightly sees as 
the greatest threat to Americans: extremists armed with 
weapons of mass destruction. 
That is why his administration has adopted a policy of 
"preventive counter-proliferation" by all military means, including 
nuclear weapons. The drawback is that, in addition to being a 
contradiction in terms, it greatly increases the risk of nuclear 
weapons use, because the most likely proliferators are least 
likely to be deterred. 
For the foreseeable future, the type of pre-emptive war now 
entered into by the US and the UK deprives all forms of global 
arms control of credibility.. 
Once the Cold War nuclear confrontation between the USA and 
the Soviet Union was over, three major international treaties 
offered the promise of an end to nuclear arms proliferation - and 
even their eventual abolition. Two bilateral Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaties (START) of 1992-93 were followed by the 
extension of the multi-lateral Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 
1995 and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 1996 
(the latter still has to enter into force). Almost overnight, nuclear 
weapons lost their looming importance in the public eye. 
Consequently, a public debate on the role of nuclear weapons in 
foreign and security policy simply failed to occur. 
The NPT entered into force in 1970, and remains the 
cornerstone of global control over the proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. All but three member countries of the United Nations 
have not signed it (Israel), India and Pakistan). But many are 
uncomfortable with the treaty's 'two class' character, allowing 
some countries to keep their nuclear weapons while forbidding 
others to develop them. Perhaps we were lulled into a false 
sense of security when the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was 
extended in 1995. 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali, then UN-General Secretary, spoke of his 
hopes for a more just and sensible way to control nuclear 
weapons, not only with regard to the actual warheads but also to 
their delivery systems, and dual-use technology. To be fully 
effective such controls, he said, would have to be balanced and 
fair; should not hinder the peaceful use of science and 
technology; and should not split the world into 'haves' and 'have-
nots'. 
Controlling the spread of weapons of mass destruction is clearly 
dependent on designing and enforcing effective verification 
procedures for each of these treaties. If disarmament is to be 
taken seriously, effective monitoring and verification is essential. 
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This is as true for verification of post Cold War arms reductions 
as for ceasefire agreements. 
For historic reasons, International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) inspections have traditionally concentrated on the 
amount of materials available to build nuclear weapons rather 
than an evaluation of the danger of proliferation from each 
country. This system used to mean that over the years more 
than half of the IAEA's annual budget for routine inspections was 
spent in Germany, Japan and Canada, While countries in the 
Middle East or South Asia, for example, were less intensively 
inspected. However, this is changing. Since Iraq was found in 
violation of its NPT obligations, a strengthened system of 
safeguards has been progressively instituted, incorporating a 
new Additional Protocol to safeguard agreements. This will 
intensify verification. A program of integrated safeguards will 
attempt to rationalize them and put resources into the 
appropriate activities. 
Before we rush too quickly to accuse so-called 'rogue states' we 
need to consider that numerous states have been involved in 
trading material as well as know-how with counties like Iraq, 
enabling Saddam Hussein to develop his nuclear, chemical and 
biological capabilities. The main exporters were not North Korea, 
Iran, Syria, Libya or Cuba but Germany, France, Russia, the UK 
and the US, Spain, South Africa, Brazil and China. As there was 
no monitoring of this trade, Iraq's WMD program went unnoticed 
by the international community. The Nuclear Suppliers Group 
have long attempted to restrict the export of materials and 
technology to potential proliferators. But companies often 
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circumvent these attempts. Equipment is often genuinely dual 
use. 
However, if the IAEA and the conventions, or any other 
organization on their behalf, were to register the trade in arms 
and weapons-related materials (UNMOVIC could surely supply a 
list of what should be categorized as such), similar program 
elsewhere in the world could be detected much earlier. 
It is often argued that the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction is essentially a political problem. It is true that the 
struggle for power often drives proliferation, and that there is no 
reliable technical solution which ensures the total detection of 
weapon usable materials. It is also true that only measures in 
the political arena can end proliferation. But the scientific-
technological nature of the root of the problem should not be 
overlooked. Only too often, scientific-technological 
developments influence the possibilities of political power, 
mostly irreversibly. In the long term, deciding what to do about 
WMD proliferation also necessitate decisions about path of 
scientific-technological advance. 
The WMD proliferation problem will not be solved by short-term 
solutions. What is obvious is the need for a re-orientation of the 
technological determinants of our industrialized global culture. 
The civil-military ambivalence of many advanced research and 
development program needs to be addressed, and proposals for 
radically new research policies outlined which will safeguard 
against the commercial exploitation of weapons relevant 
technologies. 
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It seems this would only be workable if the current security 
paradigm of the western hemisphere was changed and 
deterrence replaced by cooperation. Only then is a long-term 
solution imaginable. Bearing in mind the political arena, with its 
many different players, their various ambitions, and the ongoing 
struggle for western domination . 
The case of biological weapons is probably the most difficult 
arms control verification challenge of all. This is one reason why 
the ban on biological weapons contained in the 1972 Biological 
Weapons Convention (BWC) does not have a verification 
system. Normally a total ban on a weapons is cast in terms of 
the spectrum of banned activities, ranging from research and 
development through to deployment and use. In the case of 
biological vi/eapons, several of the stages in the life cycle of the 
banned weapon are difficult to discern and therefore verity. The 
scientific data are often ambiguous. Attempts to verify the illicit 
research, development, production and stockpiling of biological 
weapon in the past have failed, in part because of these 
considerations. 
These difficulties were among those that led the United States to 
conclude that it could not support any form of verification system 
for the BWC and that it should therefore block agreement on the 
draft protocol to the treaty that was due to be agreed in 2001. 
The US claimed that it feared that intrusive verification would 
lead to a loss of commercial propriety information by its highly 
competitive and lucrative biotechnology industry, and that its bio-
defence program would be exposed to foreign espionage via 
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international on-site inspections and other monitoring and 
verification activities. 
Among the South Asian countries, there are 'good' as well as 
'bad' nukes. After the 1998 South Asian nuclear explosions, the 
official Indian nuclear dogma has maintained that India's nuclear 
weapons are 'good' nukes, the welcome fruit of decade of self 
reliant labor by Indian scientists and engineers and a symbol of 
India's scientific and technological strength. Nuclear 
weaponization is presented as necessity for the protection of 
the geo-political interests of a great nation that has finally found 
the will to become a world class power. 
On the other hand, Pakistan's nuclear weapons were always 
'bad', a technologically weak 'nations' upstart reaction to the 
legitimate ambitions of the regional super power. Worse still, 
Pakistan's bomb were, technologically speaking, mostly stolen 
goods and, politically, the product of an undemocratic, military -
ruled and theocratic state. Besides, Pakistan was recently under 
severe international pressure as the hidden story of Pakistan's 
nuclear exports to Libya , Iran and North Korea has slowly 
emerged, and the father of Pakistani bomb was forced to 
confess to the illegal marketing of nuclear technology. 
US approach in nuclear policy vis-a-vis India, from the days of 
the Strobe Talbott- Jaswant Singh talks to the present , little 
progress ahs been made in US approach towards India's 
nuclear policy. For both India and Pakistan, sanctions for 
withdrawn for reasons relating to the post 9/11 'war on terror' 
rather than any shift in the US nuclear policy. 
146 
Actually the demands on India for cooperation on the non 
proliferation front should cause even more concern than they did 
earlier. In the post 9/11, after the announcement of the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) in mid -2003 by the US, 
cooperation in non-proliferation has an entirely new meaning. 
The Bush-Vajpayee statement describing India and the US as 
'partners in controlling the proliferation of the weapons of mass 
destruction and the means to deliver them' needs to be parsed 
in the light of this new moves. 
Pakistan also acquires a significant place in US policy of South 
Asia the US needs Gen. Musharraf for a variety of purposes— 
including the pursuit of its objectives in Afghanistan. While 
offenng an exit from the corner that Gen. Musharraf finds 
himself in , Washington would like to extract as much as 
possible from the Pakistani leader on the nuclear question. That 
was the bargaining between Washington and Islamabad. It has 
been assumed that the US would want a full disclosure on the 
past proliferation activity of Dr Abdul Qadir Khan and the 
Pakistani establishment. That will be crucial in understanding the 
extent of the damage done by the onward proliferation from 
Pakistan 
It may be also possible that the Us would also like a credible 
set of actions from Gen. Musharraf that no future proliferation 
would take place from Pakistan . The out come of the US -
Pakistan bargain would be determine by variety of political 
factors. But whatever may be the result of this deal-making, it 
would have important implications for India. 
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India, on the other hand, strictly adhere to and cooperate with 
the non-proliferation initiatives. India shares the objective of 
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons despite the fact that it 
has state out side the MPT. 
India's record on non-proliferation has been a responsible one 
and its nuclear policies and programs can not be equated with 
those of irresponsible states. That would one of the reasons that 
USA and India reached on an agreement on July 18,2005 on 
nuclear matters. The agreement recognizes the India is a 
responsible state with advanced nuclear technology and that it 
should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such 
states. India has, in turn , agreed as a reciprocal measures to 
identify and separate Civilian and Military nuclear facilities and 
programs in a phased manner and file a declaration regarding 
the civilian facilities with the IAEA and placed them voluntarily 
under its safeguards. The Indian government has the right to 
decide which facilities and programs it would like to identify as 
'civilian' for the purpose of this agreement and therefore place 
under safeguards. 
The US President Bush has agreed to work with the US 
congress to adjust the US laws and policies to achieve full civil 
nuclear energy cooperation with India, and to work with its 
friends and allies in the Nuclear Supplier Group to enable full 
civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India. 
Besides, the Indo- US nuclear deal, the new post cold war US 
foreign policy owes much to "The Perfect for the New American 
Century" (PNAC), a Washington-based neo-conservative think 
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tank founded in 1997. PNAC was clear that the US must rule the 
world: "[the new world order] must have a secure foundation on 
unquestioned US military pre-eminence... The process of 
transformation is likely to be a long one, absent some 
catastrophic and catalyzing event like a new Pearl Harbor". That 
Pearl Harbor like event came on 11 September 2001. After 9/11 
there was no lack of spokesman for the American Empire. In 
unabashedly imperial language, Zbigniew Brzezinski, who 
initiated the anti-soviet jihad in Afghanistan, writes in his book 
The Grand Chessboard that the US should seek to "prevent 
collusion and maintain dependence among the vassals, keep 
thbutahes pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from 
coming together". 
Ralph Peters, an officer responsible for conceptualizing future 
welfare in the office of the deputy chief of staff for intelligence, 
in his book New Glory made it clear that for Expanding 
America's Global Supremacy, his country needs to fight: 
"We have entered an age of constant conflict. 
"We are entering a new American century, in which we will 
become still wealthier, culturally, more lethal, and increasingly 
powerful. We will excite hatreds without precedent. 
"There will be no peace. At any given moment for the rest of our 
life times, there will be multiple conflicts in mutuating forms 
around the globe. The de-facto role of the US armed forces will 
be to keep the world safe for our economy and open to our 
cultural assault. To those ends, we will do a fair amount of 
killing." 
ApvcndiTC^ 
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APPENDDC-A 
Number of Nuclear Tests Conducted by Six Countries till 
Signature of CTBT 
Year 
1945 
1946 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
United 
States 
1 
2 
0 
3 
0 
0 
16 
10 
11 
6 
18 
18 
32 
77 
0 
0 
10 
96 
USSR/ 
Russia 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
2 
0 
5 
10 
6 
9 
16 
34 
0 
0 
59 
79 
Great 
Britain 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
2 
0 
0 
6 
7 
5 
0 
0 
0 
2 
France 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
3 
2 
1 
China 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
India 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
Total 
1 
1 
1 
2 
0 
3 
1 
0 
18 
11 
18 
16 
24 
33 
55 
116 
0 
3 
71 
178 
150 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
47 
45 
38 
42 
56 
46 
39 
24 
27 
24 
22 
22 
20 
20 
19 
15 
14 
16 
18 
18 
18 
17 
14 
0 
9 
14 
17 
17 
19 
16 
23 
24 
17 
21 
19 
21 
24 
31 
31 
31 
24 
21 
19 
25 
27 
10 
0 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
1 
0 
2 
1 
3 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
3 
3 
4 
3 
5 
0 
8 
5 
4 
6 
9 
2 
5 
9 
11 
10 
12 
12 
10 
9 
8 
8 
8 
0 
1 
1 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
3 
1 
1 
0 
1 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
50 
60 
76 
64 
79 
67 
64 
53 
57 
48 
55 
44 
51 
5 
66 
58 
54 
50 
49 
55 
57 
36 
23 
151 
1987 
1988 
i 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
Total 
(%age) 
14 
15 
— 
11 
8 
7 
6 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1030 
(50.34) 
0 
23 
16 
7 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
715 
(34.94) 
1 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
0 
0 
0 
0 
45 
(2.2) 
8 
8 
8 
9 
6 
6 
0 
0 
5 
1 
210 
(10.27) 
1 
1 
0 
2 
0 
2 
1 
2 
2 
2 
45 
(2.2) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
(0.05) 
47 
40 
28 
18 
14 
8 
1 
2 
7 
3 
2046* 
(100) 
Source: Arms Control Association, Department of Energy 
National Resources, Defence Council, United States 
• This figure does not include two nuclear detonated over 
Japanese cities, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, during World War II 
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APPENDIX - B 
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS 
1930s initial research on nuclear fission technology 
1942 Manhattan Project starts 
1943 Quebec Agreement signed 
1945 First nuclear test by the USA Bombing on Hiroshima & 
Nagasaki Mc Mahon Bill/US Atomic Energy Act UN 
Atomic Energy Commission formed 
1946 Baruch Pain Floated 
1949 First nuclear test by the Soviet Union 
1952 First nuclear test by the Great Britain 
1953 Atoms for Peace proposal floated 
1954 Hydrogen Bomb testes by the USA Nuclear test ban 
proposal by India 
1957 International Atomic Energy Agency formed 
1958 EURATOM treaty signed 
1960 First nuclear test by France 
1961 UN 18 Nations Disarmament Committee formed 
1962 CTBT and LTBT proposed 
1963 PTBT signed 
1964 First nuclear test by PRC 
1965 UNENCC resolutions 
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AFPENDIX-C 
Press Release by Pakistan Foreign Office Spokesman 
Foreign Secretary's Statement on "India's Nuclear Doctrine: 
Implications for Regional and Global Peace and Security" at The 
Institute o Strategic Studies Islamabad 7-September 1999 
Quantification o Indian Nuclear Deployment: 
Estimates* Cost 
Estimates of Gen. Sudriji carried out (1985) 
Value at present day 
Estimates of K. Sburamatiyam (1984) (Cost of 20x 
Prithti, 20x Agni, 60x warheads, deployment costs, 
command & control system, safety measures 
Cost of Agni I & II Missiles 
Cost of Prithvi Missiles 
Cost of one atomic weapons R & D costs not 
included 
Rs. 7,000 crore 
($17 billion) 
Rs. 13,55 crore 
Rs. 10, 000 crore 
Rs. 20-35 crores 
per 
Rs. 8 crores per 
copy 
Rs. 8 crores per 
wea 
150 Weapons (60x Agni +40-60x Prithvi of air 
delivery + Command and Control + 3-4 Surveillance 
satellites + Communications & Reconnaissance 
systems 
Rs. 2,000-3,000 
crores 
Costs of operating, maintenance. Training of 
personnel to keep the nuclear arsenal in, high state 
of alert 
Rs. 2, 000-3,000 
crores 
Total costs of minimum credible deterrence (cost of 
nuclear submarines not included) 
Rs. 10, 000 crores 
Cost of 1 nuclear submarine (2-4 submarines 
required) 
Rs. 4,000-5,000 
crores 
Annual cost of minimum credible deterrence 
(minimal posture) 
Rs. 2,000-3,000 
crores 
Annual cost of minimum credible deterrence (with 
400 warheads) 
Rs. 5,000-7,000 
crores 
Source: The Indian Express; "A Price Tag to Deterrence Minimal, 
,54 
Credible and Nuclear by Vinod Anand, of August 23, 1999. 
Cost of 350-400 nuclear weapons (triad) 
In the worst case scenario of trade embargoes, 
international credit cut-offs & other punitive 
measures This cost is less than 6.7% of India's GNP 
If the economy grows @ 7% per annum till the year 
2030 
US $ 16 billion/Rs. 
700 billion 
10 times greater 
than the above 
estimate 
Total cost will be 
13.7% of the GNP 
Cost Estimates Published by The Nation, The News and Dawn of 
August 23, 1999. 
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